Tully Rector

Capitalism is not only an economic order, but a form of life. Market socialism is proposed as an alternative, and should be assessed according to the standards of second-order coherence and social rationality that make a form of life habitable. I argue that it fails to meet those standards. Competitive market practices encode values that determine specific reasons for action and belief, reasons antithetical to those given by the principle of community. That principle, however, validates the politics under which common capital ownership is secured. The selfsame agents, in their fulfillment of essential and non-negotiable functional roles, are required to be equally responsive to incompatible reasons. This undermines the case for market socialism’s general stability.

One of the perennial fault-lines in monetary theory is that between commodity and credit theories of money. The emergence of alternative payment systems based on blockchain and distributed ledger technologies, of which Bitcoin is the most prominent example, has raised a host of important questions in relation to this debate. This article considers two. The first is ontological: Are Bitcoin and similar ‘cryptocurrencies’ best conceived of as money? The second is political: Do these money candidates represent an emancipatory development over state-backed fiat currency? The ontological question, we will argue, invites the political one. If it is the case, as Chartalists maintain, that (i) for some X to be money it must have certain properties which can only be imparted by political authority (broadly understood) and if (ii) political authority ought to be subject to public control, then attempts by private actors to usurp a social ‘money function’ cannot count as legitimate political developments. We will argue in support of this position. This discussion is limited to Bitcoin, though its implications generalize for relevantly similar cryptocurrencies. Our method involves considering, first, claims made by Bitcoin’s defenders about its status as money, and what accounts for that status. While these claims are often thought to extend Mengerite or generally Austrian lines of economic argument, they resonate more with Marx’s theory of monetary value. Moreover, a close assessment of that theory’s defects yields specific normative conclusions that potentially undermine the notion that Bitcoin constitutes a valid means of resisting state monetary authority.

This paper presents and defends a new conception of freedom as a value in the sphere of economic production. It challenges the common, proprietarian-contractual view of economic liberty. My alternative integrates three elements: compossible control, non-alienation, and reason-responsiveness. After surveying various forms of freedom, conceptual ground is cleared for the presentation of those three elements in a relational structure. I define them, show how they interpenetrate, and argue for their shared centrality. Compossible control involves a person’s conditions of economic agency being sufficiently under their influence to satisfy their entitlement to a self-directed life, consistent with others having equivalent control in their own case. Non-alienation involves having reasons to apprehend one’s productive activities as a worthy manifestation of one’s identity. Reason responsiveness obtains when the requirements of production that one faces can be met by weighing and acting on reasons one takes as normative. I then discuss possible objections to my account. These have to do with its consistency with market requirements, the coherence of its basic distinctions, and the importance ascribed to non-alienation. I show how each of these objections are defeated.

This paper offers a brief account and defense of freely associated production as a political ideal. I discuss its conceptual structure, specifying what is meant by free association in terms of economic production, the sense in which it is a value for political order, and its approximate place in an historical lineage of reflection on freedom. Given that our economic arrangements are constitutively determined by law and public policy, and involve relations of governing power, the values that legal authority must subserve bear directly on the productive sphere. One of those values – arguably the highest – is relational freedom. Reigning structures of production violate its demands. Without understanding the ways in which that violation occurs, we cannot effectively address some of our most urgent social crises.