Tyler McNabb

The problem of divine hiddenness, currently a much‐discussed topic in analytic philosophy of religion, can be (roughly) summarized in the question, ‘Why is God not more obvious or apparent?’ Sometimes the problem is used to undermine theistic belief. Here we seek to add a unique contribution to the growing debate on this theme from the perspective of Reformed epistemology, particularly Alvin Plantinga's construal; moreover, we do so in a way that is theologically relevant. We conclude, with assistance from Scripture and from Plantinga, that the problem of divine hiddenness is not a problem for the Reformed epistemologist.

Say The Pro-Life View is the position that abortion involves unjustifiedly killing a fetus. And say The Anti-Factory Farming View is the position that factory farms are deeply immoral. One recent objection to The Pro-Life View is that it entails violence against abortion doctors is justified—a view that many find implausible. For the sake of argument, I don’t initially contest this claim—I grant (initially) The Pro-Life View is committed to this position. However, I argue The Anti-Factory Farming View is committed to a similar view, namely, that violence against factory farm workers is justified. Therefore, if this is a good objection to The Pro-Life View, it’s a good objection to The Anti-Factory Farm View. And if it’s not a good objection to the latter, it’s not a good objection to the former. Furthermore, I show why it isn’t crazy to think that violence against abortion doctors is only contingently wrong, and I provide an error theory for why people may think otherwise.

McNabb and Baldwin have recently argued that Classical Theism and Buddhism can be rendered in a logically consistent way. That is, one could theoretically endorse the theses of Classical Theism and the metaphysical theses of what they call mere Buddhism. One criticism of their project goes like this: McNabb and Baldwin's project, typical of analytic philosophy, is ahistorical. While McNabb and Baldwin's argument might go through with respect to some very generalized form of Buddhism, McNabb and Baldwin don't show that actual Buddhists who belong to robust Buddhist traditions can adhere to theism. In this article, I put forward the hypothesis that the Shentong tradition shows promise as an actual Buddhist tradition that is consistent with Classical Theism.

Tyler Dalton McNabb has recently argued that the metaphysics of a certain stripe of Classical Theism can be rendered consistent with the metaphysics of the medieval Buddhist philosopher, Dölpopa. In this paper, we seek to continue the conversation by investigating Dölpopa’s doctrine of the Buddha nature in more detail. Specifically, we seek to put into conversation, Dölpopa’s theology of the Buddha nature with Trinitarian theology. We argue that there are relevant similarities between the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and Dölpopa’s theology. In order to do this much, we first give a brief primer on Dolpopa’s doctrine of the Buddha nature and how it relates to Classical Theism. We then move to define what the Catholic Church means by the doctrine of the Trinity. Finally, we investigate relevant passages in the Mountain Dharma and put Dölpopa’s theology of the Buddha nature into conversation with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Scholastic and analytic philosophers have often criticized those Medieval ontological arguments which were inspired by Anselm’s _Proslogion_. Notably, Thomas Aquinas famously rejected contemporary ontological arguments on the grounds that they are committed to the mistaken thesis that God’s existence is self-evident. For Aquinas, the proposition “God exists” can only be self-evident to those who grasp God’s essence, yet we cannot possess such knowledge in this life. Meanwhile, analytic philosophers emphasize another criticism which was also anticipated by Aquinas: the charge that valid classical ontological arguments are question-begging, since they assume at the outset that some relevant description of God has an extramental referent. In this paper, we suggest that Scholastic ontological arguments may be more persuasive than critics allow. In particular, we seek to revive Bonaventure’s ontological argument for God’s existence outlined in _Journey of the Mind to God_, Chapter V. Having provided a concise formulation of the argument, we consider the motivation for each premise, drawing on Brian Leftow’s work on Ordinary Sensory Imagination and Kris McDaniel’s account of the analogy of being. We argue that since Bonaventure’s argument is consistent with a strong doctrine of divine ineffability, it is well placed to avoid Aquinas’ criticisms. Equally, Bonaventure’s background metaphysical commitments and epistemology of being afford him a way of arguing that his preferred description of God has an extramental referent. Although Bonaventure’s argument may be criticized at various stages, we conclude that it deserves further attention from Thomists and analytic philosophers alike.

McNabb and Baldwin have recently argued that Classical Theism and Buddhism can be rendered in a logically consistent way. That is, one could theoretically endorse the theses of Classical Theism and the metaphysical theses of what they call mere Buddhism. One criticism of their project goes like this: McNabb and Baldwin’s project, typical to analytic philosophy, is ahistorical. While McNabb and Baldwin’s argument might go through with respect to some very generalized form of Buddhism, McNabb and Baldwin don’t show that actual Buddhists who belong to robust Buddhist traditions can adhere to theism. In this paper, I put forward the hypothesis that the Shentong tradition shows promise as an actual Buddhist tradition that is consistent with Classical Theism.

