Venanzio Raspa

This book tells several stories: from Alexius Meinong’s life up to his university years, stories about the social, political and cultural environment where he grew up, stories that he tells in his oeuvre—the story of Arnold of Brescia, of the Jesuit order, of education in Austria and moments of Austrian history in the 19th century. This book is about history, politics, religion and education, and it is about ‘that arch-plague nationalism which has poisoned the flower of our European culture’ (Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday).

The writings contained in this critical edition introduce us to a Meinong who has hitherto remained hidden, thereby offering us a fuller picture of his character and thought. The editor's introduction gives an account of Meinong's university years in Vienna between 1870 and 1875, when he attended Brentano's lectures and seminars. Meinong's newspaper articles from that time, the manuscripts contained in his estate and the dissertation on Arnold of Brescia reveal the educational as well as historical interests of young Meinong, alongside his political and religious views, which are not presented in his later works. The book also explains Meinong’s transition from history to philosophy, a topic so far neglected by scholars. Die in diesem Band enthaltenen Schriften machen uns mit einem Meinong bekannt, der bisher verborgen geblieben ist, was ein vollständigeres Bild seiner Figur und seines Denkens ermöglicht. In seiner Einführung erzählt der Herausgeber von Meinongs Universitätsjahren in Wien zwischen 1870 und 1875, als er Brentanos Vorlesungen und Seminare besuchte. Seine Zeitungsartikel aus der damaligen Zeit, die im Nachlass enthaltenen Manuskripte und die Dissertation über Arnold von Brescia offenbaren uns, neben den pädagogischen, die historischen Interessen des jungen Meinong, sowie seine politischen und religiösen Ansichten, die in seinen späteren Werken nicht mehr zum Ausdruck kommen. Außerdem wird sein Übergang von der Geschichte zur Philosophie erklärt, der bisher von der Meinong-Forschung vernachlässigt worden ist.

The debate about Aristotle’s categories in the 19th century is largely a reaction to Kant’s criticisms of the Aristotelian theory of categories. Scholars tried both to interpret Aristotle’s texts and to defend the Stagirite from the accusation of collecting the categories in a rhapsodic way. Starting from this well-known historiographical assumption, I aim to show that Kant not only criticized but also provided an interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of categories and that the interpretations of nineteenth-century scholars (Trendelenburg, Bonitz, Brentano, Apelt, and others), while intending to respond to Kant, move largely within the conceptual framework outlined by Kant, contain Kantian elements or develop hints provided by Kant.

This essay explores how literary fiction, as a form of pseudos, can nonetheless convey truths about the human world. Drawing on Aristotle and Meinong, it argues that literature operates through incomplete, non-existent objects and “assumptive” propositions that approximate truth without asserting it. Fiction constructs possible states of affairs that illuminate aspects of reality, offering critical hypotheses about how things are or could be. Through narrative synthesis, literature reveals patterns, motives, and meanings often obscured in factual discourse, thereby contributing to human self-understanding. Examples from Williams’s Stoner and Seneca’s Medea illustrate how particular stories attain universal significance. Ultimately, the essay defends literary fiction as a reflective and cognitively valuable mode of interpreting the world.

This is the first volume devoted to the aesthetics of the Graz school. V. Raspa’s introduction gives an outline of the aesthetic themes and exponents of the school. D. Jacquette argues for a Meinongian subjectivistic aesthetic value theory. B. Langlet deals with aesthetic properties and emotions. Ch.G. Allesch presents Witasek's aesthetics in its historical context. Í. Vendrell Ferran investigates the aesthetic experience and quasi-feelings in Meinong, Witasek, Saxinger and Schwarz. R. Martinelli illustrates the musical aesthetics of Ehrenfels, Höfler and Witasek. P. Mahr asks if object-theoretical aesthetics is possible at all. M. Potrc and V. Strahovnik concentrate on Veber's aesthetic judgment. N. Dolcini deals with the migration of ficta, and F. Orilia with words and pictures in fictional stories.

The search for a language pervades Hegel’s early writings and characterizes his self-understanding as an intellectual. At first, in Tübingen and Berne, the language that Hegel is in search of must be such as to bring intellectuals and the people closer together and, at the same time, it must act as a glue for the people, that is, it must encourage individuals to identify with the community they belong to. Later, in Frankfurt, Hegel will turn to the search for a language appropriate to science and, at the same time, will criticize forms of language regarded as inadequate; this will lead to his first attempts to develop a system.

Brentano’s dissertation "Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles" (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle) (1862) is examined in the light of the nineteenth-century debate on the Aristotelian categories. After providing an exposition of the conceptions of the main representatives of this debate, Adolf Trendelenburg and Hermann Bonitz, this paper assesses Brentano’s point of view on the meaning and origin of the Aristotelian categories. It shows (i) that Brentano assumes non-Aristotelian elements in his reading of the Aristotelian categories, (ii) that this depends on the fact that he shares Bonitz’s thesis, and (iii) that his reading is incomplete in the light of certain Aristotelian statements about non-being.

Aristotle's Organon in Old and New Logic 1800–1950 explores the reception and interpretation of Aristotle's logic over the last two centuries. The volume covers seminal works during this period by logicians, historians of logic, and historians of philosophy, including John Lloyd Akrill, Francesco Barone, Günther Patzig, Enrico Berti, and Mario Mignucci. Contributors consider the reception of the Organon in old logic and chart the appearance of formal approaches to logic beginning with Boole. This in-depth study of Aristotelianism also covers logic in Kant and Hegel, alongside the problems and projects of interpreting Aristotle in the new logic after Boole and Frege. The background of modern debates concerning induction and abduction provides further insight into Aristotelian logic during the period. By filling gaps in our understanding of Aristotelian logic, this book provides a fundamental missing link in 21st century studies of the history of Aristotelianism. It brings together scholars of both ancient and modern logic to understand the interpretation of ancient logic before and after the development of the modern, algebraic approach to logic.

The essay gives a brief account of the aesthetics of the Graz school, focusing on the standpoint of the object as well as on that of emotions. Meinong's reflection on aesthetics stems from a psychological background and subsequently receives an ontological grounding. After examining the notions of imagination, fantasy representation, relation and complexion, I show how both the theory of production of representations and that of higher-order objects develop under the impulse of Ehrenfels's concept of Gestalt quality; both these theories may be applied to aesthetics in the explanation of artistic creation and of aesthetic objects. Meinong identifies the specific object of aesthetics with the objective and distinguishes aesthetic feelings, which are true feelings, from imaginary ones. Witasek develops a psychological aesthetics built on the conceptual framework of Meinongian philosophy: aesthetic properties are ideal and extraobjective, they connect the aesthetic object to the subject's mental attitude; an aesthetic object is an object endowed with aesthetic properties, such as beauty, which depends on the degree of pleasure or displeasure the object may induce in the subject. Witasek, though, parts from Meinong as regards both the role of objectives, which he views as mere intermediaries of beauty, and the conception of imaginary and aesthetic feelings. In the last part, I present the reactions to Witasek's aesthetics, both positive and negative, within the Graz school itself, and I sketch Ehrenfels's and Veber's aesthetic views.

This paper discusses the intellectual relationship between Meinong and Twardowski, focusing on their ideas about representations and judgements, which are in part extraneous to Franz Brentano’s philosophy. The two philosophers addressed similar topics and their respective positions can be seen to overlap in some regards. This is shown by looking at their views on judgements about relations, intuitive and non‑intuitive representations, and Twardowski’s represented judgements, which display some strong analogies with Meinong’s assumptions.

This chapter contextualizes Vasil’ev’s work considering the state of logic in both Russia and Western Europe between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, and, above all, the ways in which Vasil’ev absorbed and re-worked input and suggestions flowing from external sources. This survey starts with the individual, Vasil’ev himself, and then moves outwards to isolate and identify the broader contexts within which his ideas developed. Among the main Russian logicians who were important for Vasil’ev there are Matvei Mikhailovich Troitsky, Mikhail I. Vladislavlev, Mikhail Ivanovich Karinsky, as well as the neo-Kantians Aleksandr Ivanovich Vvedensky and Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin. As to the Western scholars, even though Vasil’ev wrote during the years of the foundational crisis of mathematics, he placed great importance on Aristotelian logic and hence on traditional logicians like William Hamilton, John S. Mill, Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Christoph Sigwart, Benno Erdmann, and Wilhelm Wundt. At the same time, attention is focused on the work of some contemporaries like Isaac Husik, Jan Łukasiewicz, Alexius Meinong and Charles S. Peirce, whose work was relevant for the elaboration of non-classical logical ideas around the turn of the century. In particular, the reading of Peirce played an important role in Vasil’ev’s elaboration of the idea of a non-Aristotelian logic. Just as important was his acquaintance with Darwin’s evolutionary theories through the mediation of Sigwart.

Truth is not only a semantic notion, because it can involve our whole being, both intellectual and emotional. The emotional character of the truth determines its relevance for us. In this paper I will first discuss Ronald de Sousa’s theory of emotional truth and the idea of the appropriateness of emotions in relation to judgment. Secondly, I will deal with Meinong’s conception that emotions have both an evaluative and a cognitive character, allow us to know what the world is like, and consequently are related to truth. Truth then turns out to be a value. If something is valuable to me, it stirs an emotion. That is why truth is capable of attracting feelings. Emotional truth is that truth which attracts a justified knowledge-feeling. This is the basis on which we might develop an aesthetics of concepts whereby theories, in order to be established, need not only to be regarded as true but to produce an emotional involvement of the subjects.

Nell’ambito della rinascita della filosofia di Aristotele nell’Ottocento, una collocazione particolare spetta all’ampio dibattito sulla dottrina delle categorie che ha coinvolto filosofi, filologi e storici della filosofia antica come Trendelenburg, Zeller, Brandis, Bonitz, Prantl, Brentano, Steinthal e Apelt. All’origine del dibattito vi sono le critiche mosse da Kant, e riprese da Hegel, alla dottrina delle categorie di Aristotele. Nel replicare a Kant – ma nel tempo il dibattito si rende indipendente dalle critiche kantiane – i vari autori offrono una disamina della dottrina categoriale aristotelica da più punti di vista e, allo stesso tempo, una ricostruzione e un commento di una teoria sparsa in tanti testi dello Stagirita. Alle interpretazioni linguistica, ontologica e semantica della dottrina delle categorie si affiancano quelle che ne danno una lettura in chiave evolutiva, oppure la riconducono a un’origine platonico-accademica, o ancora la intendono come una struttura concettuale in cui trovano ordine le nostre rappresentazioni. Nell’indagare l’origine e definire il significato delle categorie non ci si può esimere dal rispondere alla classica domanda: che cos’è l’essere?

The contributions gathered in this volume address various facets of the philosophical psychology elaborated on by Alexius Meinong and some of his students. They cover a wide range of topics, from the place of psychological investigations in Meinong’s philosophical programme to his thought-provoking views on perception, colours, Vorstellungsproduktion, assumptions, values, truth, and emotions. Although psychological themes are omnipresent in the works of Meinong and his students, it is probably not unfair to say that their theory of the mind received considerably less attention in literature than their object theory, which somehow became the hallmark of the Meinong School. Our hope is that this volume will help restore the balance and, indirectly, foster a novel understanding of Meinong’s philosophy in the context of his time.

Truth is a semantic notion. However, it can involve our whole being, including our emotional part. This article explores the somewhat puzzling notion of emotional truth from a Meinongian perspective. According to Meinong, knowledge is justified true judgment, but a kind of justification belongs to emotions, too. A value is objective when its valuation does not rest on false premises (judgments) as in the case of superstition. In a similar way, an emotion which is triggered by a judgment is justified if the related judgment is justified as well. Emotional truth is the kind of truth which gives rise to a justified knowledgefeeling, where a knowledge-feeling is that feeling by which we feel the value of a truth, that is, of a justified judgment which in turn justifies the emotion connected to it.

