Tomás Balmaceda

Frente a la retórica instalada en clave de una inteligencia artificial (IA) eficiente y libre de prejuicios, nuestra propuesta en este artículo es argumentar por qué esta visión tan popular de la IA es inadecuada y examinar algunas de sus derivas en el trazado de políticas públicas. En primera instancia, argumentaremos que es imposible –por principio– plantear una IA valorativamente neutra, a partir de lo señalado por algunos aportes filosóficos tanto canónicos como contemporáneos. En la segunda sección analizaremos un caso que ilustra de modo diáfano la carga valorativa que gravita en la IA. Esto nos llevará a indagar, en la tercera sección, los diferentes niveles en los cuales los sesgos pueden tener injerencia en la IA. Nuestro objetivo central es explicitar la paradoja consistente en cómo la aplicación de IA en políticas públicas y en la toma de decisiones en ámbitos privados, lejos de ser una herramienta para combatir desigualdades estructurales, termina consolidando escenarios perjudiciales para poblaciones vulnerables.

En este trabajo nos concentramos en la tecnología de reconocimiento facial y hacemos hincapié en que en las últimas décadas se instaló en el discurso público la idea de que este tipo de tecnología es “objetiva” y carente de los errores y sesgos humanos, adjudicándole cualquier responsabilidad al “buen o mal uso” que se haga de ella. Frente a esta retórica, argumentamos que a la hora de hablar de artefactos tecnológicos la neutralidad es imposible, aun en la instancia misma del diseño. A tal efecto, a partir de las ideas del pragmatismo norteamericano analizamos un caso real, para mostrar que no es posible sostener una dicotomía entre hechos y valores y que es necesario reconocer que no existe una distinción tajante entre el diseño de la tecnología y el uso que hacemos de ella. In this paper we concentrate on facial recognition technology and emphasize that in recent decades, the idea that this type of technology is “objective” and devoid of human errors and biases has been installed in public discourse, assigning it any responsibility to the “good or bad use” that is made of it. Faced with this rhetoric, we argue that when it comes to talking about technological artifacts, neutrality is impossible, even in the very instance of design. To this end, based on the ideas of North American pragmatism, we analyze a real case to show that it is not possible to sustain a dichotomy between facts and values, and that it is necessary to recognize that there is no sharp distinction between the design of technology and the use that we make of it.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a rapidly developing field with the potential to revolutionize many aspects of our lives. However, as it is not possible to fully understand the impact of a technology in a vacuum, different points of view are necessary to analyse what AI can do for our society. This chapter explores the philosophical underpinnings of the particular perceptions of AI in Latin America. It argues that the region’s history of colonialism and dependency has shaped the way that Latin Americans think about technology, and that this can lead to a deep-seated distrust of AI. As Latin American philosophers, we want to discuss the potential for AI to exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities in our region as well as argue that it is important to address these concerns in order to ensure that AI is used for the benefit of all. To bring this new point of view is not only the interest of our region: we believe it can lead to a more nuanced and critical discussion of AI. We need to move beyond the simplistic narratives of AI as either a force for good or evil, and instead focus on the complex ways in which it can be used to both empower and disempower people.

The use of generative AI (GAI) has sparked a significant amount of ethical controversy. In this work, we aim to address the ethical complications that arise when GAI is used to generate images, videos, or audio based on deceased individuals. Our reflections will focus on artistic and cultural products that include such developments, where both ethical and aesthetic issues can be raised. We understand that beyond the authorization that heirs may provide for the use of digital recordings in generating GAI products, these cultural products and works of art raise a series of ethical questions stemming from the quality of the generated image and audio, the ubiquity and accessibility of these technologies, and the epistemic reliability of AIs. We will analyze a series of guiding ethical principles that would allow for the creation of such artworks and other cultural products while achieving a balance between the conflicting rights. Finally, we will review a number of objections and controversies that remain unresolved.

Gregorio Klimovsky argumentó en contra de los análisis sintacticistas de la noción de lenguaje. En este trabajo se examinan sus argumentos, destacando su vínculo con las discusiones recientes sobre universalidad expresiva, y se plantean algunas réplicas atendibles. Luego se adopta un enfoque general de la cuestión que resulta incompatible con el sintacticismo estricto pero que permite una reformulación aceptable, vinculada con una idea minimalista sobre el alcance de la teoría semántica. Gregorio Klimovsky argued against syntactical analyses of the notion of language. In this paper I examine his arguments, noting their links with recent discussions of universal expressibility, and raise some plausible objections. Afterwards I adopt a general approach to the issue which is incompatible with strict syntacticism but allowing an acceptable reformulation, associated with a minimalist notion of the scope of the semantic theory.

This work promotes the thesis that humans are naturally transhuman. In order to achieve this, we present in the first two sections some examples of technological devices assembled to human beings, and we critically review the assumptions and dichotomies on which the idea of human enhancement is based according to the ordinary transhumanist vision. Thirdly, we present the thesis of the Extended Mind to support our intuition. Fourthly, we dismantle the most relevant philosophical dichotomies that structure the transhumanist position. Finally, we recapitulate the reasons why we should wake up from the transhumanist dream.