•  47
    Zetetic Seemings and Their Role in Inquiry
    In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. forthcoming.
    The paper addresses the nature of seemings in light of their role in inquiry. Seemings are mental states or events with propositional content that have a specific phenomenology often referred to as “felt truth”. In epistemology, seemings are mainly discussed as possible (non-inferential) justifications for belief. Yet, epistemology has recently taken a zetetic turn, that is, a turn toward the study of inquiry. I will argue that the role of seemings in epistemology should be re-assessed from the …Read more
  • Libertarismus
    In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes, Metzler. forthcoming.
  •  1
    Doxastischer Voluntarismus und epistemisches Handeln
    In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, Metzler. pp. 218--224. 2019.
  •  1539
    Epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict
    In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. pp. 58-76. 2021.
    In this paper, I will examine the notion of an epistemic dilemma, its characterizations in the literature, and the different intuitions prompted by it. I will illustrate that the notion of an epistemic dilemma is expected to capture various phenomena that are not easily unified with one concept: while some aspects of these phenomena are more about the agent in a certain situation, other aspects seem to be more about the situation as such. As a consequence, incompatible intuitions emerge concerni…Read more
  •  210
    Agnosticism as settled indecision
    Philosophical Studies 179 (2): 671-697. 2022.
    In this paper, I spell out a descriptive account of agnosticism that captures the intuitive view that a subject enters the mental state of agnosticism via an act or event called suspension. I will argue that agnosticism is a complex mental state, and that the formation of an attitude is the relevant act or event by which a subject commits to indecision regarding some matter. I will suggest a ‘two-component analysis’ that addresses two aspects that jointly account for the settled state of agnosti…Read more
  •  26
    Descartes' Meditations do not end up sceptical at all. In fact, the sixth meditation displays an intriguing epistemological optimism. Descartes affirms without reservation that knowledge of the external world is possible. The antisceptical argument at the end of the Meditations is often interpreted as a refutation of dream scepticism, with the conclusion that a person in the waking state can also determine that he or she is awake. We examine the logic of the argument in detail and find that thi…Read more
  •  58
    Wider den doxastischen Kompatibilismus
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (4): 569-595. 2019.
    The aim of this paper is to show that doxastic compatibilists are making a strong case for genuine doxastic freedom when modelled on compatibilist free will. Unfortunately, their arguments from analogy can be used for the introduction of rather odd forms of freedom that concern our emotions, e.g. “freedom of fear” and “freedom of anger”. The author argues that this problem of overgeneralisation also concerns free will compatibilists who originally provided the weak conditions that are used by do…Read more
  •  213
    On the analogy of free will and free belief
    Synthese 194 (8): 2785-2810. 2017.
    Compatibilist methods borrowed from the free will debate are often used to establish doxastic freedom and epistemic responsibility. Certain analogies between the formation of intention and belief make this approach especially promising. Despite being a compatibilist myself in the practical debate, I will argue that compatibilist methods fail to establish doxastic freedom. My rejection is not based on an argument against the analogy of free will and free belief. Rather, I aim at showing that comp…Read more
  •  223
    Explaining the Knobe effect
    In Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 65-79. 2014.
    In this paper I reject the view that the famous ‘Knobe effect’ reveals an asymmetry within people’s judgments concerning actions with good or bad side effects. I agree with interpretations that see the ascriptions made by survey subjects as moral judgments rather than ascriptions of intentionality. On this basis, I aim at providing an explanation as to why people are right in blaming and ‘expraising’ agents that acted on unacceptable motives, but praise and excuse agents who meet intersubjective…Read more