Vasco Correia

In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes that undermine the ‘intentionalist’ account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.

In this article I argue that most biases in argumentation and decision-making can and should be counteracted. Although biases can prove beneficial in certain contexts, I contend that they are generally maladaptive and need correction. Yet critical thinking alone seems insufficient to mitigate biases in everyday contexts. I develop a contextualist approach, according to which cognitive debiasing strategies need to be supplemented by extra-psychic devices that rely on social and environmental constraints in order to promote rational reasoning. Finally, I examine several examples of contextual debiasing strategies and show how they can contribute to enhance critical thinking at a cognitive level.

La pensée irrationnelle dans ses diverses formes constitue à la fois un problème pratique et un dilemme théorique auquel il faut pouvoir répondre. Du point de vue pratique, les illusions de l'esprit sont à l'origine de décisions irrationnelles, jugements biaisés, rationalisations, préjugés, voire même de troubles mentaux. Du point de vue théorique, elles nous placent devant une énigme digne du sphinx : est-ce de manière volontaire et intentionnelle que les sujets irrationnels se dupent eux-mêmes et prennent leurs désirs pour des réalités, ou bien sont-ils les victimes de leurs illusions? La conception qui domine parmi les philosophes, dite « intentionnaliste », soutient que les illusions de l'esprit sont des actes intentionnels dont les agents sont entièrement responsables. Cet ouvrage s'efforce de montrer, au contraire, que la pensée irrationnelle prend racine dans des illusions cognitives qui tendent à se produire de façon à la fois involontaire et inconsciente. Il devrait intéresser non seulement les étudiants, mais aussi les chercheurs en philosophie de l'esprit et en sciences cognitives.

Le problème de la duperie de soi constitue un défi majeur pour toute théorie de la rationalité, attendu que le sujet qui se dupe lui-même semble adhérer à une croyance illusoire tout en étant conscient de son caractère illusoire. C’est en tout cas ce que prétend la tradition « intentionnaliste » qui domine parmi les philosophes (Sartre, Davidson, Pears, Talbott, Scott-Kakures, Bermudez), qui tend à décrire la duperie de soi comme un acte intentionnel dont l’agent serait entièrement responsable. Nous soutenons au contraire une conception dite « émotionnaliste » selon laquelle la duperie de soi est un phénomène sub-intentionnel et involontaire d’illusion cognitive qui trouve son explication dans l’influence des émotions sur notre faculté de juger. Cela nous amène à développer une théorie « cognitivo-hédonique » des émotions qui vise à rendre compte du rôle que jouent ces dernières non seulement dans la naissance des croyances irrationnelles, mais même des actions irrationnelles (acrasia).

Cet article examine les effets des illusions cognitives sur nos jugements et nos inférences, aussi bien sur le plan épistémique que sur le plan pratique. Prenant appui sur la recherche empirique sur les biais motivationnels et cognitifs, je montre d’abord de quelle manière ces phénomènes irrationnels tendent à compromettre la rationalité de nos croyances et de nos décisions. Bien que les biais de jugement tendent à se produire de manière non intentionnelle, je soutiens que nous sommes en partie responsables des attitudes irrationnelles qui en résultent, dans la mesure où nous avons la possibilité de les contrecarrer moyennant des stratégies de contrôle épistémique conçues pour assurer de façon indirecte la rationalité des processus cognitifs. Je décris succinctement un ensemble de stratégies de ce type.

Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of argumentative discourse. Yet, in everyday debates people use arguments that seem valid in light of such rules but nonetheless biased and tendentious. This article seeks to show that the rationality of argumentation can only be fully promoted if we take into account its ethical dimension. To substantiate this claim, I review some of the empirical evidence indicating that people’s inferential reasoning is systematically affected by a variety of biases and heuristics. Insofar as these cognitive illusions are typically unintentional, it appears that arguers may be biased despite their well-intended efforts to follow the rules of critical argumentation. Nevertheless, I argue that people remain responsible for the rationality of their arguments, given that there are a number of measures that they can (and ought to) take to avoid such distortions. I highlight the importance of argumentational virtues and critical thinking to rational debates, and describe a set of indirect strategies of “argumentative self-control”

‘Intentionalist’ approaches portray self-deceivers as “akratic believers”, subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is false. In this paper I argue that the intentionalist model leads to a number of paradoxes that seem to undermine it. I claim that these paradoxes can nevertheless be overcome in light of the rival hypothesis that self-deception is a non-intentional process that stems from the influence of emotions upon cognitive processes. Furthermore, I propose a motivational interpretation of the phenomenon of ‘hyperbolic discounting bias’ which highlights the role of emotional biases in akratic behavior. Finally, I argue that we are not the helpless victims of our irrational attitudes, insofar as we have the ability – and arguably the epistemic obligation – to counteract motivational biases.

In this article I argue that most biases in argumentation and decision-making can and should be counteracted. Although biases can prove beneficial in certain contexts, I contend that they are generally maladaptive and need correction. Yet critical thinking alone seems insufficient to mitigate biases in everyday contexts. I develop a contextualist approach, according to which cognitive debiasing strategies need to be supplemented by extra-psychic devices that rely on social and environmental constraints in order to promote rational reasoning. Finally, I examine several examples of contextual debiasing strategies and show how they can contribute to enhance critical thinking at a cognitive level.

This paper focuses on the effects of motivational biases on the way people reason and debate in everyday life. Unlike heuristics and cognitive biases, motivational biases are typically caused by the influence of a desire or an emotion on the cognitive processes involved in judgmental and inferential reasoning. In line with the ‘motivational’ account of irrationality, I argue that these biases are the cause of a number of fallacies that ordinary arguers commit unintentionally, particularly when the commitment to a given viewpoint is very strong. Drawing on recent work in argumentation theory and psychology, I show that there are privileged links between specific types of biases and specific types of fallacies. This analysis provides further support to the idea that people’s tendency to arrive at desired conclusions hinges on their ability to construct plausible justifications for those conclusions. I suggest that this effort to rationalize biased views is the reason why unintentional fallacies tend to be persuasive.