Trudy Rose Govier

How do Humans Think? How should we think? Almost all of philosophy and a great deal else depends in large part on the answers that we provide to such questions. Yet they are almost impossible to deal with in isolation; notions about nature of thought are almost bound to connect with metaphysical notions about where ideas come from, with notions about appropriate arenas for certainty, doubt, and belief, and hence with moral and religious ideas. The Western tradition of thinking about thinking takes shape with Socrates; among the other important strands covered in this book are Descartes’ recipe for discovering truth through systematic doubt, Hume’s notion that all our ideas are copies of sense impressions, Wollstonecraft’s introduction of the perspective of gender into such questions, and Wittgenstein’s claim that much of the traditional terrain of Western philosophy should be thought of as the proper domain only of linguistic assertion, possessing no content beyond the words. With each philosopher and school of thought dealt with, Govier shows how ideas about thinking connect to the other elements of the particular philosophy, and brings to life the social and intellectual context that the ideas spring from. _Socrates’ Children_ is thus not only an investigation of notions of thinking and knowing in Western culture; it is a selective general history of much of Western philosophy, from a unique and fascinating perspective.

Can God’s existence be proven by logic? Are computers smart enough to follow rules—or to cheat? What is an out-of-body experience? How can tables be solid when physicists say they’re made of subatomic particles that are only probability functions? Does science depend on trust? What is conscience? Does it come from God? From religious teaching? Social training? Is it rational to pursue your own self-interest? Can we all survive if we do this? In this collection of stories and dialogues Trudy Govier shows how these old and new philosophical questions arise, and offers imaginative and striking depictions of some of the theories and arguments they have inspired.

_Forgiveness and Revenge_ is a powerful exploration of our attitudes to serious wrongdoings and a careful examination of the values that underlie our thinking about revenge and forgiveness. From adulterous spouses to terrorist factions, we are surrounded by wrongdoing, yet we rarely agree which response is appropriate. The problem of how to respond realistically and sensitively to the wrongs of the past remains a perplexing one. Trudy Govier clarifies our thinking on this subject by examining the moral and practical impact of revenge and forgiveness, both personal and political. _Forgiveness and Revenge_ offers much-needed clarity and reason where emotions often prevail. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the ethics of attitudes to wrongdoing.

Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions.

We are pleased to publish this WSIA edition of Trudy’s Govier’s seminal volume, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Originally published in 1987 by Foris Publications, this was a pioneering work that played a major role in establishing argumentation theory as a discipline. Today, it is as relevant to the field as when it first appeared, with discussions of questions and issues that remain central to the study of argument. It has defined the main approaches to many of those issues and guided the ways in which we might respond to them. From this foundation, it sets the stage for further investigations and emerging research. This is a second edition of the book that is corrected and updated by the author, with new prefaces to each chapter.

Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise. I shall concentrate here on aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation, a type of what has been called conductive argument. Though initially intrigued by my efforts to describe and explore conductive argument, Harald Wohlrapp later concluded that my treatments were seriously flawed and that an alternative approach can serve to replace that problematic and much contested conception. Much of the difference between our approaches concerns what he deems to be a logicistic approach on my part.

I would first like to congratulate Harald Wohlrapp on the substantial success of his book on the philosophy of argument. The learning, originality, and energetic dedication shown in this work are impressive indeed. Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise, as we will be hearing today and in further conversations. In this presentation I shall concentrate on two aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation; as will be apparent, even on this single topic more could be said. What I will discuss today are the themes of logicism and objectivity.

I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for inferring an inference. Referring to the recent work of Harald Wolhrapp, I will explore the allegation that a faulty logicism is involved when argument analysis is based on an explicit statement of premises and conclusion. In developing this account, reference will also be made to the work of Douglas Walton, Marcello Guarini, Trudy Govier, and Lilian Bermejo-Luque.

Trust facilitates communication, love, friendship, and co-operation and is fundamentally important to human relationships and personal development. Using examples from daily life, interviews, literature, and film, Govier describes the role of trust in friendship and in family relationships as well as the connection between self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem. She examines the reasons we trust or distrust others and ourselves, and the expectations and vulnerabilities that accompany those attitudes. But trust should not be blind. Acknowledging that distrust is often warranted, Govier describes strategies for coping with distrust and designing workable relationships despite it. She also examines situations in which the integrity of interpersonal relationships has been violated by serious breaches of trust and explores themes of forgiveness, reconciliation, and the restoration of trust. By encouraging reflection on our own attitudes of trust and distrust, this fascinating book points the way to a better understanding of our relationships and ourselves.

Nations possessing nuclear weapons have seen them as useful for many purposes. These include classic nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence, the fighting of a nuclear war ‘if deterrence fails,’ and a ‘diplomatic’ use in which the weapons are seen as implements of coercive political power. Concerning all these uses profound ethical questions arise. It is the last use which will be the focus of attention in this paper.I have chosen this subject partly because I believe that it has received insufficient attention from those reflecting on nuclear policies from an ethical point of view. Discussions tend to focus on the use, threat to use, or intention to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack. The retention of nuclear weapons for such a purpose is far easier to rationalize than is the development of such weapons for extended deterrence, nuclear ‘diplomacy,’ or the actual waging of a nuclear war. Historically, nuclear weapons have been held by nuclear states for all these purposes. In fact, there are natural relations between the functions. When a power possesses nuclear weapons, the ultimate token of military power in the modern world, it is natural that it will seek to use them for purposes less restricted than the sole one of deterring nuclear war. Hence there is a natural development from classic deterrence to extended deterrence and the coercive use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of national interest. There is also a natural connection between classic deterrence and the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of fighting and ‘prevailing’ in a nuclear war. An opposing state is to be prevented from attacking by the belief that an attack would be followed by retaliation. That requires that a nuclear state indicate the will and capacity to retaliate-that is, to use these weapons in a real war if necessary.

We explore the relationship between argument and narrative with reference to parables. Parables are typically thought to convey a message. In examining a parable, we can ask what that message is, whether the story told provides reasons for the message, and whether those reasons are good reasons. In exploring these questions, we employ as an inves-tigative technique the strategy of reconstructing parables as argu-ments. We then proceed to con-sider the cogency of those argu-ments. One can offer arguments through narratives and, in particu-lar, through parables, but that do-ing so likely brings more risks than benefits, from an epistemic point of view