Tris Hedges

Within existential phenomenology, both seriality and style have been drawn on to theorise the embodiment and perceptibility of (social) ontological differences. While style refers to how we encounter the world and others not in the abstract, but as immediately and intuitively meaningful, seriality is a form of collective being that pertains to our being similarly constrained and enabled by the socio-material environment. In this paper, my aim is to make explicit the constitutive relationship between style and seriality for the sake of theorising oppressive forms of normalisation. Focusing on the embodiment and perception of gendered and racialised categories, I argue that style and seriality are co-generative, as the various series to which we belong elicit certain styles, and that these habituated styles function to further serialise us. I illustrate this constitutive entanglement by discussing cases of racist and transphobic treatment of athletes who deviate from norms of white femininity.

Upon entering Harlem for the first time, Simone de Beauvoir recounts how “a force pulls me back … fear. Not mine but that of others – the fear of all those whites who never take the risk of going to Harlem”. But of what are they fearful? The risk, Beauvoir describes, is not that of an external danger but themselves. These passages detail the phenomenon of having one’s collective being, one’s unity to certain others, revealed to oneself through a third-person encounter. In this paper, (1) I make sense of Beauvoir’s reflections through Gerda Walther’s social ontology, (2) to show how we consistently undergo pre-reflective we-experiences qua social identities. (3) I then demonstrate how this pre-reflective ‘we’ is made reflective by the external Third; and (4) how we may reflectively disavow ourselves of this ‘we’ when we find it uncomfortable, alienating, and inappropriate. These novel inroads into the phenomenology of collective intentionality leads me (5) to argue that while members of dominant groups enjoy the privilege of having their collective being remain in the unremarkable background, members who inhabit social identities that are stigmatised and oppressed are systematically forced back upon themselves through third-person encounters.

In this paper I undertake to describe and theorize an important way in which subjects are kept "in line" with heteronormativity at the level of embodied affectivity. To do this, I synthesize a phenomenological understanding of sexuality with contemporary work in philosophy of emotion to thematize a form of self-doubt that is felt in relation to the experience of queer desires. I argue that the elicitation of such feelings of self-doubt is a crucial way in which a wider affective milieu of heterosexism is unjustly enforced. To achieve these aims, I first conceptualize heterosexism as an affective milieu, meaning a sociocultural system with prescribed "feeling rules." Section 2 then draws on phenomenological discussions of sexuality to show how (erotic) desire is an existentially significant aspect of our affective lives. I then develop an account of self-doubt, in section 3, as something felt, self-alienating, and self-involving. Finally in sections 4 and 5, through examples drawn from autofictional literature and film, I parse out two forms of self-doubt and the unjust harms they incur. First, self-doubt as an existential background feeling. Second, episodic self-doubt which is enacted to regulate the salience, legitimacy, or self-importance of a particular affective experience.

In this paper I initiate an important dialogue between the phenomenology of social perception and analytic social ontological discussions of how our perception of others (and concurrent conferrals of social kinds) can be sites of ‘ontic injustice’. Katharine Jenkins develops the concept of ontic injustice to theorise how your being of a social kind can consist, at least in part, of wrongful constraints and enablements. Taking Jenkins’s discussion of interpersonal kinds as the focus, I argue that the phenomenological concept of style enables a more experientially accurate account of how such (oftentimes unjust) interpersonal kinds come into being. My central claim is that Jenkins’s indicator/base property distinction performs a theoretical abstraction from actual embodied lived experience and that these properties are experientially subordinate to how other subjects are first and foremost given stylistically in experience, that is, as unified meaningful wholes. To support this claim, I engage with Jenkins’s example of gender presentation and show how its misalignment with base properties is better made sense of through the tripartite distinction of style, indicator properties, and base property. Introducing this phenomenological perspective enriches the experientially descriptive aspects of Jenkins’s social ontology.

In this paper, we draw on Alfred Schutz’s theoretical framework to better understand how oppression is enacted through discriminatory acts. By closely examining the role of typifications and relevances in our experience of others, and by supplementing this analysis with contemporary social scientific resources, we argue that a Schutzian perspective on oppression yields important phenomenological insights. We do this in three key steps. Firstly, we contextualise _Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World_ within Schutz’s broader body of work, elucidating his central conditions of discrimination. Secondly, we highlight the limitations of Schutz’s account, in how it fails to capture more peripheral, subtle, and implicit oppressive practices. Finally, we introduce two underexplored insights derived from Schutz’s framework: the role of relevances in understanding the motivational underpinnings of implicit biases, and the connection between self-typification and stereotype threat. With this multidimensional approach, we hope to enhance our understanding of oppression whilst bridging gaps in Schutz’s original conceptualization.

