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In this paper, I take on a stance on the famous “Special Composition Question” (SCQ), in contemporary metaphysics, according to which the very presumption that individual objects combine to form composite objects is not a brute fact and should be problematized. SCQ asks, for any individual object, when it is the case that there is a composite such that the former composes the latter. Arguing against Peter Van Inwagen’s organism (1990) and following Peter Unger’s (1979) nihilism, I defend the very counterintuitive claim that no two arrangement of objects (xs) compose another object (y). My radical conclusion follows: I do not exist, never existed, and shall never exist!

Nietzsche has a word to say in most of the areas of philosophy. In ontology, there is the idea of becoming, in epistemology he talks about perspectivism and truth, and his ethics has the morality of the Overman. However, although enough has been said about Nietzsche’s philosophy in general, not much emphasis has been given to how his views about perspectivism, morality, and truth relate to the ontology of becoming. The aim of this paper is to shed light on this important connection. Accordingly, first, the paper examines his ontology of becoming and contrasts it with the Parmenidean ontology of being. Later, the paper follows Nietzsche’s footsteps in deconstructing the commonsense understanding of Truth and shows how he reconfigures the truths with his perspectivism in connection with the ontology of becoming. Towards the end, it presents Nietzsche’s criticism of morality as being-in-itself that—the paper argues—follows the Parmenidean ontology of being. Finally, by emphasizing the order of value differences in some valuations, meanings, truths, and focusing on Nietzsche’s denial of nihilism, the paper argues against the claim of Nietzsche being a moral relativist.

Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ has caused a radical change in the common-sense theory of knowledge. The subject became the centre and the necessary premise for the validity of the objective world. This change in the understanding of knowledge has best manifested itself in Weber’s ‘Verstehende Soziologie’. Therefore, in order to understand the Weberian sociological method and to be able to detect the possible problems that may arise from his sociology, a better grasp of what Kantian epistemology is and in what ways it has influenced Weberian sociology is needed. Accordingly, this paper will firstly analyse Kantian epistemology with a special emphasis on transcendental idealism, and will expand and explain in detail Weber’s ‘Verstehende Soziologie’. Next, the paper will show how Weberian sociology relates to Kantian epistemology through the construction of ideal types. Before concluding, the focus moves to the objectivity claim of both Kantian epistemology and Weberian sociology and shows how objectivity arises from subjectivity through the establishment of causality. Finally, the paper will propose an objection to the objectivity claim of Weberian sociology and will argue that Kantian epistemology, when adopted as a method of sociology, becomes reflexive and threatens to deprive sociology of its objectivity claim.

The philosophy of logic literature has long been concerned with the demarcation problem of logicality. Since Alfred Tarski, a lot has been said about the question of what a logical notion is. However, surprisingly, the curiosity on this matter has never gone beyond the classical first-order logic (FOL). This paper will be an attempt to extend the discussion beyond classical FOL. Accordingly, in this paper, by adopting a Plurality-of-Logical-Domains approach, I will propose a new pluralism of logical notions. At its base, my pluralism will have Sher‘s (2022) account of invariance. Unlike Sher, following Bonnay (2008), I will not assume invariance under all isomorphisms but under potential isomorphisms as a criterion of a logical constant. This I will call the Weakened-Sher-Thesis. My proposed pluralism will become explicit as I go on to offer an application of it in Modal Logic.

The phenomenological ontologies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have often been discussed in comparison to one another. Often, a Merleau-Pontian critique of Sartre, based on subjectivity, has been given. In doing so, both Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s views on freedom, facticity, the body, and the Other has been discussed in great detail. Despite all of this, however, not much emphasis has been given to their understanding of negativity in its relation to the construction of Self as the Being-in-the-world of human-reality. Accordingly, this article will focus on the relationship between subjectivity and negativity in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty with a specific emphasis on Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre’s philosophy of negation. First, the article will expand on Sartre’s philosophy of negation and explain how he conceives the experience of nothingness as the foundation of subjectivity. Later, it will develop a Merleau-Pontian critique of Sartrean philosophy of negation (a) by claiming that Sartrean negativity degenerates into pure and absolute positive of the Cartesian duality, and most importantly, (b) by showing how Merleau-Ponty constructs a new dialectical ontology of Self, based on the world-as-me; a being that is seen as flesh.