Tony Smith

Our massive tampering with the world's interdependent web of life-coupled with the environmental damage inflicted by deforestation, species loss, and climate change-could trigger widespread adverse effects, including unpredictable collapses of critical biological systems whose interactions and dynamics we only imperfectly understand. Uncertainty over the extent of these effects cannot excuse complacency or delay in facing the threats ... We the undersigned, senior members of the world's scientific community, hereby warn all humanity of what lies ahead. A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated. (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1992).

Agricultural biotechnology is a social pursuit, undertaken by social agents within social institutions.1 Any attempt to explore the social dimensions of a profound and complex technological development such as biotechnology is bound to be controversial, and any attempt to formulate an ethical assessment of such a development is bound to be yet more complex and controversial. This surely explains why many choose to ignore these inquiries. But the social dimensions of biotechnology are just as real as viruses, bacteria, enzymes, and cells. To refuse to investigate them with the same seriousness that viruses, bacteria, enzymes and cells are investigated is to place an arbitrary restriction on the scope of rational inquiry.

Like most terms in social theory, the term "conservative" is profoundly ambiguous and contested. In the United States today the word is often applied to those who call for an absolute minimum of government interference in capitalist markets. In another meaning it refers to those who insist that social life should center on the preservation of a community’s traditions and cultural values. There is a deep tension between these two viewpoints. Capitalist markets left to themselves radically destabilize established communities, and so preserving cultural traditions and values requires political intervention in economic life. Given this ineluctable tension it is probably best not to use the same term to refer to both positions. In the present paper I shall refer to the former perspective, whose intellectual roots are found in the "classical liberalism" of John Locke and others, as "neoliberalism." The latter perspective will be referred to as "neoconservatism.".

The main argument in favor of neoliberalism is simple enough: individuals will freely exchange whenever mutual gains result. It follows that restricting trade and investment across borders both infringes liberty and prevents people from enjoying benefits. At this point an appeal is made to historical evidence: previously poor regions have lifted more people out of poverty at a faster rate than ever before in human history by opening up to trade and investment. Neoliberal theorists and policy makers conclude..

In a world where exploitation and uneven development condemn billions to suffering, the proper understanding of the intellectual relationship between Hegel and Marx appears a small matter indeed. Marx‟s Capital, however, remains the single most important text for comprehending the system that generates this suffering. The question of the proper reading of this work thus remains important. Sooner or later this brings us to the Hegel/Marx question. In a recent article in Science and Society John Rosenthal forcefully argues that there is one and only one place where Hegelian themes play a role in Capital (Rosenthal 1999). In Rosenthal‟s view, Marx‟s description of the relationship between money and ordinary commodities deliberately echoes the relationship between universals and finite things in Hegel‟s system of idealism. The fact that Marx found this aspect of Hegel‟s thought useful is not at all to Hegel‟s credit. According to Rosenthal, Hegel‟s thought perversely grants abstractions priority over flesh and blood human subjects in a way that exactly parallels the way money, a “real abstraction,” perversely dominates social agents in capitalism. Apart from this, Rosenthal insists, Marx abandons his earlier experiments with Hegelian motifs in Capital. In specific, nothing like Hegelian dialectics can be found, a “methodology” based on bad puns and spurious reasoning. In order to justify this thesis Rosenthal attacks on two main fronts. First, he hopes to convince the reader that Hegel‟s use of the key terms “universality,” 1 “particularity,” and “individuality” is irredeemably flawed. Rosenthal complains that Hegel‟s term “universality” is systematically ambiguous, sometimes referring to the relatively more inclusive, on other occasions to the all-inclusive. The sense of the term “particularity” shifts in Hegel‟s writings between what is relatively unique (“bare” particularity) and what is relatively more determinate (“specificity”)..

In a world where exploitation and uneven development condemn billions to suffering, the proper understanding of the intellectual relationship between Hegel and Marx appears a small matter indeed. Marx‟s Capital, however, remains the single most important text for comprehending the system that generates this suffering. The question of the proper reading of this work thus remains important. Sooner or later this brings us to the Hegel/Marx question. In a recent article in Science and Society John Rosenthal forcefully argues that there is one and only one place where Hegelian themes play a role in Capital (Rosenthal 1999). In Rosenthal‟s view, Marx‟s description of the relationship between money and ordinary commodities deliberately echoes the relationship between universals and finite things in Hegel‟s system of idealism. The fact that Marx found this aspect of Hegel‟s thought useful is not at all to Hegel‟s credit. According to Rosenthal, Hegel‟s thought perversely grants abstractions priority over flesh and blood human subjects in a way that exactly parallels the way money, a “real abstraction,” perversely dominates social agents in capitalism. Apart from this, Rosenthal insists, Marx abandons his earlier experiments with Hegelian motifs in Capital. In specific, nothing like Hegelian dialectics can be found, a “methodology” based on bad puns and spurious reasoning. In order to justify this thesis Rosenthal attacks on two main fronts. First, he hopes to convince the reader that Hegel‟s use of the key terms “universality,” 1 “particularity,” and “individuality” is irredeemably flawed. Rosenthal complains that Hegel‟s term “universality” is systematically ambiguous, sometimes referring to the relatively more inclusive, on other occasions to the all-inclusive. The sense of the term “particularity” shifts in Hegel‟s writings between what is relatively unique (“bare” particularity) and what is relatively more determinate (“specificity”). And the notion of “individuality” jumps between the absolutely unique (bare particularity again) and the fully determinate system (“totality”)..

This book is quite simply the best study of the "young Marx" (pre-1848) and his immediate predecessors I have ever read. For supporters of the ancient régime in the first half of the nineteenth century, the failure of the French Revolution meant that everything could now go back to “normal.” But for the thinkers Kouvelakis examines — Kant, Hegel, Heine, Hess, Engels, and Marx — the Revolution’s promise of emancipation was merely deferred, not defeated. What exactly did that mean? Answers differed greatly.

No one would dispute that it is impossible to understand the intellectual and political history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without taking Karl Marx (1818-83) into account. Most believe, however, that Marx‘s legacy was buried once and for all in the rubble of the Berlin Wall. This consensus is mistaken. It would be foolish to assert that Marx anticipated the correct answer to every significant question facing us today. But it would be no less foolish to deny that Marx‘s work presents a powerful challenge to contemporary political philosophy.

Before getting to the matters at hand I would like to repeat once again how much I agree in general with Rosenthal‟s account of the bizarre ontology of money, the ultimate form of value.1 My own view remains that this agreement is far more important, theoretically and politically, than any disagreements we may have over the interpretation of Hegel.2 I would also like to note that if I were to respond to each of Rosenthal‟s complaints in adequate detail, the present piece would be longer than his response, which was quite long itself in comparison to my original review essay. Far better to stick to what I take to be the central issues, beginning with Hegel‟s attitude towards the material world.

The three volumes of Capital form an immensely complex work, including a variety of quite different sorts of texts. Marx’s systematic ordering of the essential determinations of capital, beginning in Volume I with relatively simple and abstract social forms and then proceeding step by step to ever more complex and concrete determinations provides a unifying thread. Many fundamental structures of the capitalist mode of production remained to be considered at the point where Marx left off in Volume III. At one point, at least, Marx planned to conclude his project with volumes on the state, foreign trade, and the world market and crisis (Marx 1973, 227, 264). This paper is devoted to two questions. Why exactly did Marx place the category of the world market at the very culmination of his systematic ordering? And what are the essential features of the social form referred to by this category? Before addressing these issues some further methodological remarks are in order.