Valentin Cojanu

Criticism directed at neoclassical economics has failed to replace it with a similar grand theory. The author argues that one possible explanation may lie in the failure of economists to formulate an opinion as to the philosophical foundations of the author’s object of study. The paper aims to discuss this issue. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, the authors review the prevailing philosophical view of “the self-interest theory (S)”, which is one of the most powerful constituents of today’s economics, and social theorizing in general. Second, the authors present a reasoning framework in which rationality becomes intelligible within a schema of integrating the self’s external and internal conditionalities into a unified view of human reasoning.

This paper aims to tackle in turn the merits and limits of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s entropic model, as well as its implications for the methodological discourse in economics. This appraisal of the Georgescu-Roegen’s work emphasizes the emergence of the entropic nature of the economic processes as a paradigm a` la Kuhn of explanation in social economics. This work provides a critical assessment of the entropic model’s main conceptual pillars, namely the role of mathematical formalism and the natural imagery of irreversibility. This discussion takes them in turn and develops a critique from a methodological point of view. The focus of this work is that the proposed epistemological reconstruction of economics is vulnerable to attacks from two methodological objections. The first deals with the change of metaphor from the “pendulum” of mechanics to the “hourglass” of thermodynamics. The second refers to the changes this replacement of metaphors brings about as to the relevance of the formalism of the discipline. This material has gathered arguments to show that the intellectual concurrence of the arguments onto the field of physics makes the methodological value of the new paradigm of entropy not transcend into a new logic of reasoning in economics. The limits of this approach stems from the same rationale for which it has got its revolutionary stature: what it proposes consists of a scientific discourse based on a mixture of evolutionary biology, economics and thermodynamics, which may open up new original and insightful perspectives, but which has never been justified on terms of economic nature alone.

The problem of causality in economics is still contended by various epistemological alternatives. The article builds on the received view of Darwinism in economics and examines the way in which economics and biology find common ground in concepts and assumptions that reflect causal commonalities of the natural and the social world. We claim that the role the contingent pattern plays in understanding socioeconomic change provides reasons to concede corrections to a rule-based causal mechanism. The article concludes on the merits of advancing the ontological equivalent of interdisciplinary studies as one possible standard in reference to which to judge the epistemic adequacy of any import.

The present-day epistemology of social science resembles a picture puzzle whose pieces are scattered to and fro across the vast domain of philosophical inquiry. This study attempts to assemble them in what appears to be a common thread of thinking for a necessary epistemic reconstruction, the historical specificity of social sciences. This understanding reveals itself as a method of validating truth in acknowledgement of three logical principles: (1) causality indeterminately becomes embedded in spatial—temporal distortions; (2) linear time is replaced by multiple, overlapping timescales, ‘multiple’ being a cultural rather than numerical concept; and (3) prediction remains associated with the least historical events, the particulars; that is, event-regularities normally specific for short periods of time.

     The Journal of Philosophical Economics comes out from a barely disguised, though deep, anxiety about the way we, the economists, may improve the ways of providing meaningful explanations for what makes and does not make sense in such economic developments as prosperity, globalisation, material imbalances, labour relations, or common property. These issues are usually resuscitated under contemporary labels such as feminism, environmentalism, Marxism, or liberalism. However, it can be argued that these issues have represented in fact recurrent threads of economic thinking dating back to ancient times