Traci Kasperbauer

Chapter 1 provides an analysis of how various theories of animal welfare may be applied to practices of killing animals. They sketch the historical development of the concept of animal welfare and present the current debate between prominent theories of animal welfare. It then shows how animal welfare has been put to use as a criterion for deciding _when_ to kill animals for their own sake, and how this has gradually led to debates over _why_ animals are killed at all. Common practices such as euthanizing sick and elderly pet animals and the precautionary killing of livestock for disease control are examined in light of animal welfare concerns. Finally, the chapter observes an emerging concern about a “natural life” for animals. From this perspective, killing animals can be considered a welfare problem, even if it happens painlessly, because it prevents the animal from living out its natural life span.

Reproduction of animals in captivity is tightly controlled. In stark contrast, regulating the reproductive behavior of human beings is generally seen as impermissible. Why is this? This chapter discusses reproductive control of primates in light of two main reasons that human beings are granted reproductive rights: the importance of autonomy and human interest in procreation. I argue that captive primates pose a challenge to the use of birth control in captivity, because they too have important interests in reproductive autonomy and procreation. If we are to be consistent, it seems we must grant reproductive rights to some captive primates, perhaps at least the great apes. However, I further argue that there is room to limit reproduction within the framework of reproductive rights. Even in the case of human beings, it is widely accepted that limiting reproduction is permissible in certain circumstances. In captivity, unlimited reproduction would quickly lead to overpopulation, causing significant negative welfare for members of the group. In such cases, I suggest, the use of birth control is permissible. To further develop my account, I review the potential welfare costs to using contraception. I also discuss why it might be important to grant reproductive rights in the context of routine contraception, particularly in an era in which anthropogenic influences on native habitats require long-term survival in captivity.

In a recent article for this journal, Bryan Pilkington makes a number of critical observations about one of our arguments for non-traditional medical conscientious objectors’ duty to refer. Non-traditional conscientious objectors are those professionals who object to indirectly performing actions—like, say, referring to a physician who will perform an abortion. In our response here, we discuss his central objection and clarify our position on the role of value conflicts in non-traditional conscientious objection.

A hybrid theory is any moral theory according to which different classes of individuals ought to be treated according to different principles. We argue that some hybrid theories are able to meet standards of psychological plausibility, by which we mean that it’s feasible for ordinary human beings to understand and act in accord with them. Insofar as psychological plausibility is a theoretical virtue, then, such hybrid theories deserve more serious consideration. To make the case for this view, we explain what psychological plausibility is and why we might value it, why the human/animal divide appears to be an entrenched feature of human psychology, and why Robert Nozick’s hybrid theory doesn’t go far enough. Finally, we make the case that a more promising psychologically plausible hybrid theory, with respect to humans and animals, will be (at least) at tribrid theory—that is, positing three domains rather than two.