Turlough O'Hagan

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one

The article argues that Rousseau's thought is unified by a non-materialistic, non-deterministic version of naturalism, according to which human beings are intrinsically good and intrinsically free, and at the same time moulded by their natural and social environment. Within that unity the article identifies a deep, creative tension between two competing visions of the best attainable form of human life: on the one hand a vision of a unified, integrated life , in which inner conflicts are at a minimum and the goal is happiness; on the other hand a vision of a divided life whose goal is self-mastery. In support of this interpretation of Rousseau, the article subjects the readings of Cassirer and Strauss-Masters to a detailed critique. It concludes with a brief examination of Rousseau's intriguing claim that he would 'rather be a man of paradoxes than a man of prejudices'