Tyra Lennie

Despite a heavy philosophical focus on issues pertaining to immigration, little discussion is taken up that examines the duties we owe to migrant children. This article works to bridge the gap between global justice literature and work on children’s autonomy and well-being. To capture what migrant children experience in the context of immigration and detention, the article examines the conditions on the island country of Nauru, where at least 222 migrant children experienced detention between the years of 2013 and 2019. Using this lived experience as an example, the article argues that we owe children specific positive duties, which are further supported by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Throughout this article, the aim is to indicate how migrant children occupy a particularly vulnerable and nonautonomous status in the context of detention. Because of this, children are owed especially weighty positive duties that are not discussed in the current global justice literature.

In this thesis, I develop a theory of wrongful discrimination that uses a social concept of autonomy as its foundation. Chapters One and Two examine how extant accounts of wrongful discrimination lack a robust explanation of how our social and external environments impact the formation and exercise of autonomy. Chapters Three and Four develop a detailed social concept of autonomy and explain how external forces can infringe upon autonomy. Chapters Five and Six of this thesis explain how infringements on autonomy become wrongful discrimination when they attach to systems of oppression and subordination, before testing the theory by analyzing fifteen cases from Canadian case law. Ultimately, this thesis fills a gap in existing literature by using a feminist and social formulation of autonomy to discuss how acts of differentiation become acts of wrongful discrimination through connection to hierarchy and systems of oppression.

In this paper, I examine John Rawls’ claim in the first edition of A Theory of Justice that Justice as Fairness cannot include considerations about the environment and non-human animals. The paper aims to resolve the tension in this statement, as the idea of a Rawlsian well-ordered society without concern for the rest of nature presents as a contradiction. Through a more charitable reading of Rawlsian theory that borrows from anti-capitalist and environmental justice frameworks, we can see how Rawlsian justice connects tightly to these issues. I conclude that the Rawlsian well-ordered society must be committed to anti-capitalist environmental justice.

In this article, I argue that existing literature discounts the role of self-improvement in Astellian friendship. To make this element central, I show how an Epicurean analysis of Astellian friendship brings self-improvement clearly into focus. On the way to centering self-improvement, I show how extant accounts imply self-improvement without explicitly setting up the architecture to explain this element of Astellian friendship. Self-improvement is centralized by way of three shared themes between the Epicurean Garden and the Astellian religious retirement: the motivation to enter, the project inside, and the manner of friendship.