•  1
    Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (edited book)
    with J. Walls
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
  •  37
    The Scope of Consent
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
    The scope of someone's consent is the range of actions that they permit by giving consent. The Scope of Consent investigates the under-explored question of which normative principle governs the scope of consent. To answer this question, the book's investigation involves taking a stance on what constitutes consent. By appealing to the idea that someone can justify their behaviour by appealing to another person's consent, Dougherty defends the view that consent consists in behaviour that expresses…Read more
  •  91
    Social constraints on sexual consent
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (4): 393-414. 2022.
    Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 393-414, November 2022. Sometimes, people consent to sex because they face social constraints. For example, someone may agree to sex because they believe that it would be rude to refuse. I defend a consent-centric analysis of these encounters. This analysis connects constraints from social contexts with constraints imposed by persons e.g. coercion. It results in my endorsing what I call the “Constraint Principle.” According to this princ…Read more
  •  23
    In their brilliant and thought-provoking book Recognizing Wrongs, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky offer a vindicatory interpretation of the law of torts. As part of this, they offer a justification for what they call the “principle of civil recourse.” This is the principle that “a person who enjoys a certain kind of legal right, and whose right has been violated by another, is entitled to enlist the state’s aid in enforcing that right, or to make demands in response to its violation, as agai…Read more
  •  44
    Why does duress undermine consent? 1
    Noûs 55 (2): 317-333. 2021.
    In this essay, I discuss why consent is invalidated by duress that involves attaching penalties to someone's refusal to give consent. At the heart of my explanation is the Complaint Principle. This principle specifies that consent is defeasibly invalid when the consent results from someone conditionally imposing a penalty on the consent‐giver's refusal to give the consent, such that the consent‐giver has a legitimate complaint against this imposition focused on how it is affects their incentives…Read more
  •  41
    The Grounds of the Disclosure Requirement for Informed Consent
    American Journal of Bioethics 21 (5): 68-70. 2021.
    In their important and insightful article, Joseph Millum and Danielle Bromwich distinguish two informational requirements for valid consent—the disclosure requirement and the understanding requirem...
  •  20
    Introduction
    with Michelle Madden Dempsey
    Ethics 131 (2): 207-209. 2021.
  •  77
    To develop a theoretical framework for drawing moral distinctions between instances of sexual misconduct, I defend the “Ameliorative View” of consent, according to which there are three possibilities for what effect, if any, consent has: “fully valid consent” eliminates a wronging, “fully invalid consent” has no normative effect, and “partially valid consent” has an ameliorative effect on a wronging in the respect that it makes the wronging less grave. I motivate the view by proposing a solution…Read more
  •  479
    Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2): 441-461. 2020.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 2, Page 441-461, September 2021.
  •  765
    Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (2): 119-150. 2020.
    Philosophy & Public Affairs, EarlyView.
  •  454
    Disability as solidarity: political not (only) metaphysical
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1): 219-224. 2020.
  •  709
    Why does duress undermine consent?1
    Noûs 55 (2): 317-333. 2019.
    In this essay, I discuss why consent is invalidated by duress that involves attaching penalties to someone's refusal to give consent. At the heart of my explanation is the Complaint Principle. This principle specifies that consent is defeasibly invalid when the consent results from someone conditionally imposing a penalty on the consent‐giver's refusal to give the consent, such that the consent‐giver has a legitimate complaint against this imposition focused on how it is affects their incentives…Read more
  •  294
    Consent, Communication, and Abandonment
    Law and Philosophy 38 (4): 387-405. 2019.
    According to the Behavioral View of consent, consent must be expressed in behavior in order to release someone from a duty. By contrast, the Mental View of consent is that normatively efficacious consent is entirely mental. In previous work, I defended a version of the Behavioral View, according to which normatively efficacious ‘consent always requires public behavior, and this behavior must take the form of communication in the case of high-stakes consent’. In this essay, I respond to two argum…Read more
  •  539
    Deception and Consent
    In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent, Routledge. 2018.
