Udo Schüklenk

_50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists presents_ a collection of original essays drawn from an international group of prominent voices in the fields of academia, science, literature, media and politics who offer carefully considered statements of why they are atheists. Features a truly international cast of contributors, ranging from public intellectuals such as Peter Singer, Susan Blackmore, and A.C. Grayling, novelists, such as Joe Haldeman, and heavyweight philosophers of religion, including Graham Oppy and Michael Tooley Contributions range from rigorous philosophical arguments to highly personal, even whimsical, accounts of how each of these notable thinkers have come to reject religion in their lives Likely to have broad appeal given the current public fascination with religious issues and the reception of such books as _The God Delusion_ and _The End of Faith_.

A number of authors have attempted to provide a consequentialist ethical justification for the accommodation of conscientious objectors.1 Steve Clarke’s article is the most recent such effort.2 Clarke essentially suggests that objectors should be accommodated because they would benefit from that accommodation, and that seems to make accommodation ethically desirable. He also acknowledges the empirical evidence demonstrating that accommodating objectors has detrimental health consequences for patients.3 For reasons not given in his article, he thinks these detrimental effects can be counteracted by creating a registry. Variations of this idea have been suggested by other contributors to this debate. Typically, they propose that conscientious objectors should register with a health authority so that patients can determine whether they will receive a particular health service.4 Clarke’s original contribution is the suggestion that all non-objectors—doctors who are willing to do the job they voluntarily signed up to do—should register instead. This is a far more resource-intensive undertaking than the registration of conscientious objectors. It seems perverse that conscientious doctors doing their job should be required to register their intent …

‘Moral status’ is simply a convenient label for ‘is owed moral consideration of a kind’. This chapter argues that we should abandon it and instead focus on the question of what kinds of dispositional capabilities, species memberships, relationships etc., constitute ethically defensible criteria that justifiably trigger particular kinds of moral obligations. Chimeras, human brain organoids, and artificial intelligence do not pose new challenges. Existing conceptual frameworks, and the criteria for moral consideration that they trigger (species membership, sentientism, personhood) are still defensible and applicable. The challenge at hand is arguably an empirical challenge that philosophers and ethicists qua philosophers and ethicists are ill equipped to handle. The challenge that needs addressing is essentially whether a self-learning AI machine, that responds exactly in the same way to a particular event as a person or sentient being would, should be treated as if it was such a person or sentient being, despite doubts about its de facto lack of dispositional capabilities that would normally give rise to such responses.

The COVID-19 pandemic has coincided with the proliferation of ethical guidance documents to assist public health authorities, health care providers, practitioners and staff with responding to ethical challenges posed by the pandemic. Like ethical guidelines relating to infectious disease that have preceded them, what unites many COVID-19 guidance documents is their dependency on an under-developed approach to bioethical principlism, a normative framework that attempts to guide actions based on a list of prima facie, unranked ethical principles. By situating them in relation to the key philosophical debates concerning bioethical principlism, we aim to explore the limits and limitations of pandemic ethical guidance documents as, specifically, ethics documents – documents that fulfil the functions of ethics as a fundamentally normative discipline. This means not only determining whether such ethical guidance documents can, in principle, provide adequate action guidance and action justification, but also, more importantly where pandemics are concerned, determining whether they support consistent decision making and transparent processes of justification. Having highlighted the problems with merely furnishing ethical guidelines with substantive ethical content in terms of principles and values, we argue that organizations that develop these documents should, instead, focus on the procedural dimensions of action guidance and action justification, which extend to questions regarding the make-up of the committees, panels and groups that develop such guidelines, the public transparency of justifications for specific pandemic-related advice or interventions and the development of explicit procedures for transparent and consistent decision making.

