Tomohiko Kondo

Plutarch and Musonius Rufus have both sometimes been regarded as forerunners of feminism, although the feminist ideas of both thinkers have also been rightly assessed as “incomplete.” What has not been fully explored, however, is the precise difference between the two thinkers’ apparent feminism. This paper will compare Plutarch’s views on women and marriage, especially in the Coniugalia praecepta, the Mulierum virtutes and the Amatorius, with those of Musonius in order to better understand to what extent Plutarch’s “incomplete feminism” can be attributed to the author rather than the cultural background of the period. While the thesis that virtue is the same for men and women is endorsed by both Plutarch and Musonius, in practice they both confine the sphere of women’s virtue to subsidiary roles. However, their justifications are different from each other. While Musonius considers external circumstances, including traditional gender roles, to be irrelevant to the exercise of virtue, Plutarch understands the female nature to be distinct from the male nature in accordance with his Platonic metaphysics and psychology. This discrepancy resonates with their respective views on marriage and sex, specifically on male same-sex intercourse and adultery. In contrast to Musonius, who focuses on procreation as the function of marriage and sexual intercourse, Plutarch places more emphasis on the affectionate bond, especially on the part of the wife. Plutarch is more interested in, and genuinely cares for, the nature and conditions of actual women, and this is what makes Plutarch’s views both attractive and problematic.

This essay explores the ethical and soteriological implications of the Stoic and Neoplatonic conception of eternal recurrence and the cosmic cycle, taking as its point of reference a lecture delivered in 1928 by the Japanese philosopher Shūzō Kuki, ‘La notion du temps et la reprise sur le temps en Orient’ (The Notion of Time and Repetition in Oriental Time). Kuki argues that the ‘Oriental’ notion of time culminates in the idea of eternal recurrence—an idea he also finds in ancient Greek philosophy, particularly in the Stoics. What he calls the Bushidō approach to emancipation from time, in contrast to the ‘Buddhist’ approach, resonates with the Stoic cosmic perspective, especially as explored by Pierre Hadot. Plotinus adopts a conception of the cosmic cycle that reflects Stoic views, yet as a Platonist he appears to affirm the ‘Buddhist’ model of emancipation—an apparent ambivalence that proves philosophically suggestive.

Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus contains many quotations and paraphrases of Plato’s Laws. Meanwhile, it is well established that Clement’s Paedagogus owes much of its material to Musonius Rufus and that Musonius’ Discourses also sometimes make allusions to Plato’s Laws. This paper explores the intertextual relations of the three by closely analyzing some passages (especially on sexual morality and on frugal ways of living) and shows that some of the references to Plato’s Laws in Clement’s Paedagogus, though not directly drawn from Musonius, can only have been made under his influence, while Musonius himself had presumably followed the Stoic tradition of utilizing Plato’s Laws in the sphere of practical ethics.

Two prominent Japanese scholars of ancient Greek philosophy in the 20th century, Takashi Ide (1892–1980) and Norio Fujisawa (1925–2004), both offered similar critiques of Aristotle’s philosophy. They questioned the value placed by Aristotle on theōria (contemplation) and its separation from praxis (action) and poiēsis (production), advocating for their reunification. Their interpretations went beyond mere historical study, encompassing broader visions of the history of Western philosophy and of philosophy in general. Despite their differing philosophical inclinations, they converged in identifying Aristotle as the emblematic figure of the decline of Western philosophy and endeavoured to rediscover their authentic philosophy before Aristotle – Socrates for Ide and Plato for Fujisawa. Ide struggled with the question of philosophy’s active role in the midst of war and eventually turned to Marxism, while Fujisawa focused on the challenges posed by modern scientific technology and called for a return to Plato’s philosophical insights.

This is the first volume to explore the modern reception and contemporary relevance of Aristotle and his philosophy in Japan, making it a valuable contribution to both global Aristotelian studies and studies of Japanese philosophical traditions. The study of Aristotle's philosophy in Japan is already over a hundred years old, yet the fruits of these efforts have mostly been published in Japanese and thus circulated almost entirely within Japan. Japanese scholarship, however, has not been conducted in isolation, but rather has developed by keeping up with crucial contemporary trends in international scholarship. Aristotelian studies in Japan have therefore been neither particularly Japanese nor Far East Asian at first glance, which is one reason why they have not received much attention in Japanese philosophical literature. This volume addresses this gap, exploring the long historical struggle of Japanese people to read, understand and adopt Aristotle's philosophy in a philosophical tradition different from the West. It also examines the applicability of Aristotle's philosophy to contemporary issues and demonstrates the extent to which his philosophy remains relevant today, whether in the East or West. Aristotle in Japan: Reception, Interpretation and Application is of interest to students and scholars of Aristotelian philosophy, as well as those working on Japanese philosophy and classical reception.

This paper will show how the Stoic Chrysippus appropriated Plato’s Republic by picking up the Platonic definition of justice as ‘doing one’s own’ and by applying it to the Stoic concept of freedom as ‘the authority of self-action’. I argue, based on the analysis of Plutarch’s De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1043A-B - and other related sources - that Chrysippus in his On ways of life, employed the concept of freedom and explicated it in terms of ‘autopragia’ or ‘ta hautou prattein’. He did so by showing that, given the correct understanding of freedom, not only life of leisure, but also the active life of politics can be said to lead to freedom. Chrysippus’ strategy of reading Plato’s texts will be seen as a kind of appropriation used to extract the best from them by making certain conceptual adjustments; an approach which he must have thought necessary to achieve a unified and consistent theory. Accordingly, he re-interpreted the Platonic phrase ‘ta hautou prattein’ along with terms, such as: ‘uninvolved’, ‘to will’, and the ‘authority’. Chrysippus, in extracting the Stoic concept of freedom from Plato’s Republic, took particular care to overcome the introverted and escapist tendency, lurking therein by radically re-reading the Platonic texts.

Although the Stoic doctrine of happiness has popularly been interpreted as concentrating on inner mental tranquility, the ancient Stoics themselves emphasize that happiness does not consist in passive experience but in activity. They consider perfect rationality and virtue to be a principle which constitute its participator—the ideally happy and free Stoic sage—as a unified self, capable of the highest degree of activity. This self-activity of the Stoic sage does not imply withdrawing from the external world, but lies in a completely consistent way of dealing with the circumstances of a life. This chapter aims to elucidate the philosophical significance of this Stoic view by framing it in the context of contemporary discussions, such as the ones put forward by Martha Nussbaum, Robert Nozick, Christine Korsgaard, and Julia Annas.