•  2
    This edited collection presents the latest cutting-edge research in the philosophy and cognitive science of temporal illusions. Illusion and error have long been important points of entry for both philosophical and psychological approaches to understanding the mind. Temporal illusions, specifically, concern a fundamental feature of lived experience, temporality, and its relation to a fundamental feature of the world, time, thus providing invaluable insight into investigations of the mind and its…Read more
  •  122
    Explanation in theories of the specious present
    Philosophical Psychology. forthcoming.
    Time-consciousness theories aim to explain what our experi­ences must be like so that we can experience change, succes­sion, and other temporally extended events (or at least why we believe we have such experiences). The most popular and influential explanations are versions of theories of the spe­ cious present, which maintain that what we experience appears to us as temporally extended. However, the role that specious presents have in bringing about temporal experiences remains undescribed. Th…Read more
  • Introduction
    In , Springer. pp. 1-6. 2016.
    “Philosophy and Psychology of Time” comprises papers from philosophers and psychologists who work on various aspects of subjective time. In the book, the broad topic of time is examined from different aspects, divided into five parts. These main aspects are the following: the concept of time in philosophy and psychology, temporal presence, the continuity and fl ow of time in mind, the timing of experiences, and the relationship between time and intersubjectivity. This chapter introduces the volu…Read more
  • Why the Transitivity of Perceptual Simultaneity Should be Taken Seriously
    Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 6. 2012.
  • On the Rehabilitation of the Knowledge Argument
    In , Iias Shimla. pp. 161-175. 2003.
    In the last decade, some viable materialist accounts of how to overcome Frank Jackson's powerful Knowledge Argument has been elaborated into such an extent that even Jackson himself has changed sides and joined its critics. In order to rehabilitate its force and importance, George Graham and Terence Horgan have redefined the original argument and exploited it against theories that reply to Knowledge Argument with a mode of presentation replies (using Michael Tye's representational theory of mind…Read more
  • Subjective Time: From Past to Future
    with Dan Lloyd
    In , Mit Press. pp. 309-321. 2014.
  • Experienced Continuity of Experiences
    Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 126 (21): 64-65. 2014.
  • The Disunity of Time
    with Dan Lloyd
    In , Mit Press. pp. 657-663. 2014.
  • Vision
    In , Routledge. pp. 556-567. 2009.
  •  128
    The Time of Experience and the Experience of Time
    In Bruno Mölder, Valtteri Arstila & Peter Ohrstrom (eds.), Philosophy and Psychology of Time, Springer. 2016.
    Philosophers have usually approached the concept of timing of experiences by addressing the question how the experiences of temporal phenomena can be explained. As a result, the issue of timing has been addressed in two different ways. The first, similar to the questions posed in sciences, concerns the relationship between the experienced time of events and the objective time of events. The second approach is more specific to philosophers’ debates, and concerns the phenomenology of experiences: …Read more
  •  1
    Time in Mind
    In Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley. 2013.
    A theoretical assumption of this chapter on time in mind is that people ought to take phenomenological descriptions of temporal experience at face value. The chapter begins with a brief review of Rick Grush's trajectory estimation model of temporal representation – the predictive inference model. It introduces the issues of whether temporal properties as they appear should be thought of as primary or secondary qualities. A constraint runs from the best science of the mind back to phenomenology t…Read more
  •  15
    Apparent Motion and Ontology of Time
    Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 23 5-9. 2018.
    Introspectively, it appears that we can have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena such as change, motion, and the passage of time. A central question in the ontology of time is whether we can make sense of these experiences without assuming that the passage of time is real. The antireductionist argument against such a possibility maintains that if there is no passage of time, but only static time slices, then our experiences as of arguably temporally extended phenomena cannot be expla…Read more
  •  171
    Time Markers and Temporal Illusions
    In Adrian Bardon, Valtteri Arstila, Sean Power & Argiro Vatakis (eds.), The Illusions of Time: Philosophical and Psychological Essays on Timing and Time Perception, Palgrave Macmillan. 2019.
    According to the thesis of temporal isomorphism, the experienced order of events in the world and the order in which experiences are processed in the brain are the same. The thesis is encompassed in the brain-time view, a popular view on the literature of the temporal illusions. The view is commonly contrasted with the event-time view, which maintains that the experienced order of events reflects the order in which the events occur in the world. This chapter focuses on the conflict between the t…Read more
  •  159
    Experience and the Pacemaker- Accumulator Model
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4): 14-36. 2017.
