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Many authors have taken up the challenge of formulating physicalism as a supervenience thesis. These endeavors have met with varying response, but it seems that the general consensus still remains that a supervenience thesis that is both sufficient and necessary for physicalism has yet to be developed. Terence Horgan1 and Jaegwon Kim2 have most famously argued that supervenience theses are not sufficiently strong for physicalism. Nonetheless, several recent articles suggest that there are philosophers who still hold out hope for some type of supervenience of the mental upon the physical being, if not both sufficient and necessary, at least necessary for physicalism.3 In this paper, I will 1) investigate some of the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizes physicalism, 2) briefly review the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or necessary and sufficient) for physicalism, and 3) investigate in some detail the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson, in his recent book, claims to have a supervenience thesis that is both necessary and sufficient for physicalism.

At least between the years 1960 and 1975 Quine defended the underdetermination thesis which asserts that there can be more than one incompatible physical theory supported by the totality of actual and possible evidence available to an investigator. Once the coherence of such a possibility is granted, one is confronted with a skeptical challenge: insofar as these theories are epistemically on a par, we cannot know which one is true. Scientific enterprise is threatened with falling short of delivering on its own promise of providing a methodology that yields knowledge. ;Quine attempts to defend his conception of science against the skeptical challenge that arises from underdetermination, while maintaining that his naturalistic, physicalistic system which denies the existence of a transcendent notion of truth can lay claim to a "robust" realism. ;Quine's best-known defense yields what he later came to call his "ecumenical" position, which amounts to arguing for the spuriousness of the putative fact of underdetermination. I argue that Quine's strategy does not work unless certain ambiguities in his concept of theory are resolved, and that once these are resolved, the strategy also leads to the undermining of the coherence of his indeterminacy of translation thesis. ;Another, more recent defense Quine has adopted leads to "sectarianism," which accepts the genuineness of underdetermined, incompatible theories, yet asserts that truth is predicable only of the assertions of one's current theory. Yet sectarianism also allows that one is free to switch between equally warranted theories. I argue that of the two ways in which the sectarian position can be interpreted, the first is powerless against the skeptical challenge and the second manages to avoid it only at the cost of adopting a perspective that does not satisfy even the minimal requirements of realism. ;The general, sobering conclusion that can be drawn from the specific problems facing Quine's philosophy is that an explanation of our epistemological position and its putative success is not automatically produced by the adoption of an "internalist," naturalist, or even scientistic perspective. A serious investigation of the skeptical challenge is vital for the modern philosopher of science, as it was for the traditional epistemologist

I start with a detailed but partial analysis of a case regarding grade inflation. The case is inspired by the discussion in Crumbley et al. (2010) and its elaboration in Roberts (2016). I supplement the case description by introducing certain facts that are not in the original discussion. The subsequent analysis is based on this enriched case description. I then raise a number of objections against my analysis. An important metaethical, methodological question emerges while responding to these objections. To what extent are characterizations of moral situations and their descriptions independent from moral commitments? Is there a neutral concept of moral relevance? I argue that we do not have a theory-neutral concept of moral relevance, and that case descriptions essentially presuppose moral commitments. From my moral perspective, as this perspective is reflected in the enriched case description I utilize, the original case description of grade inflation already involves utilizing the wrong moral perspective or theory.