-
36Physicalism, Introspection, and Psychophysics: The Carnap/Duncker ExchangeIn Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer, Springer. pp. 113-125. 2017.In 1932, Rudolf Carnap published his article “Psychology in a Physical Language.” The article prompted a critical response by the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker. The exchange is marked by mutual lack of comprehension. In this paper I will provide a contextualized explication of the exchange. I will show that Carnap’s physicalism was deeply rooted in the psychophysical tradition that also informed Gestalt psychological research. By failing to acknowledge this, Carnap missed out on the possibil…Read more
-
299Eigenpsychisches und Fremdpsychisches: Rudolf Carnaps Verhältnis zur Psychologie zwischen 1928 und 1932In Christian Damböck & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Der Junge Carnap in Historischem Kontext: 1918–1935 / Young Carnap in an Historical Context: 1918–1935, Springer Verlag. 2021.
-
27Philosophie der PsychologieIn Simon Lohse & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Grundriss Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Die Philosophien der Einzelwissenschaften, Meiner. pp. 475-509. 2017.Handbook article about philosophy of psychology. (in German). In S. Lohse & T. Reydon (Eds.): Grundriss Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Die Philosophien der Einzelwissenschaften. Meiner Verlag, pp. 475-509
-
24Philosophie der PsychologieIn Simon Lohse & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Grundriss Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Die Philosophien der Einzelwissenschaften, Meiner. pp. 475-509. 2017.
-
97The Continuing Relevance of 19th-Century Philosophy of Psychology: Brentano and the Autonomy of Psychological MethodsIn M. C. Galavotti & F. Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, Springer. forthcoming.This paper provides an analysis of Franz Brentano’s thesis that psychology employs a distinctive method, which sets it apart from physiology. The aim of the paper is two-fold: First, I situate Brentano’s thesis (and the broader metaphysical system that underwrites it) within the context of specific debates about the nature and status of psychology, arguing that we regard him as engaging in a form of boundary work. Second, I explore the relevance of Brentano’s considerations to more recent debate…Read more
-
284What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis of?Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the…Read more
-
14Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice: IntroductionIn Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice, De Gruyter. pp. 1-22. 2012.
-
Implicit ReasoningIn J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition, Routledge. pp. 377-388. 2023.
-
Progress in psychologyIn Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress, Routledge. pp. 184-203. 2022.The chapter argues that whereas traditional accounts of progress have typically focused on scientific theories (evaluating them with regards to their truthlikeness or their explanatory and predictive success), we should pay closer attention to efforts of forming and developing scientific concepts (evaluating them with regards to how well such concepts serve the respective aims of research, which can include, but are not limited to, explanation and prediction). If we focus on concepts rather than…Read more
-
336Eigenpsychisches und Fremdpsychisches: Rudolf Carnaps Verhältnis zur Psychologie zwischen 1928 und 1932In Christian Damböck & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Der Junge Carnap in Historischem Kontext: 1918–1935 / Young Carnap in an Historical Context: 1918–1935, Springer Verlag. pp. 169-184. 2021.Carnaps Werk zwischen den späten 1920er- und frühen 1930er-Jahren nimmt verschiedentlich auf Begrifflichkeiten und Debatten der philosophischen und experimentellen Psychologie seiner Zeit Bezug. Diese Bezugnahmen sind jedoch nicht immer konsistent oder explizit. Beispielsweise bedient Carnap sich sowohl im Aufbau als auch in seinen Ausführungen zur Psychologie in einer physikalischen Sprache einiger Grundannahmen der experimentellen Psychologie, führt dies jedoch nicht konsequent zu Ende. Umgeke…Read more
-
558Data quality, experimental artifacts, and the reactivity of the psychological subject matterEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (1): 1-25. 2022.While the term “reactivity” has come to be associated with specific phenomena in the social sciences, having to do with subjects’ awareness of being studied, this paper takes a broader stance on this concept. I argue that reactivity is a ubiquitous feature of the psychological subject matter and that this fact is a precondition of experimental research, while also posing potential problems for the experimenter. The latter are connected to the worry about distorted data and experimental artifacts…Read more
-
24Physicalism, Introspection, and Psychophysics: The Carnap/duncker ExchangeIn Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer, Springer. 2017.In 1932, Rudolf Carnap published his article “Psychology in a Physical Language.” The article prompted a critical response by the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker. The exchange is marked by mutual lack of comprehension. In this paper I will provide a contextualized explication of the exchange. I will show that Carnap’s physicalism was deeply rooted in the psychophysical tradition that also informed Gestalt psychological research. By failing to acknowledge this, Carnap missed out on the possibil…Read more
-
59Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie—in the Contexts of Historicism, Relativism, and NaturalismHopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1): 226-233. 2020.
