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25While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. These discussions have tended to focus on an extremely limited number of intuitively-identified paradigm examples concerning attempts to establish the reliability of a method of belief formation. Here, I seek to answer a prior analytical question about the nature of ep…Read more
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29When Is a Belief Formed in an Epistemically Circular Way?Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (3): 336-353. 2023.While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. These discussions have tended to focus on an extremely limited number of intuitively-identified paradigm examples concerning attempts to establish the reliability of a method of belief formation. Here, I seek to answer a prior analytical question about the nature of ep…Read more
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27Comments on Wilson’s “Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?”Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2): 23-26. 2017.
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18Comments on Morton’s “A Dilemma for Streetian Constructivism”Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2): 45-48. 2018.
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6Comments on Green’s “Metacognition as an Epistemic Virtue”Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (2): 21-22. 2019.
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2David Owens, Reason without Freedom: the problem of epistemic normativity (review)Philosophy in Review 22 (1): 63-66. 2002.
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18Comments on Tucker’s “Harman vs. Virtue Theory”Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2): 171-174. 2005.
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39Comments on Katerina Psaroudaki’s “Defending Conciliationism from Self-Defeat”Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2): 11-14. 2016.
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24Comments on Chad Bogosian’s “Impeccability, Consensus, and Trusting One’s Intuitions”Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2): 15-19. 2015.
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Should There Be a Moral Epistemology?Dissertation, The University of Arizona. 2002.What is moral epistemology? It is the attempt to construct a theory that explains whether and how moral beliefs are epistemically justified. This dissertation is an evaluation of this project. Should we develop a specialized, topic-specific epistemology that applies only to the domain of morality, or should we develop a perfectly general theory which can be applied to ethics as a special case? In chapter one, I argue that we should be very cautious about developing topic-specific epistemologies …Read more
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36A Critique of Two Criteria of Epistemically Circular BeliefSouthwest Philosophy Review 29 (1): 173-183. 2013.While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. Here, I discuss two possible accounts of when a belief is formed in an epistemically circular manner, arguing that both have serious problems, and should thus be rejected. Seeing where they founder points the way to a better attempt at a criterion of epistemically circ…Read more
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8Lehrer on Knowledge and CausationIn Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 63--74. 2003.
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46The Competing Practices Argument and Self-defeatEpisteme 2 (1): 13-24. 2005.Andy believes that p because his tarot cards indicate that p. Betty believes that ∼p because her crystal ball reveals that ∼p. If Andy and Betty know that they disagree, and disagree because they engage in different practices, is Andy's belief that p rational? The answer depends in part on whether Andy has good reasons to think that reading tarot cards is reliable about the topic while reading crystal balls is not. If a person has good reasons to believe that practice P1 is reliable while a comp…Read more
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18Review of J.l. Bermudez (eds.), Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (9). 2003.
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70Topical epistemologiesMetaphilosophy 38 (1). 2007.What is the point of developing an epistemology for a topic—for example, morality? When is it appropriate to develop the epistemology of a topic? For many topics—for example, the topic of socks—we see no need to develop a special epistemology. Under what conditions, then, does a topic deserve its own epistemology? I seek to answer these questions in this article. I provide a criterion for deciding when we are warranted in developing an epistemological theory for a topic. I briefly apply this cri…Read more
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13Justification-affording arguments and corresponding conditionalsGrazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1): 251-263. 2009.Intuitions about arguments are an important source of evidence in epistemology. In this paper, I consider a principle defended recently: Necessarily, an argument P therefore C is justification-affording for subject S only if S justifiably believes that if P, then C. Cling presents an argument for . is important because its truth is inconsistent with many plausible epistemological theories, including standard reliabilism and even some forms of internalist foundationalism. I will argue that non-sk…Read more
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24The concept of belief and evidentialism: A review of belief's own ethics by Jonathan Adler (review)Behavior and Philosophy 32 269-272. 2004.