Unsal Cimen

16. ve 17. yüzyıllarda, dirimselci Yeni Platoncu kimya felsefesi doğa araştırmalarında deneysel yönteme taraftar iken, mantıksal ve matematiksel yöntemlere karşı çıkmıştı. Örneğin, Jan Baptist van Helmont, Aristoteles’in yöntemine matematiksel olduğunu söyleyerek karşı çıkmış ve de Aristoteles’in ilk hareket ettirici düşüncesinin onun matematiksel yönteminin bir sonucu olduğunu ileri sürmüştü. Bu yazıda, Francis Bacon’ın da, van Helmont’a benzer şekilde, ilk hareket ettirici düşüncesini Aristoteles’in tasımsal yönteminin bir sonucu olarak gördüğü ileri sürülecektir.

In this study, I discuss the role of mathematics in Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy. Bacon was one of the important figures of early modern philosophy and has been accepted as one of the frontier philosophers of modern science. The increasing role of mathematics in natural philosophy was an important development of this period of time, which raises the question of whether Bacon approved of the new role of mathematics in natural philosophy. The new role of mathematics in natural philosophy was mainly developed by astronomers such as Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler, and can be defined as ‘making natural philosophical claims through mathematics’. I will examine the role of mathematics in Baconian natural philosophy by considering the following questions: Can Bacon’s attitude towards the role of mathematics be accepted as Aristotelian? Were there similarities between Bacon and al–Bitruji in their ideas of how an astronomical model should be established? Is there any difference in Bacon’s attitude towards mathematics between his earlier and later works? Can we use Bacon’s approach to arithmetical quantification to refute the claim that he was against the new role of mathematics? Was there any similarity between the attitude of Bacon and neo-Platonist chemical philosophers towards mathematics? Is there any relation between the non–mechanical character of Bacon’s philosophy and his attitude towards mathematics? Is there any relation between his matter theory and his attitude towards mathematics? Throughout this thesis, I emphasise that Bacon attached importance to applying mathematics to natural philosophy, however, was against the idea of making natural philosophical claims through mathematics. I argue that he had two fundamental commitments for being distrustful towards mathematics’ ability in making natural philosophical claims; his first being the consistency between the human mind and the course of logic and mathematics, and the second being the inconsistency between the course of nature and the course of logic and mathematics.

When we examine the history of astronomy up to the end of the seventeenth century by considering the relation between mathematical astronomy and natural philosophy, it has been argued that there were two groups of philosophers and astronomers: instrumentalists and realists. However, this classification is deficient when we consider attitudes toward the explanatory power of mathematics in determining astronomical theories. I offer the solution of dividing realists into two subcategories—mathematical realists and physical realists. Mathematical realists include those who thought mathematics could provide the real motions of celestial bodies. The physical realists, who include Ibn Rushd (Averroës), believed mathematics could not provide us with the real structure of the heavens. To avoid contradictions between the physical and mathematical models, the physical realists held that a mathematical model of the heavens should be designed by considering physics. I argue, in this article, that Francis Bacon can be considered a physical realist.