The once popular thesis that non-Christians who are inculpably ignorant of the gospel can be saved through ‘implicit faith’ in Christ has fallen on hard times. In this paper, we consider objections raised against this position by a range of Catholic critics including Thomas Crean, Augustine DiNoia, Gavin D’Costa, and Stephen Bullivant. In our judgment, criticisms of ‘implicit faith’ often suffer from a lack of clarity about the nature of such faith, although admittedly this ambiguity was present even in original Scholastic uses of the term. However, in the past few decades analytic philosophers have explored many forms of belief which one might call ‘implicit’. Accordingly, we draw on both Scholastic and analytic epistemology to arrive at a more attractive characterisation of implicit faith. We argue that once implicit faith is understood in this way, recent objections to the claim that non-Christians can be saved through implicit faith are soluble. `

We take canonical theology, in its most minimal form, to be the normative thesis that the final shape of a canon ought to guide how one interprets the texts contained within the canon. Within the Christian tradition, a standard objection to canonical theology goes something like this: Given the diversity of canon lists, whose canon should we endorse? Should we prefer the Masoretic ordering or the LXX? If the Greek tradition, which Greek tradition? Call this the Problem of Canon List Diversity (PCLD). Appealing to scholastic hermeneutics, especially St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and recent developments in the theology of inspiration, we develop a successful response to PCLD.

I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausible and that, contrary to the Pandora’s Box objection, there are certain serious world religions that cannot successfully use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted. In arguing for, I deploy Ernest Sosa’s Swampman case to show that Plantinga’s proper function condition is a necessary condition for warrant. I then engage three objections to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, each of which attempts to demonstrate that his conditions for warrant are neither necessary nor sufficient. Having defended the plausibility of Plantinga’s theory of warrant, I present and expand his key arguments to the effect that naturalism cannot make use of it. These arguments provide the conceptual tools that are needed to argue for : that there are certain world religions that cannot legitimately use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted.

Many Buddhists tend to think that the world is overall, a good state of affairs, and that life is worth living. However, Yujin Nagasawa points out that there is a mismatch between the positive value one puts on the world and the Buddhist's metaphysics. Buddhism endorses the impermanence thesis which roughly states that all things exist only momentarily. And it's the impermanent nature of reality that leads to significant suffering in the world. If impermanence is a fundamental feature to reality, and, if suffering is primarily linked to the impermanent nature of reality, how can one consistently give an optimistic assessment of the value of the world? In this paper, I come to the aid of the Buddhist and point to how she might develop her own response to this problem.

Inspired by Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), we develop an argument—the “Scriptural Argument Against Dogmatic Protestantism” (SAADP)—that Protestants who accept the doctrine of sola scriptura cannot reasonably hold that Catholic and Eastern churches are in doctrinal error. If sola scriptura is true and Catholic and Eastern Churches have fallen into error, it is improbable that any Protestant can reliably form true beliefs about controversial points of Christian doctrine, including sola scriptura or suggestions that Catholic and Eastern Christians are in error. We evaluate potential responses to SADDP, considering how SAADP should affect ecumenical doctrinal debates.

The testimony that Jesus rose from the dead or that St. Francis miraculously received stigmata is supposed to vindicate Christianity over other religious traditions. Similarly, the rainbow bodies of important spiritual exemplars in Tibetan Buddhism can be taken to justify the Buddhist tradition over its counterparts. What should we believe when the evidence suggests that the competing miracle claims contained in two different religious contexts both happened? One of David Hume's arguments against miracles is that the competing testimonies in diverse religious traditions cancel each other out. In this paper, we argue against Hume. Specifically, we argue that there is logical space for thinking that Buddhist and Christian miracle claims are not competing but can be understood as consistent.

McNabb and DeVito have recently argued that Graham Oppy’s objections to the First Way are found wanting. Specifically, they argue that Oppy has mischaracterised the argument. McNabb and DeVito then restructure the First Way on behalf of St. Thomas. More recently, Joseph Schmid and Daniel Linford argue that the restructured argument given by McNabb and DeVito is problematic. For it is either valid but unmotivated or it is plainly invalid. In this paper, I argue that McNabb and DeVito’s schematic glossing of the First Way is both valid and motivated.

Tyler Dalton McNabb and Michael DeVito develop a thoroughly original and Orthodox model for how Christian belief, and, even specifically Eastern Christian belief, can be warranted. They do this by creatively bringing recent work on religious experience, in the context of the Divine Liturgy, into conversation with Alvin Plantinga’s well-known explication of Reformed Epistemology. What emerges is a distinctly Eastern Christian approach to warranted Christian belief, that modifies and, arguably, improves upon Plantinga’s original model.

