Travis Quigley

In a challenge trial, research subjects are purposefully exposed to some pathogen in a controlled setting, in order to test the efficacy of a vaccine or other experimental treatment. This is an example of medical effective altruism (MEA), where individuals volunteer to risk harms for the public good. Many bioethicists rejected challenge trials in the context of Covid‐19 vaccine research on ethical grounds. After considering various grounds of this objection, I conclude that the crucial question is how much harm research subjects can permissibly risk. But we lack a satisfying way of making this judgment that does not appeal simply to the intuitions of doctors or bioethicists. I consider one recent and structurally plausible approach to critically evaluating the harm question. Alex London defends a social consistency test for research risks: we should compare the risks undertaken by research subjects to relevantly similar risks which are accepted in other spheres of society. I argue there is no good reason not to consider volunteer military service as a relevant social comparison. This implies there is essentially no cap on acceptable risks on the social consistency rationale. In short, if soldiers can be heroes, why can't research volunteers?

Joseph Raz’s service conception of law remains one of the best known theories of political authority. Setting aside ongoing debates about the nature of authority, I locate a problem in the basic justificatory structure of the service conception. I show that the service justification of the state does not yield the conclusion that the law generates exclusionary reasons, which are meant to be the key hallmark of authority. An automatic but defeasible _habit _of obeying the state is likely to lead to better outcomes than exclusionary deference to the state. Given the instrumental justification of the service conception, this means that exclusionary reasons to defer do not obtain. Habituation and automaticity have been developed in other contexts and are here extended to the context of political authority. The possibility of habitual obedience undercuts Raz's theory while suggesting a new approach to the question of political authority.