Tomas Sodeika

The aim of this article is to highlight the nature of the fundamental moments of phenomenological research, such as evidence and description, and the ambivalence of their relationship to each other. On the one hand, both evidence and description are related to Husserl’s attempt to ‘return to the things themselves’. Evidence is understood by the founder of phenomenology as a relation to an object in which the meaning of that object is given to us immediately in the object itself. Description, on the other hand, avoids what is characteristic of any interpretation-oriented methodology: the ‘substitution’ of an explanatory reconstruction for the object under study. A certain discrepancy between phenomenological evidence and phenomenological description becomes apparent when we take into account the reception of the text in which the experience of the evidence is described. What is usually overlooked is that an experience whose content is the text being read is not an experience whose content is the phenomenon described in the text. This confusion leads to a turning away from ‘the things themselves’ and a restriction of phenomenology to the realm of texts. The way to avoid this deformation is through a phenomenological reduction, which must be carried out not only by the phenomenologist-researcher but also by the reader of the texts that provide a description of phenomenological experience.

The Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden gained recognition primarily due to his research on aesthetics. However, he considered the ontology to be the main area of his philosophical interests. At the beginning of his scientific career, Ingarden realized that he could not agree with his teacher Edmund Husserl, who considered phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. From Ingarden’s point of view, the fallacy of this approach lies in the fact that it leads to metaphysical idealism and makes it impossible to grasp the difference between real-life objects and intentional objects, i.e. objects generated by pure consciousness. In his main work Controversy over the Existence of the World, Ingarden tried to identify the difference between the ontological structures of real and intentional objects, expecting in this way to uphold the legitimacy of a realistic point of view and to prove that the real world is not a product of pure consciousness, but exists independently of him. Nevertheless, the result achieved by using the existential and formal ontological analysis of the a priori structures of various objects turned out to be insufficient to refute Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The article focuses on the last lifetime publication of Ingarden—his book On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations published in 1970. Since this work is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of responsibility, it may seem that here we are dealing primarily with research on ethics. The article attempts to show that the book can be read as an ontological study that continues the “debate about the existence of the world,” i.e. as an attempt to prove the reality of the world. However, this proof is no longer based on an analysis of the a priori structures of various objects, but on a direct experience of responsibility.

In this article, Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of boredom is compared with some aspects of Zen practice. Heidegger is primarily interested in boredom as a “fundamental mood,” which takes us beyond the opposition of the subject and object. Thus, boredom reveals the existence more initially than those forms of cognition that are the basis of classical philosophy and special sciences. As an essential feature of the experience of boredom, Heidegger singles out that being in this state we feel that our attention is held by something in which we find nothing but emptiness. In the article, this emptiness is compared with the Buddhist concept of shunyata, and various forms of experiencing boredom are paralleled with the different types of concentration achieved in Zen practice. Besides, the question is discussed how the Buddhist perception of emptiness corresponds to Heidegger’s “openness.”

Straipsnyje Martino Heideggerio paskelbta „filosofijos pabaigos“ situacija nagrinëjama Freudo psichoanalizës ir Derrida différance poþiûriu. Tyrinëjimo pradþios taðkas yra nejaukumo sàvoka, kuriàFreudas analizuoja studijoje „Das Unheimliche“. Anot Freudo, nejaukumo jausmas gali bûti iðgyventas tada, kai þmogus susitinka savo antrininkà . Tokiø susitikimø situacijose ðisjausmas kyla ið to, kad èia patiriamas gyvenimo ir mirties ambivalentiðkumas. Panaðø ambivalentiðkumà galima aptikti ir tada, kai turime reikalà su Derrida minima différance, kuri yra ne þodis ir nesàvoka, bet greièiau tam tikras performatyvas. Ðiuo aktu sukuriama situacija, kurioje pasireiðkia paaiðkinimo ir ið-aiðkinimo kaip dviejø skirtingø prasmës aptikimo strategijø ambivalentiðkumas, kylantisið to, kad prasmë aptinkama tekste, t. y. medijoje, kuri yra nei gyva, nei mirusi.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: Heideggeris, Freudas, Derrida, filosofijos pabaiga, psichoanalizë, tekstas,différance