Rutgers - New Brunswick
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2004
Portland, Oregon, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphysics
  •  9
    Goodbye, Humean Supervenience
    In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 7, Oxford University Press. pp. 129-153. 2012.
    Humean supervenience, at least in its familiar Lewisian guise, harbors an internal inconsistency. Suppose that: (1) fundamental properties are categorical; (2) fundamental properties endow objects with different dispositions in different possible worlds; and (3) properties are individuated by sets of their possible instances. This chapter demonstrates that if (2) is true, then every fundamental property necessarily correlates with a unique disposition. Therefore, by (3), every fundamental proper…Read more
  • Skeptical Success
    In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  2
    Skeptical Success
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 35-62. 2010.
  •  56
    Inspiratory threshold loading negatively impacts attentional performance
    with Eli F. Kelley and Bruce D. Johnson
    Frontiers in Psychology 13. 2022.
    RationaleThere are growing concerns over the occurrence of adverse physiologic events occurring in pilots during operation of United States Air Force and Navy high-performance aircraft. We hypothesize that a heightened inspiratory work of breathing experienced by jet pilots by virtue of the on-board life support system may constitute a “distraction stimulus” consequent to an increased sensation of respiratory muscle effort. As such, the purpose of this study was to determine whether increasing i…Read more
  •  3884
    An extended critical investigation of Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). I wrote this a couple of years ago as a way of thinking through the argument, but now lack the ambition to revise it into a paper. (It's too long to be a paper, too short and too narrowly focused on one person's argument to be a book.) Rather than let it age in private, I'm sharing it publicly for anyone interested in Plantinga's argument.
  •  2
    The Nature of Fundamental Properties
    Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick. 2004.
    Are fundamental properties dispositional, like fragility, or categorical, like triangularity? Much hangs on this question, including the modal status of the laws of nature and the relation between conceivability and possibility. I first map the contours of the issue, exploring the space of possible positions and outlining the common assumptions. Next I evaluate the existing arguments, none of which I find ultimately persuasive. Finally, I introduce a novel position, macro-Humeanism, which render…Read more
  •  473
    What is a disposition?
    Synthese 144 (3): 321-41. 2005.
    Attempts to capture the distinction between categorical and dispositional states in terms of more primitive modal notions – subjunctive conditionals, causal roles, or combinatorial principles – are bound to fail. Such failure is ensured by a deep symmetry in the ways dispositional and categorical states alike carry modal import. But the categorical/dispositional distinction should not be abandoned; it underpins important metaphysical disputes. Rather, it should be taken as a primitive, after whi…Read more
  •  522
    Recent Work on Dispositions
    Analysis 72 (1): 115-124. 2012.
  •  2776
    Goodbye, Humean Supervenience
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7 129-153. 2012.
    Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.
  •  2838
    Skeptical Success
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 35-62. 2005.
    The following is not a successful skeptical scenario: you think you know you have hands, but maybe you don't! Why is that a failure, when it's far more likely than, say, the evil genius hypothesis? That's the question. This is an earlier draft.