•  5
    In their brilliant and thought-provoking book Recognizing Wrongs, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky offer a vindicatory interpretation of the law of torts. As part of this, they offer a justification for what they call the “principle of civil recourse.” This is the principle that “a person who enjoys a certain kind of legal right, and whose right has been violated by another, is entitled to enlist the state’s aid in enforcing that right, or to make demands in response to its violation, as agai…Read more
  •  19
    Why does duress undermine consent? 1
    Noûs 55 (2): 317-333. 2021.
  •  7
    The Grounds of the Disclosure Requirement for Informed Consent
    American Journal of Bioethics 21 (5): 68-70. 2021.
    In their important and insightful article, Joseph Millum and Danielle Bromwich distinguish two informational requirements for valid consent—the disclosure requirement and the understanding requirem...
  •  10
    with Michelle Madden Dempsey
    Ethics 131 (2): 207-209. 2020.
  •  22
    To develop a theoretical framework for drawing moral distinctions between instances of sexual misconduct, I defend the “Ameliorative View” of consent, according to which there are three possibiliti...
  •  81
    Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2): 441-461. 2021.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  152
    Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (2): 119-150. 2020.
    Philosophy & Public Affairs, EarlyView.
  •  54
    Disability as solidarity: political not (only) metaphysical
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1): 219-224. 2020.
  •  129
    Noûs, EarlyView.
  •  69
    Consent, Communication, and Abandonment
    Law and Philosophy 38 (4): 387-405. 2019.
    According to the Behavioral View of consent, consent must be expressed in behavior in order to release someone from a duty. By contrast, the Mental View of consent is that normatively efficacious consent is entirely mental. In previous work, I defended a version of the Behavioral View, according to which normatively efficacious ‘consent always requires public behavior, and this behavior must take the form of communication in the case of high-stakes consent’. In this essay, I respond to two argum…Read more
  •  221
    Deception and Consent
    In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent, Routledge. 2018.
  •  355
    Expecting the Unexpected
    Res Philosophica 92 (2): 301-321. 2015.
    In an influential paper, L. A. Paul argues that one cannot rationally decide whether to have children. In particular, she argues that such a decision is intractable for standard decision theory. Paul's central argument in this paper rests on the claim that becoming a parent is ``epistemically transformative''---prior to becoming a parent, it is impossible to know what being a parent is like. Paul argues that because parenting is epistemically transformative, one cannot estimate the values of the…Read more
  •  140
    Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (1): 90-112. 2018.
  •  90
    On Wrongs and Crimes : Does Consent Require Only an Attempt to Communicate?
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3): 409-423. 2019.
    In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros clarifies the debate about whether consent needs to be communicated by separating the question of whether consent requires expressive behaviour from the question of whether it requires “uptake” in the form of comprehension by the consent-receiver. Once this distinction is drawn, Tadros argues both that consent does not require uptake and that consent does not require expressive behaviour that provides evidence to the consent-receiver. As a result, Tadros takes…Read more
  •  181
    Vagueness and Indeterminacy in Metaethics
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 185-193. 2017.
    This chapter discusses vagueness in ethics.
  •  100
    Moral indeterminacy can be problematic: prospectively it can give rise to deliberative anguish, and retrospectively, it can leave us in a limbo as to what attitudes it is appropriate to form with respect to past actions with indeterminate moral status. These problems give us reason to resolve ethical indeterminacy. One mechanism for doing so involves the use of our normative powers to place obligations on ourselves and to waive our claims against others. This mechanism could operate through an e…Read more
  •  250
    Why Is There Female Under-Representation among Philosophy Majors?
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2. 2015.
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the percentage of…Read more
  •  480
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the percentage of…Read more
  •  273
    Future-Bias and Practical Reason
    Philosophers' Imprint 15. 2015.
    Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the …Read more
  •  457
    You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival of each stranger …Read more
  •  61
    Altruism and Ambition in the Dynamic Moral Life
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4): 716-729. 2017.
    Some people are such impressive altruists that they seem to us to already be doing more than enough. And yet they see themselves as compelled to do even more. Can our view be reconciled with theirs? Can a moderate view of beneficence's demands be made consistent with a requirement to be ambitiously altruistic? I argue that a reconciliation is possible if we adopt a dynamic view of beneficence, which addresses the pattern that our altruism is required to take over time. This frees up theoretical …Read more
  •  394
  •  526
    Fickle consent
    Philosophical Studies 167 (1): 25-40. 2014.
    Why is consent revocable? In other words, why must we respect someone's present dissent at the expense of her past consent? This essay argues against act-based explanations and in favor of a rule-based explanation. A rule prioritizing present consent will serve our interests the best, in light of our interests in having flexibility over our consent and in minimizing the possibility of error in people's judgments about whether we consent
  •  351
    On Whether To Prefer Pain to Pass
    Ethics 121 (3): 521-537. 2011.
    Most of us are “time-biased” in preferring pains to be past rather than future and pleasures to be future rather than past. However, it turns out that if you are risk averse and time-biased, then you can be turned into a “pain pump”—in order to insure yourself against misfortune, you will take a series of pills which leaves you with more pain and better off in no respect. Since this vulnerability seems rationally impermissible, while time-bias and risk aversion seem rationally permissible, we ar…Read more
  •  159
    The Burdens of Morality: Why Act‐Consequentialism Demands Too Little
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1): 82-85. 2016.
    A classic objection to act-consequentialism is that it is overdemanding: it requires agents to bear too many costs for the sake of promoting the impersonal good. I develop the complementary objection that act-consequentialism is underdemanding: it fails to acknowledge that agents have moral reasons to bear certain costs themselves, even when it would be impersonally better for others to bear these costs.
  •  663
    Agent-neutral deontology
    Philosophical Studies 163 (2): 527-537. 2013.
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequ…Read more
  •  218
    Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.
  •  12947
    Sex, Lies, and Consent
    Ethics 123 (4): 717-744. 2013.
    How wrong is it to deceive someone into sex by lying, say, about one's profession? The answer is seriously wrong when the liar's actual profession would be a deal breaker for the victim of the deception: this deception vitiates the victim's sexual consent, and it is seriously wrong to have sex with someone while lacking his or her consent.
  •  975
    Vague Value
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2): 352-372. 2014.
    You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations