Tomas Kollarik

This study analyzes a specific cognitive bias and argumentative fallacy for which the author introduces the original term polarization error. It is a faulty abductive inference in which an agent interprets a disagreement at the non-axiological level (instrumental or definitional) as a fundamental disagreement at the axiological level. The aim of this paper is not to deny the existence of genuine value conflicts, but to demonstrate how pseudo-value disputes imperceptibly intermingle with legitimate conflicts in a polarized society. The author argues that the essence of this error lies in the projection of one's own knowledge onto the opponent and the attribution of bad faith, which leads to a form of epistemic misrecognition (in the sense of A. Honneth). Failure to recognize this type of dispute transforms political agonism into destructive antagonism and sets in motion the polarization spiral. The study illustrates this mechanism through examples from contemporary public discourse and proposes a corrective through the Principle of Charity as a necessary condition for functional agonism.

This paper offers a philosophical critique of the prevailing deficit models of conspiracy thinking, which reduce it to psychological pathology or epistemic failure (Douglas et al. 2017; Cassam 2019). Drawing on the concept of the "anti-anti conspiracy theorist," I propose an alternative framework grounded in the interdependence of trust and control. I argue that conspiracy narratives are not an escape into a "psychological paradise" of certainty, but rather a manifestation of an "anxiety hell" that individuals enter upon losing trust in the system. Using the analytical metaphor of the Matrix, the dialectic of trust and control, and a typology distinguishing identity-based and reactive types, I demonstrate that conspiracy thinking can be a comprehensible response to perceived institutional dysfunction and alienation from power. The paper concludes with an open question: is the restoration of trust possible without a fundamental reassessment of the current arrangement of control and bureaucratization?

According to informal logic, the possibilities of deductive logic as a tool for analysing and evaluating ordinary arguments are very limited. While I agree with this claim in general, I question it in the case of the argument from cause to effect. In this paper I first show, on the basis of carefully chosen examples, that we usually react differently to falsification of the conclusion of the argument from cause to effect than we do to the falsification of the conclusion of other defeasible arguments. I then identify general conditions and assumptions under which the causal argument from cause to effect can be reconstructed as deductive. Finally, I compare the causal argument with the expert argument, which is a typical example of a defeasible argument in the narrower sense.

V práci sa zaoberám kritickou expozíciou argumentačných schém v kontexte pragma-dialektického prístupu k argumentácii. Nadväzujem pritom na prácu Hitchcocka a Wagemansa (2011), ktorí sa sústredili najmä na problémy súvisiace s typológiou argumentačných schém v pragma-dialektike. Pozorovania Hitchcocka a Wagemansa sú v priebehu výkladu kriticky hodnotené, prípadne upravené. Časť kritiky, ktorú v práci uvádzam, súvisí s tým, že niektoré dôležité aspekty argumentačných schém sú v rôznych pragma-dialektických publikáciách prezentované odlišne bez toho, aby sa odlišnosť akokoľvek komentovala, alebo zdôvodnila. Existencia takýchto zdôvodnení nie je pritom iba znakom, ale aj nevyhnutnou podmienkou toho, aby sme akúkoľvek zmenu mohli nazývať pokrokom v teórii. Posledná časť práce je zameraná na problémy týkajúce sa hodnotenia argumentácie v pragma-dialektickom prístupe. Hoci článok prináša vlastné pozitívne návrhy, dôraz a celkový zámer spočíva predovšetkým na expozícii nedostatkov súčasného stavu pragma-dialektickej koncepcie argumentačných schém. Kľúčové slová: argumentačné schémy, kritické otázky, pragma-dialektický prístup k argumentácii, hodnotenie argumentov.

The aim of this paper is to show that the disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists about the compatibility of free will with determinism is merely verbal, since although one side of the dispute claims that free will is compatible with determinism while the other denies it, they actually ascribe a different meaning to the term "free will". One can therefore accept both the compatibilist thesis and the incompatibilist thesis, since the two are not contradictory. My method is to analyse the meaning of the phrase "being an ability to do otherwise" as a property of abilities and the meaning of the phrase "having an ability to do otherwise" as a property of agents. The result of this analysis allows me to make an unbiased comparison of the necessary conditions that compatibilists and incompatibilists expect to hold if agents are to have the ability to do otherwise. It is shown, as expected, that these conditions are not the same.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the idea that Toulmin’s main focus in The Uses of Argument is to critique formal deductive logic. I first try to challenge the argument that, on the basis of what Toulmin says about analytic arguments, it is impossible to determine exactly what they are. I will then attempt to determine the basic contours of analytic arguments. Finally, I will conclude that the concept of an analytic argument involves epistemological assumptions to which formal logicians are in no way committed by the nature of their discipline.