The theses exposed by Alexius Meinong in two newspaper articles in 1873 are taken as the paradigm of a feeling that was common to young Austrian intelligentsia. Meinong upholds a conception of life as struggle and of history as a series of struggles among nations. In his view, the defence of the interests of a people is absolute and generates conflicts among nations that will increasingly dominate future scenarios. The concept of nation has an identification function inward and one of dissociation outward. This discourse is contextualised within the framework of the various student corporations of the University of Vienna, where the new ruling class was forming which, despite different political ideas, was united by nationalism. Finally, the paper analyses the opposing views of Eric J. Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith on the idea of nation and suggests some similarities between the Habsburg Empire and the European Union.

This volume examines the entire logical and philosophical production of Nikolai A. Vasil’ev, studying his life and activities as a historian and man of letters. Readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of this influential Russian logician, philosopher, psychologist, and poet. The author frames Vasil’ev’s work within its historical and cultural context. He takes into consideration both the situation of logic in Russia and the state of logic in Western Europe, from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th. Following this, the book considers the attempts to develop non-Aristotelian logics or ideas that present affinities with imaginary logic. It then looks at the contribution of traditional logic in elaborating non-classical ideas. This logic allows the author to deal with incomplete objects just as imaginary logic does with contradictory ones. Both logics are objects of interesting analysis by modern researchers.

This chapter systematically expounds Vasil’ev’s logic of concepts, that is, a logic in which the law of excluded middle does not hold. Sigwart, especially with his concept of the forms of judgment and his critique of particular judgement, exercised a considerable influence on Vasiliev’s development of such a logic. Taking up Sigwart’s analysis, Vasil’ev gives a strong interpretation of the particular judgment as ‘Only some (not all) S are P,’ while the form ‘Some, and maybe all, S are P’ would correspond to the Aristotelian indefinite proposition. According to Vasil’ev, the strong particular affirmative judgment presupposes the particular negative judgment ‘Some (the remaining) S are not P,’ and vice versa. These constitute one sole judgment, the accidental one. By means of an analysis of the square of opposition, Vasil’ev shows that for the judgments about concepts, which he distinguishes from the judgments about facts, there are three kinds of universal judgments (affirmative, negative, and universal) among which only the relation of contrariety holds, and therefore the law of the excluded fourth holds, not that of excluded middle, as is shown in the triangle of oppositions. The chapter closes with a historical excursus on the principle of excluded middle followed by a debate on particular propositions between Louis Couturat and Salomon Ginzberg, who discuss ideas which show very strong affinities to Vasil’ev’s on strong particular judgment.

This chapter discusses in depth Vasil’ev’s imaginary logic. Vasil’ev criticizes the uniqueness of logic and the absoluteness of logical principles, taking into consideration the conceptions of Gerardus Heymans, Carl Göring, Benno Erdmann, Edmund Husserl and John S. Mill. The key point of his criticism is the assumption of another world, different from ours, and of beings with a different intellectual structure from our own. He then proposes a novel concept of negation, which is not based on the incompatibility between predicates and is not a deduction as it is in our world. In an imaginary world, in which negations are immediate and perceptible, the law of contradiction does not hold. In this imaginary world another logic is valid, imaginary logic, which accepts a third form of judgment near affirmation and negation, namely the indifferent judgment, which asserts that both P and non-P apply to the same object simultaneously. In this new logic, the law of excluded middle does not hold, but the law of excluded fourth does. After an exposition of the different kinds of judgments (individual, universal, and particular), Vasil’ev shows how it is possible to conduct inferences containing indifferent judgments. The chapter closes with three arguments: the analogy between imaginary logic and non-Euclidean geometry, some alternative interpretations of imaginary logic (e.g., a logic that, distinguishing between absolute and relative negation, accepts degrees of falsehood), and the notion of metalogic, that is, a minimal logic which is shared by both Aristotelian logic and imaginary logic.