Tucker McKinney

: Heidegger describes Dasein as subject to a constant pressure to bring its intentional performances into agreement with those of its peers and thence with a generic description of ‘what one [das Man] does’, called Dasein's conformism. I argue that extant accounts of this pressure, which appeal to the essential social embeddedness of intentional performance, fail to account for both the scope and modal force of the demand to act as one does. I propose that we can better understand the role of das Man in Heidegger's account of intentional agency by exploiting a structural similarity between ‘Dasein’ and the familiar notion of epistemic capacity, or a power of knowledge. The result is an account that locates the source of das Man's authority not in our social nature but in our shared aspiration to ontological understanding.

Heidegger claims that Dasein’s capacity for adopting intentional stances toward the world is grounded in the reflective structure of its being, which dictates that Dasein exists for the sake of a possibility of itself. Commentators have glossed this reflective structure in terms of the idea that our subjection to the normative demands of intentionality is grounded in a basic commitment to upholding an identity-concept, such as an occupation or social role. I argue that this gloss has serious adverse implications for Heidegger’s philosophical project and for the internal coherence of his theory of intention. I recommend an alternative gloss on the reflective structure of existence, according to which sustaining a robust claim to openness to the world specifies the universal, formal object of intentional stance-taking. The reflective structure of existence should be understood through the concept of self-maintenance, rather than self-definition.