Ugo Perone

The following remarks try to trace a scenario of twentieth-century philosophy, which in my opinion shows a new interest in the issue of time. Many have underscored that nineteenth-century philosophy replaces the paradigm of Nature with that of History as an historical a priori in Foucault’s sense, that is, as the horizon within which the problems are to be located and solved. The issue of identifying the dominant nineteenth-century paradigm—further complicated by thedeclining resort to the great narratives of this “short century”—is still open, so I do not believe it improper to point out that many twentiethcentury philosophers suddenly reconsidered the issue of time as a way of defining the nineteenth-century paradigm of time in a new manner.

The political does not exist. What exists is individual and collective life; there is nature, with its inexhaustible cycles; there is the world, the (blind and astute) interlacement of the actions, conflicts and visions that will become history. The political exists only as an invention: the invention of a specific space of the relation that intercepts life, modifies nature, and is a curvature of the world. I would like to dwell on this invention, not without warning that the political of which one speaks precedes and constitutes specific kinds of politics, since it is the condition of their possibility.

The following remarks try to trace a scenario of twentieth-century philosophy, which in my opinion shows a new interest in the issue of time. Many have underscored that nineteenth-century philosophy replaces the paradigm of Nature with that of History as an historical a priori in Foucault’s sense, that is, as the horizon within which the problems are to be located and solved. The issue of identifying the dominant nineteenth-century paradigm—further complicated by thedeclining resort to the great narratives of this “short century”—is still open, so I do not believe it improper to point out that many twentiethcentury philosophers suddenly reconsidered the issue of time as a way of defining the nineteenth-century paradigm of time in a new manner.

A practical hermeneutics of time. The Possible Present unfolds from within a freely reinterpreted hermeneutic perspective and provides an original theoretical proposal on the topic of time. In dialogue especially with the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger, but resorting also to suggestions coming from a theological background (Barth and Bonhoeffer), the work proposes a personal and original theory of time centered on a conception of the present that does not reduce temporality to a succession of mere instants. When one claims that time is ungraspable, one refers neither to the past (which is rather irretrievable) nor to the future (which is rather uncertain) but to the present. The present in which we are is in fact what fades from our hands without break. The present is a decisive threshold for finite existence. It is the threshold where past and future meet and can give birth to a livable horizon of meaning. Dilating the present and giving it a meaningful chance to be is a task for philosophy. It is the attempt of giving time to time and also giving it shape, place, and space. To succeed at this task while rediscovering the sources of a narrative way of thinking that in truth it has never abandoned, philosophy must go back and turn time into the primary object of discourse, like in stories, which are precisely the attempt at disposing the temporal flow of events according to a meaning. Perone argues that in time, however, what passes is not simply decline, but rather something irreducible, an exteriority that must be said.

Die Hermeneutik setzt sich mit dem Subjekt auseinander, sie entdeckt dessen List und Tauschung, sie schafft es aber nicht ab. Sie uberlasst es vielmehr der geduldigen Arbeit der Interpretation den Faden der Ariadne zu probieren, der uns nicht aus dem Labyrinth der Welt herausfuhrt, sondern es in einen bewohnbaren Ort verwandelt. Um dies zu tun, muss man am Subjekt gesichert arbeiten und sich gleichzeitig zu seinen aussersten Grenzen vorstrecken: wieder das Subjekt denken aber, zur gleichen Zeit und trotz dem Subjekt, uber das Subjekt hinaus denken. Das Buch verfolgt die Etappen, den Wechsel des Subjekts der Modernitat und kreuzt damit das Endliche und die Zeitlichkeit, den Wunsch und das Bedurfnis, die Erinnerung und das Zeugnis. Es entsteht die Moglichkeit eines neuen Subjekts, das nicht mehr verschlossen und selbstandig ist, sondern von einer Komplexitat und einer Andersheit durchquert ist, welche es grunden und bilden; ihm kann die Aufgabe der Philosophie als Suche nach der Wahrheit wieder anvertreut werden.

The title of this essay suggests a chiasm that interweaves name and image, difference and identity. Neither a zero-sum equation nor an analogy where known meets unknown, this chiasm points out an unresolved knot that cannot be simply unravelled just cutting it. Besides parallelisms in each tradition, both name and image include identity and difference – between themselves and the objects they design. The aim of this short essay is to investigate difference and identity, not simply stating the two terms, but searching the relation between them

The eulogy of philosophy is the impossible and necessary praise of a discipline all at the same time,as modern philosophy is subject to a twofold condition of being detached from truth and not living without truth; needing and waiting for truth, without really wishing it. According to the Author who draws a global balance of his theory, philosophy is that action of the man searching for his measure in saying how things are but so as to allow the full manifestation of things ; and further on, in such a way that this manifestation engages responsibly in the respect and protection not only of the thing said but also of every other thing and every other speaker.

The author outlines the outcome of the paradigm of secularisation. The importance of this category of historical comprehension lies in the close connection which the majority of scholars establishes between modernity and secularisation. This connection unfolds in two forms: the first, more extended, establishes a continuity between past and present and awards secularisation the function of having transformed the sacred society of the past into the secular society of the present ; the second, more interesting and deeper vision, sets secularisation at the origin of modernity as a brake and interruption of the tradition. The author tries to overcome the oppositional structure of paradigm of secularisation which underlies both forms and suggests that the true characteristic of modernity lies in the new and inclusive role of the political sphere. Rationality, inclusivity and immanence, which are typical characteristics of secularisation, can be traced back to this sphere. It so becomes possible to justify novelty and secularism of modernity in a way which avoids the dualistic scheme of secularisation. Secularisation sets the form of modernity in a somehow transcendental way, but it doesn’t determine its contents.