Vasti Roodt

Nietzsche's legacy for political thought is a highly contested area of research today. With papers representing a broad range of positions, this collection takes stock of the central controversies (Nietzsche as political / anti-political thinker? Nietzsche and / contra democracy? Arendt and / contra Nietzsche?), as well as new research on key concepts (power, the agon, aristocracy, friendship i.a.), on historical, contemporary and futural aspects of Nietzsche's political thought. International contributors include well-known names (Conway, Ansell-Pearson, Hatab, Taureck, Patton, Connolly, Villa, van Tongeren) and young emerging scholars from various disciplines.

Describing an action or a state of affairs as a form of violence is usually shorthand for condemning whatever falls under that description. However, precisely because the concept of violence is taken to have a special kind of moral force, it is prone to conceptual inflation. In this chapter, I argue that we should resist such inflation for epistemic and moral reasons. Specifically, the indiscriminate application of the concept deprives us of the means for saying what violence is not, which leaves us unable to specify the moral end for the sake of which violence is to be condemned. Having made the case for delimiting the concept of violence, I go on to show that violence is not a normative concept, and that expanded notions of “systemic” or “structural” violence add nothing to our understanding of the specific wrong at stake. I conclude that decoupling violence from normative assumptions enables us to distinguish between violence as a feature of specific human actions and injustice as a feature of policies and institutions that cannot be reduced to individual agency. My aim, ultimately, is not to reject violence as framework for explanation and evaluation, but to show that it is self-defeating to expand this framework beyond reasonable limits.

In this chapter, I argue that Nietzsche is not a political thinker in a specific, normative sense of the term: the kind of thinking that starts from the point of view of human beings who must share a common world, rather than from the point of view of the human being in the singular or the human type in general. Consequently, Nietzsche is not the philosopher to turn to for new forms of human solidarity, new political norms or new kinds of polity. I argue further that the value of Nietzsche’s philosophy does not depend on what he has to say about politics. On the contrary, the value of his philosophy lies precisely in what is not political in it; in the extent to which it confronts us with the limits of political thinking.

First, a remark on the topic of my paper, which contains an 'and' where one would expect an 'or'. It might seem highly questionable to want to establish a relation between the self-proclaimed 'last anti-political German', teacher of self-overcoming and solitude, and a political thinker with an express commitment to political action and citizen equality. Would a genuine concern with both thinkers not precisely preclude any attempt to fabricate an alliance between them?One way of circumventing this difficulty might be to argue that Nietzsche is really a political thinker, and, more problematically, that he is some version of a radical democrat. Conversely, one might try to demonstrate that Arendt is really a closet Nietzschean — provided, of course, that one takes Nietzsche to be amenable to a modicum of democratic theory.However, such an attempt to force their divergent projects into the straitjacket of mutual consistency would lose more in integrity — and ultimately, in relevance — than it would gain in cohesion. It is not my intention, therefore, to try and merge their respective undertakings into either a watered-down Nietzsche or a spiced-up Arendt, or to cobble together a new political theory out of their different philosophies.Instead of aiming at an ultimate synthesis, my concern in this paper is with a particular field of inquiry where Nietzsche’s thinking finds, to some extent, its analogue in that of Arendt. The purpose of this exercise is not to simply show up a few points of similarity, but rather, to illuminate a particular problem from two perspectives that stand in an analogical, rather than dialectical, relationship to one another.This analogical relationship does not resolve itself into an ultimate synthesis, and is not predicated on a seamless fit between two different fields of reference. On the contrary, this relationship, like any analogy, has an inevitable remainder, something held in abeyance that transcends the relationship with the analogon. Moreover, as will become clear, it is the differences as much as the affinities between Nietzsche and Arendt’s thinking that serve to illuminate the question this paper aims to address.This question concerns modernity as a condition of disintegration or loss, and particularly the loss of a coherent cultural complex — that is, an inter-human domain of “structured sense”, to borrow a term from Nancy — which necessarily circumscribes the meaning of the human. The premise of the paper, then, is that what has been lost in modernity are the cultural conditions for being — or becoming — human, as opposed to enduring only as a form of animal life or, on the other side of the scale, descending into barbarism . This premise derives from the analogous critiques of modernity developed by Nietzsche and Arendt, in so far as both thinkers examine the problem of modernity through the optics of culture.My argument proceeds in three stages. The first part of the paper examines the meaning and status of 'modernity' in Nietzsche's and Arendt’s respective projects. Here I investigate the time of modernity as falling literally 'between past and future', in which the present exists as only as a gap or aporia between the 'no longer' and the 'not yet'. This focus also serves as an introduction to the problem of the meaning of the human in the absence of any conception of a durable world. Part two examines Nietzsche's and Arendt’s analogical understanding of the human in relation to limitation and transcendence, which allows for a consideration, in part three of the paper, of the extent to which modernity entails a negation of both limitation and transcendence, and a concomitant loss of the human.By way of conclusion, I offer a brief consideration of the future of the human, at which point it also becomes clear in which respects the Nietzschean and Arendtian projects ultimately diverge