•  71
    Limits of Abductivism About Logic
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solv…Read more
  •  86
    Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good
    European Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    So-called optimists about moral testimony argue, against pessimists, that, ceteris paribus, we ought to accept and act in accordance with trustworthy, pure moral testimony. I argue that even if we grant this, we need to explain why moral testimony cannot make us more virtuous. I offer an explanation that appeals to the fact that we cannot share inferential abilities via testimony. This explanation is compatible with the core commitments of optimism, but it also allows us to see what is right abo…Read more
  •  97
    Expressing Validity: Towards a Self-Sufficient Inferentialism
    In Martin Blicha & Igor Sedlár (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2019, College Publications. forthcoming.
    For semantic inferentialists, the basic semantic concept is validity. An inferentialist theory of meaning should offer an account of the meaning of "valid." If one tries to add a validity predicate to one's object language, however, one runs into problems like the v-Curry paradox. In previous work, I presented a validity predicate for a non-transitive logic that can adequately capture its own meta-inferences. Unfortunately, in that system, one cannot show of any inference that it is invalid. Her…Read more
  •  227
    Virtues for the Imperfect
    Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (4): 605-625. 2018.
    We suggest a new neo-Aristotelian account of right action: An action A is right for an agent S in a situation C just in case it is possible for A in C to result from a good practical inference. A practical inference is good if people must have a disposition to make such practical inferences where a society is to flourish. One advantage of this account is that it applies to non-ideal agents. It thus blocks the right-but-not-virtuous objection to virtue ethics. Our account furthermore suggests a n…Read more
  •  330
    Do the Virtues Make You Happy?
    Philosophical Inquiries 7 (2): 181-202. 2019.
    We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept 'happiness' is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn't deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn't imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing set…Read more
  •  9
    While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from curren…Read more
  •  208
    Foot Without Achilles’ Heel
    Philosophia 47 (5): 1501-1515. 2019.
    It is often assumed that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics postulates an obligation to be a good human being and that it derives further obligations from this idea. The paper argues that this assumption is false, at least for Philippa Foot’s view. Our argument blocks a widespread objection to Foot’s view, and it shows how virtue ethics in general can neutralize such worries.
  •  183
    Inferring by Attaching Force
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 701-714. 2019.
    The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.
  •  128
    According to McHugh and Way reasoning is a person-level attitude revision that is regulated by its constitutive aim of getting fitting attitudes. They claim that this account offers an explanation of what is wrong with reasoning in ways one believes to be bad and that this explanation is an alternative to an explanation that appeals to the so-called Taking Condition. I argue that their explanation is unsatisfying.
  •  426
    We cannot infer by accepting testimony
    Philosophical Studies 176 (10): 2589-2598. 2019.
    While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
  •  244
    The Cut‐Free Approach and the Admissibility‐Curry
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1): 40-48. 2018.
    The perhaps most important criticism of the nontransitive approach to semantic paradoxes is that it cannot truthfully express exactly which metarules preserve validity. I argue that this criticism overlooks that the admissibility of metarules cannot be expressed in any logic that allows us to formulate validity-Curry sentences and that is formulated in a classical metalanguage. Hence, the criticism applies to all approaches that do their metatheory in classical logic. If we do the metatheory of …Read more
  •  238
    Faithfulness for naive validity
    Synthese 196 (11): 4759-4774. 2019.
    Nontransitive responses to the validity Curry paradox face a dilemma that was recently formulated by Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer. It seems that, in the nontransitive logic ST enriched with a validity predicate, either you cannot prove that all derivable metarules preserve validity, or you can prove that instances of Cut that are not admissible in the logic preserve validity. I respond on behalf of the nontransitive approach. The paper argues, first, that we should reject the detachment principl…Read more
  •  526
    Choosing Your Nonmonotonic Logic: A Shopper’s Guide
    In Pavel Arazim & Tomáš Lávička (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2017, College Publications. pp. 109-123. 2018.
    The paper presents an exhaustive menu of nonmonotonic logics. The options are individuated in terms of the principles they reject. I locate, e.g., cumulative logics and relevance logics on this menu. I highlight some frequently neglected options, and I argue that these neglected options are particularly attractive for inferentialists.
