Uri Brun

Hans Sluga argues that Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance is “systematically ambiguous” because it conflates two distinct kinds of concepts: cluster concepts, unified by overlapping resemblances, and kinship-based concepts, grounded in causal and historical relations. By treating these as if they were the same, Sluga suggests, Wittgenstein reveals a deeper limitation of his thought: his failure to fully reckon with the historical dimension of human existence. This paper challenges that diagnosis. It argues that what Sluga takes to be a problem – the interweaving of resemblance and kinship – is in fact what makes the notion of family resemblance philosophically productive. I develop this claim in three steps. First, I challenge the distinction between “cluster” and “kinship” concepts by arguing that even a supposedly paradigmatic “cluster” concept like “game” cannot be unified by purely synchronic relations of similarity. Second, I argue that Wittgenstein draws on our ordinary understanding of family resemblance, which resists any sharp separation between synchronic and diachronic relations. Third, I suggest this interdependence is integral to Wittgenstein’s use of family resemblance as a model of conceptual unity over time, rather than an atemporal, synchronic account of conceptual structure at a given moment. This is shown by considering PI §67, where Wittgenstein introduces a temporal dimension by discussing how the extension of “number” changes over time. Taken together, these considerations direct us towards a genealogical reading of family resemblance, in which the unity of a concept consists in evolving patterns of resemblance that are internally shaped by historically developed practices.