  •  647
    Expecting the Unexpected
    Res Philosophica 92 (2): 301-321. 2015.
    In an influential paper, L. A. Paul argues that one cannot rationally decide whether to have children. In particular, she argues that such a decision is intractable for standard decision theory. Paul's central argument in this paper rests on the claim that becoming a parent is ``epistemically transformative''---prior to becoming a parent, it is impossible to know what being a parent is like. Paul argues that because parenting is epistemically transformative, one cannot estimate the values of the…Read more
  •  435
  •  288
    On Wrongs and Crimes : Does Consent Require Only an Attempt to Communicate?
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3): 409-423. 2019.
    In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros clarifies the debate about whether consent needs to be communicated by separating the question of whether consent requires expressive behaviour from the question of whether it requires “uptake” in the form of comprehension by the consent-receiver. Once this distinction is drawn, Tadros argues both that consent does not require uptake and that consent does not require expressive behaviour that provides evidence to the consent-receiver. As a result, Tadros takes…Read more
  •  386
    Vagueness and Indeterminacy in Metaethics
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 185-193. 2017.
    This chapter discusses vagueness in ethics.
  •  361
    The Burdens of Morality: Why Act‐Consequentialism Demands Too Little
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1): 82-85. 2016.
    A classic objection to act-consequentialism is that it is overdemanding: it requires agents to bear too many costs for the sake of promoting the impersonal good. I develop the complementary objection that act-consequentialism is underdemanding: it fails to acknowledge that agents have moral reasons to bear certain costs themselves, even when it would be impersonally better for others to bear these costs.
  •  1157
    Agent-neutral deontology
    Philosophical Studies 163 (2): 527-537. 2013.
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequ…Read more
  •  565
    Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.
  •  15312
    Sex, Lies, and Consent
    Ethics 123 (4): 717-744. 2013.
    How wrong is it to deceive someone into sex by lying, say, about one's profession? The answer is seriously wrong when the liar's actual profession would be a deal breaker for the victim of the deception: this deception vitiates the victim's sexual consent, and it is seriously wrong to have sex with someone while lacking his or her consent.
  •  1337
    Vague Value
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2): 352-372. 2013.
    You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations
  •  830
    A Deluxe Money Pump
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 21-29. 2014.
    So-called money pump arguments aim to show that intransitive preferences are irrational because they will lead someone to accept a series of deals that leaves his/her financially worse off and better off in no respect. A common response to these arguments is the foresight response, which counters that the agent in question may see the exploitation coming, and refuse to trade at all. To obviate this response, I offer a “deluxe money pump argument” that applies dominance reasoning to a modified mo…Read more
  •  473
    Aggregation, Beneficence, and Chance
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2): 1-19. 2013.
    It is plausible to think that it is wrong to cure many people’s headaches rather than save someone else’s life. On the other hand, it is plausible to think that it is not wrong to expose someone to a tiny risk of death when curing this person’s headache. I will argue that these claims are inconsistent. For if we keep taking this tiny risk then it is likely that one person dies, while many others’ headaches are cured. In light of this inconsistency, there is a conflict in our intuitions about ben…Read more
  •  416
    Moral indeterminacy can be problematic: prospectively it can give rise to deliberative anguish, and retrospectively, it can leave us in a limbo as to what attitudes it is appropriate to form with respect to past actions with indeterminate moral status. These problems give us reason to resolve ethical indeterminacy. One mechanism for doing so involves the use of our normative powers to place obligations on ourselves and to waive our claims against others. This mechanism could operate through an e…Read more
  •  589
    Why Is There Female Under-Representation among Philosophy Majors?
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2. 2015.
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the percentage of…Read more
  •  794
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the percentage of…Read more
  •  1159
    Future-Bias and Practical Reason
    Philosophers' Imprint 15. 2015.
    Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the …Read more