If you were to take a time machine and travel back to the 1980s, Catholic epistemology would look drastically different than it does today, at least in analytic circles. One of those drastic changes relates to whether Catholic epistemology is consistent with Reformed epistemology. Another issue relates to whether St. Thomas Aquinas was a classical evidentialist. In this paper, I survey recent developments in Catholic epistemology. I do this by first looking at Gregory Stacey's recent work arguing the Catholic Church's teaching on faith is best situated in a Reformed epistemological framework. I then engage decades old objections to Reformed epistemology from a Catholic perspective. I respond to these objections partly by surveying recent work by Catholic epistemologists. The paper then takes a turn to look at the recent scholarship on Aquinas' epistemology. I show that there is now an emerging consensus that Aquinas belongs not to a hard evidentialist camp as it was previously thought, but rather an externalist friendly tradition.

How is God related to the state? Could the existence of robust political authority somehow be evidence for God? In this Element, the author explores these questions, pro and con, looking at various major positions. At the start of the volume, they defend a political argument for God's existence. Having motivated a theistic account of political authority, they then discuss the role God plays or could play in classical liberalism, Marxism, and postliberalism. While they sympathetically survey each political theory in turn, at the end of each section, they raise various objections to the view being discussed. Finally, at the end of the Element, the author articulates desiderata for theists who are looking for political frameworks

In this paper, informed by Vatican 2 and one of its premier modern day scholars, Gerald O'Collins, we will argue (1), that while the Christian evangelist should proclaim that Jesus is the only way to God, she should nonetheless be open to the possibility that Christ is saving those in non-Christian traditions as non-explicit or anonymous Christians, and, (2), that other serious religious traditions can be interpreted as doctrinally consistent with (or something nearby) the Nicene Christian tradition. In conclusion, these theses will lead us to argue that in the Christian's approach to evangelism, her first step in persuading her non-Christian counterpart should be to emphasize the commonality that exists between the Christian tradition and the relevant non-Christian tradition. The evangelist then, should not see her main task as developing arguments against her interlocuter's religious tradition (though, this has its place), but rather her focus should be on proclaiming an additional truth that her interlocuter can accept alongside many of her already held religious commitments.

In this essay, we put forth a novel solution to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, utilizing recent work done by Duncan Pritchard on radical skepticism. Key to the success of Plantinga’s argument is the doubting of the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties. We argue (viz. Pritchard and Wittgenstein) that the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties constitutes a hinge commitment, thus is exempt from rational evaluation. In turn, the naturalist who endorses hinge epistemology can deny the key premise in Plantinga’s argument and avoid the dilemma posed on belief in the conjunction of naturalism and evolution.

This book breaks new ground for the philosophy of religion by showcasing work that engages with the lived reality of the spiritual life. It demonstrates that philosophy’s relationship with spirituality is more than a historical curiosity and that, in the twenty-first century, it is still meaningful to think about philosophy in connection with spirituality. The chapters are organised around the following themes: spiritual practice and philosophical understanding; philosophical reflections on living a spiritual life; philosophical problems concerning the spiritual life. The first part discusses whether or not the topic of spirituality should be given a more fundamental role within the philosophy of religion, and, if so, how that might be accomplished. The second part addresses fundamental issues concerning human beings, their lives, and their self-understanding in relation to the spiritual life. The final part considers philosophical problems that emerge when discussing the spiritual life. By bringing together discussions of these topics this volume constitutes a valuable resource for scholars in disciplines in which the spiritual life is a focus of interest, particularly philosophy, theology, and religious studies.

Abstract:In this essay we argue that, based on current scientific data, the most prudential course of future actions that an American conservative can take, is one that assumes what we call climate change alarmism. In order to establish this thesis, we first provide a basic overview of the relevant climate change science, as well as give an analysis of the alarmist and lukewarming dialectic (the two primary interpretations of the data). We then move to develop our environmental wager. Finally, following Roger Scruton, we end this work by proposing what sort of policies conservatives should endorse going further.

. In this essay, we move to further advance the work done on God and emotions by RT Mullins, exploring the role exhaustive divine foreknowledge plays as it relates to God’s emotional life. Given our preliminary investigation at the intersection of divine foreknowledge and divine emotions, and focusing specifically on the neoclassical theistic conception of God, we argue that in light of God’s foreknowledge, his emotional life is dissimilar when compared to that of his creation. That said, our primary aim is one of exploration: Should divine foreknowledge play a role in how we understand God’s emotional life? Given our analysis, we answer in the affirmative.