Valentin Pluder

In his Elements of the Philosophy of Right Hegel points out that the reference to an abstract ethical rule like the categorical imperative is not enough to establish consistent interpersonal actions. In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein points out that a mere rule cannot be the cause of regular actions. But Hegel and Wittgenstein do not only share similar and therefore comparable concerns in connecting rules and acts. They also share similar solutions how to provide this connection. This similarity will be shown by comparing simple interpretations of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s categorical imperative and Wittgenstein’s critique of rule-following. The comparison will proceed in two stages. In the first stage, it will be shown that both philosophers share the opinion that general rules, in the form of theoretical propositions, can be related to an unlimited range of actions and that individual actions can be related to an unlimited range of rules. Both believe that this problem cannot be solved by bringing in more theoretical propositions that interpret the original rule. So rule and act are left disconnected and the whole concept of rule-following is challenged, which both philosophers regard as a problem. The second stage of the comparison focuses on the suggestion that the solutions both philosophers provide can be situated within the same framework. The thought that rule and act can ever be adequately understood apart from each other is rejected. Instead, some kind of internal relation, if not identity, has to be assumed. This relation that binds rule and act together is ultimately located within some kind of social institution. For Hegel the necessary institutional context is the Sitte or Sittlichkeit (ethical life), while for Wittgenstein it is customs, uses, institutions or forms of life.

Jakob Friedrich Fries, Professor für Philosophie, Physik und Mathematik, gehört, obwohl bei Fichte promoviert und habilitiert, zu den Antipoden des sogenannten Deutschen Idealismus. Er richtet sich gegen Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling und gilt insbesondere als Gegenspieler Hegels – beide äußern sich wenig anerkennend dem jeweils anderen gegenüber – ohne freilich eine vergleichbare Wirkung zu erreichen, nicht zuletzt wegen seiner Zwangsemeritierung als Philosophieprofessor von 1819 bis 1838 aufgrund politischer Äußerungen.

Der Begriff »Klassische Deutsche Philosophie« setzt sich zusehends gegenüber der alten Bestimmung »Deutscher Idealismus« durch. Dies geschieht vollkommen zu Recht, denn letztere führt in die Irre. Tatsächlich verfolgen Fichte, Schelling und Hegel zusammen mit Kant das Anliegen, Idealismus und Realismus als einseitige Positionen zu überwinden. Ausgehend von diesem gemeinsamen Vorhaben entspinnt sich zwischen ihnen eine Kontroverse, die in unterschiedlichen Lösungskonzepten mündet. Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt die unterschiedlichen Ansätze zur Vermittlung von Idealismus und Realismus, die in der Forschung bisher eher vage präsent sind, erstmals systematisch anhand ihrer historischen Entwicklung dar. Ein Anhang zur Analytischen Philosophie belegt die Relevanz der Fragestellung auch für die Philosophie der Gegenwart.

The Wissenschaftslehre 1804-ii does not end with absolute knowledge in the 25th lecture, because this absolute knowledge is as sealed off from the common knowledge as the Absolute itself in the 15th lecture was. As matters stand in the 25th lecture the Wissenschaftslehre can neither meet its own claim to unify all knowledge in one system nor can the genesis of the absolute knowledge, which had to begin with common knowledge, be understood by means of the Wissenschaftslehre itself. The problem in linking absolute knowledge and common knowledge is that, on the one hand, absolute knowledge is hermetically closed. Therefore, nothing and especially not common knowledge can derive or result from it. On the other hand, absolute knowledge is not supposed to depend on anything but the Absolute itself. Therefore, it cannot be understood adequately as a condition for common knowledge. Fichte’s solution to this problem is to differentiate between the genesis of absolute knowledge and absolute knowledge itself. Common knowledge is necessary only for the genesis of absolute knowledge. However, the validity of the common knowledge depends on the pursuit of the absolute knowledge.

This chapter deals with the relation of Hegelian speculative logic to the ‘classical’ logic that is or was attributed to Aristotle. While on the one hand Hegel thought of Aristotle as the founder of what became known as classical or formal logic, he ascribed to Aristotle on the other hand “truly speculative ideas”, thus honouring him as a precursor of his own speculative philosophy. Points of contact between Aristotle and Hegel are e. g. the thought of teleology, the distinction of potentiality and actuality as well as the peculiar Aristotelian figure of noesis noeseos. Although at first glance speculative and Aristotelian logic seem to be at odds with each other, Valentin Pluder shows how Aristotelian logic can serve several functions within the project of Hegel’s speculative philosophy.

Fichte claims that it is a severe misinterpretation of his philosophy if one understands it as an absolutization of thinking or consciousness. Even more misguided is the assumption that this special thinking or consciousness can be achieved by abstracting from all empirical evidence. Nevertheless the term ‚pure knowledge‘ is of importance within the WL and it means precisely a formal knowledge which has been cleaned from all empirical contents. Therefore, Fichte’s claim shall be examined by contrasting the pure knowledge with the absolute knowledge in the WL 1804-II. The hypothesis here followed is that no pure entity like the pure knowledge can be found at the head of the system of the WL 1804. The highest point within the realm of thought, meaning the first entity of knowledge, is in fact the absolute knowledge, which differs essentially from the pure knowledge. Fichte beteuert, dass es eine schwere Fehlinterpretation seiner Philosophie sei, wenn man sie als Verabsolutierung des Denkens oder des Bewusstseins verstünde. Dies gilt umso mehr, wenn angenommen wird, dass dieses Denken zudem lediglich aus der Abstraktion von allem Empirischen und auf Grund dieses vermeintlich reinigenden Abstraktionsprozesses entstanden ist. Dennoch spielt das reine Wissen eine zentrale Rolle in der WL. Entsprechend soll Fichtes Beteuerung runtergebrochen auf das Verhältnis von reinem Wissen und Absolutem Wissen in der zweiten Vorlesung zur Wissenschaftslehre aus dem Jahr 1804 überprüft werden. Die hier vertretene These lautet: Nicht eine reine Instanz, hier konkret: nicht das reine Wissen, ist das Höchste in der Wissenschaftslehre 1804. Das denkbar Höchste, bzw. die erste Instanz innerhalb des Wissens, ist vielmehr das Absolute Wissen. Und dieses ist – darauf kommt es an – wesentlich unterschieden von dem reinen Wissen.