Tomaso Pignocchi

This article explores a dialogue between Buddhist and Wittgensteinian thought to propose a non-foundational, therapeutic epistemology for the philosophy of religion. Drawing on Madhyamaka analyses of dṛṣṭi (views), emptiness, and dependent origination, together with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on pictures, belief, and certainty, it argues that the root of suffering lies in structured habits of mind and language rather than in a lack of justified knowledge. Epistemic transformation is therefore inseparable from ethical transformation: knowing is sought not to secure theoretical foundations, but to loosen the grip of distorted frameworks that sustain attachment and delusion. In both Madhyamaka and Wittgenstein, philosophy functions as a practice of clarification, not a system of doctrines. The paper shows how Candrakīrti’s account of conventional truth operates as a method for de-reifying experience within everyday life, much as Wittgenstein’s grammatical therapy dissolves conceptual entanglement. Madhyamaka does not substitute one ground for another, but redefines the epistemic aim itself: liberation lies in perceiving the world without clinging to any view as ultimately real. This model invites a reconceptualization of religious epistemology that neither presupposes theistic commitments nor collapses into secular reductionism, opening instead toward cross-cultural, experientially engaged, and methodologically plural forms of reflection within the philosophy of religion.

This essay begins by examining Johann Georg Hamann's distinctive perspective on language, situating it within the broader context of his theological-philosophical thought. It focuses particularly on the critical roles of experience, sensation, and imagery in Hamann's often nebulous philosophy, dedicating significant attention to his critique of his friend Kant. The second part of the essay explores the significant parallels between the philosophies of Hamann and Wittgenstein, especially their shared critique of the view that language and knowledge are founded on transcendent a priori principles and laws, as well as the ambivalent role of language as both creator and dissolver of metaphysical illusions. The essay concludes with a brief overview of Wittgenstein's actual knowledge of Hamann, seeking to outline the intellectual ground common to both thinkers.

Almost every Indian philosophical tradition sees reality as illusory and filled with suffering, aiming at liberation through correct knowledge. Hence, establishing valid means of knowledge has long been vital in Indian thought, and especially urgent in Buddhism. However, due to some of its inescapable premises, the latter grapples with ensuring valid knowledge, striving to preserve perceptual understanding of particulars while avoiding conceptualization. This article explores Buddhism's complex relationship between perception and conceptualization, focusing on unresolved epistemological tensions from the tradition stemming from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and the attempts to resolve them by figures like Dharmottara and Tibetan Gelug and Sakya schools. In the conclusion, we will observe the unravelling of this very problem through the radical deconstruction operated by Candrakīrti, which shares certain similarities with Wittgenstein's dissolution of metaphysical illusions.

Following Robert Fogelin’s work, philosophers have traditionally analysed deep disagreements in Wittgenstein’s thought through the lens of “On Certainty.” This paper explores another fruitful avenue for understanding Wittgenstein’s views on deep disagreements: this avenue lies in examining the form of disagreement that arises between believers and non-believers, as documented in his “Lectures on Religious Belief”. Drawing on this text and others, I will try to demonstrate how deep disagreement, starting from a situation of incompatibility and mutual non-persuasiveness between the parties, can, through the intermediary stage of mutual partial emotive understanding, lead sometimes to an extreme form of resolution: the conversion of one’s own way of seeing things to that of the other party. This conversion, however, does not rely on an appeal to explanations, reasons, or rationality. Instead, it appeals to the overcoming of a blockage by the will. This concept of a complete reorientation of one’s own perspective is central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and may even be considered the ultimate goal of his mature work.

The use of paradoxical similes is a common feature in both the philosophical works of Wittgenstein and the Buddhist scriptures. By using paradoxes, these thinkers seek to shake our preconceived notions of reality and challenge us to view things in a new way. For Wittgenstein, paradoxical similes were a means of conveying the limitations of language and the difficulty of expressing certain ideas and sensations. By presenting us with seemingly contradictory statements, he prompts us to rethink the meaning of words and concepts. Similarly, in Buddhist scriptures, paradoxical similes are used to help practitioners understand complex concepts such as emptiness and non-self. While the use of paradoxical similes can be confusing at first, their power lies in their ability to deconstruct and challenge our assumptions about reality. By embracing contradictions and paradoxes, we can gain a deeper understanding of the world around us and ourselves.

This article explores how the notion ofordinary aestheticscan stem, as well as the one ofordinary ethics, from thatrevolution of the ordinarystarted by Wittgenstein and further developed by philosophers like Cavell and Diamond. The idea ofordinary ethicsemphasizes the importance of everyday life and the particular details of our experiences. This concept can be extended to aesthetics, forming the basis of a modality of aesthetic appreciation that recognize values and importance in the details and nuances of everyday experience. One example of suchordinary aestheticscan be found in thehaikupoetry of Bashō. Bashō’s poetry often focuses on the ordinary and mundane aspects of life, such as the changing of seasons, the sound of rain, or the sight of a bird in flight, but also on that lower world made of insects, rotten foliage, and excrements. Bashō conveys in poetry the core ofZenphilosophy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of all things and the value of living in the present moment. This approach to aesthetics offers an alternative to more traditional modes of aesthetic appreciation, which tend to prioritize grandeur, spectacle, and formal perfection. Ultimately, the concept of ordinary aesthetics invites us to find the intrinsic importance in the simple things that surround us and to cultivate a deeper appreciation for the richness of our everyday lives.