Tushar Chaturvedi

In the epistemology of peer disagreement, Conciliationism holds that discovering a disagreement with an epistemic peer rationally requires substantial revision in one’s credence. A novel explanation for this rational requirement, Accountability Thesis (Peter, Synthese 190(7):1253-1266, 2013), argues that it is grounded in irreducibly second-personal reasons arising from a relationship of mutual accountability between deliberating agents. This essay challenges this second-personal approach, arguing in favour of an explanation that invokes no irreducibly second-personal reasons. The alternative explanation, which appeals only to third-personal evidence and first-personal norms of rationality, is argued to be explanatorily superior. It is more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory scope, accounting for cases Accountability Thesis cannot, such as disagreement with absent epistemic peers. Furthermore, it provides a more complete account by integrating the dual evidential role of peer disagreement as both first-order testimonial evidence and higher-order evidence of one’s own fallibility. The essay does not argue that there could be no procedural epistemic obligations in deliberation with epistemic peers; such a claim would rule out other plausible understandings of epistemic peerhood. Nonetheless, it concludes that insofar as argument for Accountability Thesis operates within a standard Conciliationist framework, its second-personal explanation for Conciliationism does not succeed.

In the epistemology of peer disagreement, Conciliationism holds that discovering a disagreement with an epistemic peer rationally requires substantial revision in one’s credence. A novel explanation for this rational requirement, Accountability Thesis (Peter, Synthese 190(7):1253-1266, 2013), argues that it is grounded in irreducibly second-personal reasons arising from a relationship of mutual accountability between deliberating agents. This essay challenges this second-personal approach, arguing in favour of an explanation that invokes no irreducibly second-personal reasons. The alternative explanation, which appeals only to third-personal evidence and first-personal norms of rationality, is argued to be explanatorily superior. It is more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory scope, accounting for cases Accountability Thesis cannot, such as disagreement with absent epistemic peers. Furthermore, it provides a more complete account by integrating the dual evidential role of peer disagreement as both first-order testimonial evidence and higher-order evidence of one’s own fallibility. The essay does not argue that there could be no procedural epistemic obligations in deliberation with epistemic peers; such a claim would rule out other plausible understandings of epistemic peerhood. Nonetheless, it concludes that insofar as argument for Accountability Thesis operates within a standard Conciliationist framework, its second-personal explanation for Conciliationism does not succeed.