    The pacemaker-accumulator model provides a framework in which the results of different duration estimation tasks are commonly accounted for. Nevertheless, the model remains abstract and it does not provide proper explanations nor predictions for duration estimations in various experimental set-ups. This paper aims to address these shortcomings by explicating an experiential pacemaker-accumulator model that supplements the standard pacemaker-accumulator model with two claims. Both of them concern…Read more
  •  19
    This edited collection presents the latest cutting-edge research in the philosophy and cognitive science of temporal illusions. Illusion and error have long been important points of entry for both philosophical and psychological approaches to understanding the mind. Temporal illusions, specifically, concern a fundamental feature of lived experience, temporality, and its relation to a fundamental feature of the world, time, thus providing invaluable insight into investigations of the mind and its…Read more
  •  23
    Philosophy and Psychology of Time (edited book)
    Springer. 2016.
    This book is an edited collection of papers from international experts in philosophy and psychology concerned with time. The collection aims to bridge the gap between these disciplines by focussing on five key themes and providing philosophical and psychological perspectives on each theme. The first theme is the concept of time. The discussion ranges from the folk concept of time to the notion of time in logic, philosophy and psychology. The second theme concerns the notion of present in the phi…Read more
  •  596
    Temporal Experiences without the Specious Present
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2): 287-302. 2018.
    Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the n…Read more
  •  214
    When is cognitive penetration a plausible explanation?
    Consciousness and Cognition 59 78-86. 2018.
    Albert Newen and Petra Vetter argue that neurophysiological considerations and psychophysical studies provide striking evidence for cognitive penetration. This commentary focuses mainly on the neurophysiological considerations, which have thus far remained largely absent in the philosophical debate concerning cognitive penetration, and on the cognitive penetration of perceptual experiences, which is the form of cognitive penetration philosophers have debated about the most. It is argued that New…Read more
  •  135
    The Causal Theory of Perception Revisited
    with Kalle Pihlainen
    Erkenntnis 70 (3): 397-417. 2009.
    It is generally agreed upon that Grice's causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality. Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match the way the world is. Finall…Read more
  •  129
    Desires, magnitudes, and orectic penetration
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (8): 1175-1185. 2016.
    Dustin Stokes argues for the existence of orectic penetration, a phenomenon in which a desire-like state penetrates our perceptual experience. His candidate for a case of orectic penetration is the most convincing candidate presented thus far. It is argued here that his candidate and his further arguments for the existence of orectic penetration do not support the claim that orectic penetration takes place. As a result, it is concluded that there are no convincing cases of desire-like states pen…Read more
  •  230
    The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural k…Read more
  •  79
    Theories of apparent motion
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3): 337-358. 2016.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially presented and spatially separated stimuli give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose…Read more
  •  17
  •  80
    Interdisciplinary perspectives on the feature of conscious life that scaffolds every act of cognition: subjective time. Our awareness of time and temporal properties is a constant feature of conscious life. Subjective temporality structures and guides every aspect of behavior and cognition, distinguishing memory, perception, and anticipation. This milestone volume brings together research on temporality from leading scholars in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, defining a new field of in…Read more
  •  322
    Color Eliminativism and Intuitions about Colors
    Rivista di Estetica 43 29-45. 2010.
    The philosophical debate over the nature of color has been governed by what we have learnt from color vision science and what color phenomenology suggests to us. It is usually thought that color eliminativism, which maintains that physical objects do not have any properties that can be identified with colors, can account for the former but not the latter. After all, what could be more obvious than the external world to be colored? Here I outline one color eliminativistic response to the objectio…Read more
  •  235
    What makes unique hues unique?
    Synthese 195 (5): 1849-1872. 2018.
    There exist two widely used notions concerning the structure of phenomenal color space. The first is the notion of unique/binary hue structure, which maintains that there are four unique hues from which all other hues are composed. The second notion is the similarity structure of hues, which describes the interrelations between the hues and hence does not divide hues into two types as the first notion does. Philosophers have considered the existence of the unique/binary hue structure to be empir…Read more
  •  109
    True Colours, False Theories
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1): 41-50. 2003.
    The question of the constituting nature of colour is largely open. The old dispute between colour objectivism and colour subjectivism is still relevant. The former has defended itself against accusations of not being able to explain colour structures, while the latter view has received criticism for not being able to provide a plausible theory of the location of colours. By weakening the notion of physical categories, making some of them perceiver-depended, colour objectivists have managed to ov…Read more