In recent years, misogyny has become a central concept in philosophy as well as an established concept in public discourse and political policy. But where is misogyny’s supposed counterpart, namely, misandry? In this paper I argue for an ameliorative analysis of "misandry", arguing that it can be reformulated in an effort to reclaim it from its misogynistic weaponisation. The term "misandry" is used almost exclusively as a misogynistic rhetorical device for attributing unjust anger, hatred, or other similar emotions to a speaker, thereby undermining their epistemic authority. Rather than dismissing the term as conceptually flawed and politically problematic, I argue that we ought to ameliorate misandry to instead refer to a felt anger, hostility, or fear toward the patriarchal social order and its valorisation and/or expression in misogynistic and machismo behaviour. To support these claims, I begin with a discussion of Kate Manne's analysis of misogyny before reflecting on how this can inform our understanding of misandry. I then demonstrate the various ways in which misandry is rhetorically deployed as a means of silencing speakers that express dissent against the patriarchy. Following this, I argue that we should ameliorate the term, not only to undermine these misogynistic practices, but also to articulate a legitimate affective and reactive attitude against the patriarchal imposition of a hierarchical gender binary.

Phenomenological discussions of sociality have long been concerned with the relations between the I, the You, and the We. Recently, dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophical work on collective intentionality has given rise to a corpus of literature oriented around the first-person plural 'we'. In this paper, I demonstrate how these dominant accounts of the 'we' are not exhaustive of first-person plural experiences as such. I achieve these aims by arguing for a phenomenological distinction between an experience of being part of a 'we' compared to an experience of being part of an 'us'. To have a 'we-experience' there must be a plurality of (unified) subjects sharing in an experience together such that the experience has the phenomenal character of being ours. An 'us-experience', on the other hand, requires the experiential salience of an external 'Third' in a way which is constitutively significant. Drawing on Sartrean social ontology, I argue that the 'us' is distinct from the 'we' on three levels, all of which pertain to the constitutive and unifying role of the Third. I then outline two forms of us-experiences: (1) the experience of being grouped and (2) the experience of apprehending one's seriality.

In this paper, my aim is to develop a phenomenological understanding of discrimination from the perspective of the discriminator. Since early existential phenomenology, the phenomenon of discrimination has received a great deal of attention. While much of this work has focused on the experience of the discriminatee, recent scholarship has begun to reflect on the intentional structures on the side of the discriminator. In a contribution to this trend, I argue that our sense of what is (ab)normal plays a constitutively significant role in the reiteration and reinforcement of harmful discriminatory practices. More specifically, I argue that Husserl's distinction between two forms of normality, namely, concordance-normality [Einstimmigkeit] and optimal-normality [Optimalität], is an important tool for illuminating otherwise overlooked aspects of the discriminator's experience. I achieve this by demonstrating how these two notions of normality play distinct constitutive roles when comparing deliberate acts of discrimination committed with malintent, compared with more primordial, habitual, and prereflective expectations which are already discriminatory in nucleo. I argue that at the heart of discriminatory practices there is a naïve, normalizing attempt to stabilize concordance at the expense of critical self-reflection, normative revisions, and enriched horizons of expectation. In doing so, this paper provides a novel and important contribution to philosophical discussions surrounding discrimination.

Over the years, phenomenology has provided illuminating descriptions of discrimination, with its mechanisms and effects being thematised at the most basic levels of embodiment, (dis)orientation, selfhood, and belonging. What remains somewhat understudied is the lived experience of the discriminator. In this paper I draw on Husserl's phenomenological account of normality to reflect on the ways in which we discriminate at the prereflective levels of perceptual experience and bodily being. By critically reflecting on the intentional structures undergirding discriminatory practices, I argue that discrimination is characteristic of a naïve normalising attitude which is habitually interested in securing a familiar experience of a static normality. I first demonstrate how this attitude problematically tends to reproduce, enforce, and further sediment discriminatory and exclusionary norms. Further, I provide an internal critique which problematises discrimination—without recourse to external normative standards—on three fronts: as epistemically unproductive, experientially obscuring, and normatively non-instantiating. In discriminatory acts we see an abnormal refusal to enrich, revise, and genetically establish new normative commitments, new ways of seeing, and a new normality.