-
2347Construct validity in psychological tests – the case of implicit social cognitionEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1): 1-24. 2020.This paper looks at the question of what it means for a psychological test to have construct validity. I approach this topic by way of an analysis of recent debates about the measurement of implicit social cognition. After showing that there is little theoretical agreement about implicit social cognition, and that the predictive validity of implicit tests appears to be low, I turn to a debate about their construct validity. I show that there are two questions at stake: First, what level of detai…Read more
-
205What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors' IntroductionErkenntnis 75 (3): 285-302. 2011.We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression “Historical epistemology” (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability; (2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3) HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current debat…Read more
-
100Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice (edited book)de Gruyter. 2012.Combining philosophical and historical scholarship, the articles in this volume focus on scientific concepts, rather than theories, as units of analysis. They thereby contribute to a growing literature about the role of concepts in scientific research. The authors are particularly interested in exploring the dynamics of research; they investigate the ways in which scientists form and use concepts, rather than in what the concepts themselves represent. The fields treated range from mathematics to…Read more
-
1682Gestalt psychology, frontloading phenomenology, and psychophysicsSynthese 198 (Suppl 9): 2153-2173. 2019.In his 1935 book Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Kurt Koffka stated that empirical research in perceptual psychology should begin with “a phenomenological analysis,” which in turn would put constraints on the “true theory.” In this paper, I take this statement as a point of departure to investigate in what sense Gestalt psychologists practiced a phenomenological analysis and how they saw it related to theory construction. I will contextualize the perceptual research in Gestalt psychology vis-a…Read more
-
1861Why Replication is OverratedPhilosophy of Science 86 (5): 895-905. 2019.Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the u…Read more
-
310Christian Damböck, Deutscher Empirismus: Studien zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum 1830–1930. (review)Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (Fall 2018): 480-485. 2018.
-
834Phenomena and Objects of Research in the Cognitive and Behavioral SciencesPhilosophy of Science 84 (5): 1165-1176. 2017.It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, suc…Read more
-
756Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen (edited book)Springer. 2009.This is a collection of original papers that look at the ways in which the dichotomy between explanation and understanding was conceptualized by various late 19th- and early 20th-century writers both in Germany and in other (mostly) European countries.
-
78This volume is a collection of original essays focusing on a wide range of topics in the History and Philosophy of Science. It is a festschrift for Peter Machamer, which includes contributions from scholars who, at one time or another, were his students. The essays bring together analyses of issues and debates spanning from early modern science and philosophy through the 21st century. Machamer’s influence is reflected in the volume’s broad range of topics. These include: underdetermination, sci…Read more
-
87The experimenters' regress reconsidered: Replication, tacit knowledge, and the dynamics of knowledge generationStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 58 34-45. 2016.This paper revisits the debate between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, concerning the experimenters’ regress. Focusing my attention on a case study from recent psychology (regarding experimental evidence for the existence of a Mozart Effect), I argue that Franklin is right to highlight the role of epistemological strategies in scientific practice, but that his account does not sufficiently appreciate Collins’s point about the importance of tacit knowledge in experimental practice. In turn, Col…Read more
-
154Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychologyPhilosophy of Science 70 (5): 937-948. 2003.This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the …Read more
-
1079Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental DataPhilosophy of Science 81 (5): 927-939. 2014.This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of…Read more
-
639This paper provides an analysis of Franz Brentano’s thesis that psychology employs a distinctive method, which sets it apart from physiology. The aim of the paper is two-fold: First, I situate Brentano’s thesis (and the broader metaphysical system that underwrites it) within the context of specific debates about the nature and status of psychology, arguing that we regard him as engaging in a form of boundary work. Second, I explore the relevance of Brentano’s considerations to more recent debate…Read more
-
970What exactly is stabilized when phenomena are stabilized?Synthese 182 (1): 57-71. 2011.The last two decades have seen a rising interest in (a) the notion of a scientific phenomenon as distinct from theories and data, and (b) the intricacies of experimentally producing and stabilizing phenomena. This paper develops an analysis of the stabilization of phenomena that integrates two aspects that have largely been treated separately in the literature: one concerns the skills required for empirical work; the other concerns the strategies by which claims about phenomena are validated. I …Read more
-
89Husserl’s Crisis as a crisis of psychologyStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2): 493-503. 2012.This paper places Husserl’s mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with – and critique of – experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology – due to its naturalism – as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide an analysis of Husserl…Read more
-
78Remembering (Short-Term) Memory: Oscillations of an Epistemic ThingErkenntnis 75 (3): 391-411. 2011.This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology . I argue that Rheinberger’s approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (“epistemic things”)—especially in the contexts o…Read more
-
123Concepts as Tools in the Experimental Generation of Knowledge in Cognitive NeuropsychologySpontaneous Generations 4 (1): 173-190. 2010.This paper asks (a) how new scientific objects of research are onceptualized at a point in time when little is known about them, and (b) how those conceptualizations, in turn, figure in the process of investigating the phenomena in question. Contrasting my approach with existing notions of concepts and situating it in relation to existing discussions about the epistemology of experimentation, I propose to think of concepts as research tools. I elaborate on the conception of a tool that informs m…Read more