Tackling a host of myths and prejudices commonly leveled at atheism, this captivating volume bursts with sparkling, eloquent arguments on every page. The authors rebut claims that range from atheism being just another religion to the alleged atrocities committed in its name. An accessible yet scholarly commentary on hot-button issues in the debate over religious belief Teaches critical thinking skills through detailed, rational argument Objectively considers each myth on its merits Includes a history of atheism and its advocates, an appendix detailing atheist organizations, and an extensive bibliography Explains the differences between atheism and related concepts such as agnosticism and naturalism.

The proper role, if any, for religion-based arguments is a live and sometimes heated issue within the field of bioethics. The issue attracts heat primarily because bioethical analyses influence the outcomes of controversial court cases and help shape legislation in sensitive biopolicy areas. A problem for religious bioethicists who seek to influence biopolicy is that there is now widespread academic and public acceptance, at least within liberal democracies, that the state should not base its policies on any particular religion’s metaphysical claims or esoteric moral system. In response, bioethicists motivated by religious concerns have adopted two identifiable strategies. Sometimes they rely on slippery-slope arguments that, sometimes at least, have empirically testable premises. A more questionable response is the manipulation and misuse of secular-sounding moral language, such as references to “human dignity,” and the plights of groups of people labeled “vulnerable.”

In an article in this journal, Christopher Cowley argues that we have ‘misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors’.1 We have not. It is Cowley who has misunderstood the role of personal values in the profession of medicine. We argue that there should be better protections for patients from doctors' personal values and there should be more severe restrictions on the right to conscientious objection, particularly in relation to assisted dying. We argue that eligible patients could be guaranteed access to medical services that are subject to conscientious objections by: (1) removing a right to conscientious objection; (2) selecting candidates into relevant medical specialities or general practice who do not have objections; (3) demonopolizing the provision of these services away from the medical profession.

The book provides an argument against a right to conscientious objection by healthcare professionals. In increasingly multicultural societies inspired by pluralism, and given the range of controversial medical procedures that are or will be legal in many countries, claims about healthcare professionals' right to abide by their own moral or religious views in the exercise of their profession become more frequent. This book explains why arguments for pluralism, tolerance, and diversity that support a right to freedom of conscience in society at large do not support the same right within the healthcare profession, or indeed any profession governed by internal norms of professionalism that someone freely decides to enter.

We argue that, in certain circumstances, doctors might beprofessionallyjustified to provide abortions even in those jurisdictions where abortion is illegal. That it is at least professionally permissible does not mean that they have an all-things-considered ethical justification or obligation to provide illegal abortions or that professional obligations or professional permissibility trump legal obligations. It rather means that professional organisations should respect and indeed protect doctors’ positive claims of conscience to provide abortions if they plausibly track what is in the best medical interests of their patients. It is the responsibility of state authorities to enforce the law, but it is the responsibility of professional organisations to uphold the highest standards of medical ethics, even when they conflict with the law. Whatever the legal sanctions in place, healthcare professionals should not be sanctioned by the professional bodies for providing abortions according to professional standards, even if illegally. Indeed, professional organisation should lobby to offer protection to such professionals. Our arguments have practical implications for what healthcare professionals and healthcare professional organisations may or should do in those jurisdictions that legally prohibit abortion, such as some US States after the reversal ofRoe v Wade.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic is a serious public health and economic emergency, and although effective vaccines are the best weapon we have against it, there are groups and individuals who oppose certain kinds of vaccines because of personal moral or religious reasons. The most widely discussed case has been that of certain religious groups that oppose research on COVID-19 vaccines that use cell lines linked to abortions and that object to receiving those vaccine because of their moral opposition to abortion. However, moral opposition to COVID-19 vaccine research can be based on other considerations, both secular and religious. We argue that religious or personal moral objections to vaccine research are unethical and irresponsible, and in an important sense often irrational. They are unethical because of the risk of causing serious harm to other people for no valid reason; irresponsible because they run counter to individual and collective responsibilities to contribute to important public health goals; and in the case of certain kinds of religious opposition, they might be irrational because they are internally inconsistent. All in all, our argument translates into the rather uncontroversial claim that we should prioritize people’s lives over religious freedom in vaccine research and vaccination roll out.

