Tzofit Ofengenden

¿Podemos distinguir la memoria de la imaginación? La visión constructiva contemporánea de la memoria, que sustituyó a la visión archivística, ha sido la perspectiva dominante durante los últimos treinta años. Sin embargo, aunque está ampliamente aceptado que la memoria episódica es constructiva, no hay consenso sobre hasta qué punto el recuerdo episódico es factivo o construido y cómo se alinea con la imaginación. El debate actual se centra en la (des)continuidad entre el recuerdo episódico y la imaginación, en concreto, si el recuerdo episódico debe conservar alguna conexión causal con episodios pasados a través de un rastro de memoria (engrama) o si puede ser totalmente construido. Este debate continúa los antiguos desafíos filosóficos de distinguir la memoria de la imaginación.El artículo conecta las discusiones filosóficas históricas sobre las distinciones entre memoria e imaginación con el debate actual sobre si son del mismo tipo. Comienza examinando los criterios que los filósofos han utilizado para diferenciar la memoria de la imaginación, rastreando la discusión desde Hume hasta los debates contemporáneos. La segunda parte explora cómo la psicología cognitiva y la neurobiología han iniciado una nueva discusión sobre la formación de la memoria, argumentando que la reciente investigación neurocientífica apoya la teoría constructiva de la memoria y se alinea con el enfoque del continuum, sugiriendo que la memoria y la imaginación son del mismo tipo.

This article challenges the claim that conscientious refusal and conscientious provision in healthcare are mutually exclusive and thus asymmetrical. While US law protects healthcare providers who refuse to perform medical services on moral or religious grounds, it offers no equivalent protections to those who feel morally compelled to provide care when the service is legally prohibited. This legal asymmetry has become more pressing following the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization decision, which overturned Roe v. Wade and triggered a wave of state‐level abortion bans. Responding to recent arguments by Kulesa and Giubilini, who contend that the symmetry thesis is false and that conscientious refusal and provision cannot be justified within the same professional framework, this article argues that their position misrepresents the symmetry and constructs a strawman. It demonstrates that refusal and provision are not intended to apply simultaneously in identical cases but rather arise in distinct legal and institutional contexts. The article also critiques the rigid distinction between “pathocentric” and “interest‐centric” models of medicine, arguing that professional goals in medicine are plural, contested, and often internally conflicted. Denying moral and professional legitimacy to conscientious provision while protecting conscientious refusal undermines ethical consistency, professional integrity, and respect for moral diversity. In a society with conflicting moral frameworks, protecting both negative and positive conscience claims is necessary to uphold justice, respect provider autonomy, and ensure patient care. The symmetry thesis, understood as the equal moral and legal status of conscience‐based refusal and provision, is both defensible and essential.

In this paper, I deal with the constructive and dynamic nature of memory formation and with the nature of memory belief, whether a memory belief reflects the real past experience or a modified memory representation. That is I grapple with the issue of whether such a belief adheres to the final stage of memory or reflects the whole constructive process of memory. After examining the multiple-trace and reconsolidation theories of memory, I conclude that recent findings in neuroscience fundamentally disturb conventional notions of memory belief, since beliefs do not reflect the reconstructive processes episodic and autobiographical memories go through.