Toshiro Osawa

This book offers the first substantial account of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's significant influence on Kant's ethics. Arguing that Baumgarten's impact is more extensive and profound than previously thought, the book provides a novel interpretation of the formation of Kant's ethical framework. Scholars have made use of Baumgarten's Ethica philosophica (1740) to elucidate Kant's complex terminology and to provide a background against which to understand Kant's nuanced relationship to his predecessors. To date, however, no English book explores the specific influence of Baumgarten's Ethica on Kant. This book comments on passages from the Ethica and contrasts them with Kant's treatment of the same concepts, topics, and questions in his ethics. Notably, Baumgarten articulates ethics around the concept of duty and the principle of perfection, leading to his version of the categorical imperative: 'perfect yourself'. While Kant rejects this ethical framework, it is evident that he directly adopts Baumgarten's ideas and critiques them at the same time. Each chapter examines a major topic: the relationship between religion and ethics, duties to oneself, duties to others, duties in particular cases, and the relationship between ethics and political philosophy. Baumgarten's Legacy in Kant's Ethics is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students working on Kant, 18th-century philosophy, and the history of ethics.

This article offers an account of Kant's conception of the duty of self-love, a rarely researched subject, by investigating how he appropriated Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's prior conception. I argue that exploring this appropriation helps us to gain new insights into Kant's conception of duty, a leading thread in Kant's ethics. Substantiating this argument, I derive the following conclusions. First, Kant peculiarly affirms a duty to rational self-love of delight. To be more precise, human beings ought rationally to love themselves in such a way that they are content with—or have a positive feeling about—themselves in acting on maxims that they are pleased to see submitted to the moral law. Further, rational self-love of delight results from declining pathological forms of self-love. Second, Kant retains, to a meaningful extent, Baumgarten's conception of the duty to self-love where feeling and rationality achieve their distinct elevation.

This paper reinterprets Kant’s argument that conscience cannot err, in light of assessing the influence of Baumgarten’s opposite argument about an erring conscience. I thereby argue that, contra Kant and in agreement with Baumgarten, we have a duty to acquire the capacity of conscience and that we must develop our acute awareness of handling unwelcome events precisely because conscience is involved in deciding the inherent goodness of an action and yet prone to make mistakes. In substantiating this argument, I demonstrate that it is helpful to demarcate self-judgment as a separate faculty in Kant’s theory of conscience.

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s ethics had a significant influence on the formation of Kant’s ethics. The extent of this influence, however, has not been sufficiently investigated by existing Kant scholarship. Filling this gap, this paper aims to reveal Baumgarten’s substantial influence on the formation of Kant’s ethics, particularly the complex ways in which Kant’s ethics retains the concept of God as crucial for ensuring that his ethics persist under the scrutiny of reason. In a systematic comparison of the ethics of the two philosophers, I argue that Kant alters and yet accommodates several aspects of Baumgarten’s ethics in his own version of the system of ethics more thoroughly than has previously been perceived. More specifically, I argue, first, that Kant’s rejection of Baumgarten’s conception of “duties towards God” and his alternative notion that duties are recognized as if they were divine commands unveil his criticism of Baumgarten’s conception of how religion is situated in ethics. Second, I argue that Kant’s argument for the extension of pure reason for practical purposes discloses his critical response to Baumgarten’s optimistic assumption about the entirety of pure reason.