In an article in this journal, Christopher Cowley argues that we have ‘misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors’. We have not. It is Cowley who has misunderstood the role of personal values in the profession of medicine. We argue that there should be better protections for patients from doctors' personal values and there should be more severe restrictions on the right to conscientious objection, particularly in relation to assisted dying. We argue that eligible patients could be guaranteed access to medical services that are subject to conscientious objections by: removing a right to conscientious objection; selecting candidates into relevant medical specialities or general practice who do not have objections; demonopolizing the provision of these services away from the medical profession.

Research into the genetic component of some complex behaviors often causes controversy, depending on the social meaning and significance of the behavior under study. Research into sexual orientation—simplistically referred to as “gay gene” research—is an example of research that provokes intense controversy. This research is worrisome for many reasons, including the fact that it has been used to harm lesbians and gay men. Many homosexual people have been forced to undergo “treatments” to change their sexual orientation. Others chose to undergo them to escape discrimination and social disapprobation. But there are other reasons to worry about such research. The very motivation for seeking an “origin” of homosexuality reveals homophobia. Moreover, such research may lead to prenatal tests that claim to predict for homosexuality. For homosexual people who live in countries with no legal protections these dangers are particularly serious.

ABSTRACT Most pharmaceutical research carried out today is focused on the treatment and management of the lifestyle diseases of the developed world. Diseases that affect mainly poor people are neglected in research advancements in treatment because they cannot generate large financial returns on research and development costs. Benefit sharing arrangements for the use of indigenous resources and genetic research could only marginally address this gap in research and development in diseases that affect the poor. Benefit sharing as a strategy is conceptually problematic, even if one, as we do, agrees that impoverished indigenous communities should not be exploited and that they should be assisted in improving their living conditions. The accepted concept of intellectual property protection envisages clearly defined originators and owners of knowledge, whereas the concept of community membership is fluid and indigenous knowledge is, by its very nature, open, with the originator(s) lost in the mists of time. The delineation of ‘community’ presents serious conceptual and practical difficulties as few communities form discrete, easily discernable groups, and most have problematic leadership structures. Benefit sharing is no substitute for governments’ responsibility to uplift impoverished communities. Benefit sharing arrangements may be fraught with difficulties but considerations of respect and equity demand that prior informed consent and consultation around commercialisation of knowledge take place with the source community and their government.1.

ABSTRACT This article examines the way in which some biomedical ethicists have constructed sexually transmitted AIDS as a significant threat to women's health. We demonstrate that the familiar claim that‘women are the fastest growing group'— whether of HIV‐infected or of AIDS patients — is misleading because it obscures the distinction between proportional rate of growth and absolute increase. Feminist ethicists have suggested that misogyny of a male dominated health care system has led to underreporting of women AIDS cases in order to support these feminists’claim of AIDS being a real threat to women's health. Given the apparent rarity of tertiary transmissions of AIDS, the assertion that most or even many women are at significant risk for AIDS seem wrong. Particularly disturbing in this campaign is the fact that the theme of‘risky sex’has been extended all the way to lesbians, even though their risk to acquire AIDS sexually is non‐existent to minuscule. We argue that actual harm is done to women by this exaggeration of their risk of contracting AIDS sexually. The scare has led to misappropriations of scarce health care funds. AIDS disproportionately affects women who inject drugs, and who suffer other diseases, poverty and malnutrition. It would have been better to concentrate health care efforts in this area instead of‘educating’women not at risk for AIDS how to prevent the acquisition of this disease. Unjustifiable AIDS anxiety has been created in women and has resulted in millions of unnecessary HIV‐tests, and many broken relationships. This anxiety has inevitably reduced the pleasure of having sex for many women. We reject the kind of‘victim ideology’that lies at the heart of this strategy which has, unfortunately, been supported by a number of influential feminist ethicists.