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30Emotion and Value, edited by Roeser, Sabine and Todd, Cain: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. xii + 258, £40 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4): 839-840. 2015.
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65Not quite neo-sentimentalismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6): 877-899. 2018.The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those…Read more
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University of MelbourneGraduate student
Parkville, Victoria, Australia