  •  833
    “Philosophy isn’t useful for changing the world,” parents of philosophy students and Karl Marx tell us (at least about non-Marxist philosophy). Cristina Bicchieri’s new book Norms in the Wild provides an impressive antidote against this worry. It stands to change of social practices as Che Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare stands to political revolutions. Bicchieri combines hands-on advice on how to change social practices with compelling theoretical analyses of social norms. She draws heavily on her …Read more
  •  202
    When Structural Principles Hold Merely Locally
    In Pavel Arazim & Tomáš Lávička (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2016, College Publications. pp. 53-67. 2017.
    In substructural logics, structural principles may hold in some fragments of a consequence relation without holding globally. I look at this phenomenon in my preferred substructural logic, in which Weakening and Cut fail but which is supra-intuitionistic. I introduce object language operators that keep track of the admissibility of Weakening and of intuitionistic implications. I end with some ideas about local transitivity.
  •  289
    Regel und Witz. Wittgensteinsche Perspektiven auf Mathematik, Sprache und Moral (review)
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3): 416-419. 2010.
    Review of Timo-Peter Ertz's "Regel und Witz. Wittgensteinsche Perspektiven auf Mathematik, Sprache und Moral," Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 2008.
  •  1008
    Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference
    Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 419-429. 2014.
    I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point out that there is an ana…Read more
  •  415
    Anti-Normativism Evaluated
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3): 376-395. 2015.
    I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore th…Read more
  •  554
    Social norms and unthinkable options
    Synthese 193 (8). 2016.
    We sometimes violate social norms in order to express our views and to trigger public debates. Many extant accounts of social norms don’t give us any insight into this phenomenon. Drawing on Cristina Bicchieri’s work, I am putting forward an empirical hypothesis that helps us to understand such norm violations. The hypothesis says, roughly, that we often adhere to norms because we are systematically blind to norm-violating options. I argue that this hypothesis is independently plausible and has …Read more
  •  352
    A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists
    In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dančák (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2015, College Publications. pp. 87-105. 2016.
    I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex language. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) logical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence relation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal …Read more
  •  383
    Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1): 1-16. 2016.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of…Read more
  •  436
    There Are Diachronic Norms of Rationality
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1): 38-45. 2015.
    Some philosophers have recently argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality, that is, that there are no norms regarding how you should change your attitudes over time. I argue that this is wrong on the grounds that there are norms governing reasoning
  •  86
    On Anscombe’s Philosophical Method
    Klēsis Revue Philosophique 35 180-198. 2016.
    While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two reasons: First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy: Her view differs considerably from curren…Read more
  •  113
    Impaired facial emotion recognition in patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsy associated with hippocampal sclerosis (MTLE-HS): Side and age at onset matters
    with Chaturbhuj Rathore, Aley Alexander, Sankara Sarma, and Kurupath Radhakrishnan
    Epilepsy Research 80 (2-3). 2008.
    To define the determinants of impaired facial emotion recognition (FER) in patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsy associated with hippocampal sclerosis (MTLE-HS), we examined 76 patients with unilateral MTLE-HS, 36 prior to antero-mesial temporal lobectomy (AMTL) and 40 after AMTL, and 28 healthy control subjects with a FER test consisting of 60 items (20 each for anger, fear, and happiness). Mean percentages of the accurate responses were calculated for different subgroups: right vs. left …Read more
  •  197
    G. E. M. Anscombe: Aufsätze (edited book)
    Suhrkamp. 2014.
    Die Wittgenstein-Schülerin Elizabeth Anscombe zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophinnen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mit der Monographie Absicht begründete sie die analytische Handlungstheorie, viele ihrer Abhandlungen gelten als Klassiker, aber nur wenige liegen bislang in deutscher Übersetzung vor. Der vorliegende Band füllt diese Lücke: Er versammelt zwölf von Anscombes wichtigsten Aufsätzen, die thematisch von der praktischen Philosophie über die Metaphysik und die Philosophie des Geistes bis h…Read more