Verity Harte

Chapter 15 argues that in _Philebus_ 64c–67b, at the close of the dialogue, Socrates carefully recapitulates the terms of the dialogue’s second contest, set out at 22c5–e3, and proceeds to draw together the threads of the dialogue’s answer to them. The basis for the fivefold ranking of goods he advances is causal: each higher-ranked good has causal responsibility of a different order or kind than each lower-ranked good. Of the triple characteristics—beauty, proportion, and truth—truth does not appear in the ranking because, though a requisite of every good that has come into being, it is not a causally responsible good-making feature.

This chapter examines the discussion between Plato and Socrates on desire (_epithumia_) in Plato’s _Philebus_. The chapter also focuses on Socrates’ insights on perceptual awareness (_aisthēsis_) and on memory (_mnēmē_). In the course of this dialogue’s detailed discussion of pleasure and as preparation for the controversial suggestion that pleasures can be false, Socrates is shown to provide us with skeleton accounts of perceptual awareness, memory, desire, imagination, and judgement. Of particular interest is Socrates’ Desire Argument, which Socrates first presented at _Philebus_ 35 D 5–6 and subsequently reprised at 41 B II–C 8. When properly understood, the chapter argues that the conclusion of Socrates’ Desire Argument makes a first key move in the project of the _Philebus_ as a whole — the defence of Socrates’ intellectual candidates in their contest against pleasure as having responsibility for the best human life.

The analogy of the Cave is by far the most elaborate of Socrates' three analogies, offered in lieu of an account of the form of the Good. Even so, his exposition of the analogy takes up scarcely more than three Stephanos pages (514a1-517a7). This first page (514a1-515a3) is devoted to the _mise en scène_: indicating the general features of the cave and the situation of its prisoners. This is followed by a brief exploration of the depicted prisoners' state of mind (515a5-c3), offered in explanation of Socrates' claim that even if the prisoners are strange — as Glaucon would have it (515a4) — they are nevertheless ‘like us’ (515a5). This chapter explores the prisoners' use and understanding of language; what this reveals about their state of mind; and what, in turn, this contributes to an explanation of the way in which these prisoners are ‘like us’. It focuses on the three lines in which Socrates and Glaucon consider what would be true of the prisoners if they could talk (515b4-6).

Prima facie, the sceptical procedure described in Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism I is committed to a gap between appearance and reality, that is, to the possibility that reality is other than it appears. But the Pyrrhonist is keen to avoid having commitments. In this paper, we consider whether the Pyrrhonist is indeed so committed; what, more precisely, the commitment might be; and whether it is the kind of commitment which can be dislodged in the way the Pyrrhonist advertises as the way to get rid of commitments, be they his own or others'. The Protagorean is our foil. It is the Protagorean's alternative approach to conflicting appearances which reveals, by contrast, the implications of the sceptical procedure, implications which prove difficult to dislodge by Pyrrhonist means

This article focuses on the idea of metaphysics as described by Plato. Plato's writings are not themselves shaped in reflection of modern subdivisions of philosophical areas and the form in which they are shaped—the often heavily and self-consciously crafted dialogue form—does not naturally invite separate identification and treatment of the writings' often tightly interwoven philosophical threads. It discusses a certain feature of Plato's ontology: his commitment, at least in certain works, to the existence of a special class of entities, once known in English as “ideas,” these days more commonly referred to as “forms.” The article further discusses ideas such as the Theory of Forms and it asks whether it has developed over a period of time. The language of forms, where do they occur and how are they categorized are also elaborated in the article.

In modern epistemology, one ‘value of knowledge’ problem concerns the question why knowledge should be valued more highly than mere true belief. Though this problem has a background in Plato, the present paper, focused on Philebus 55–9, is concerned with a different question: what questions might one ask about the value of knowledge, and what question(s) does Plato ask here? The paper aims to articulate the kind(s) of value Plato here attributes to ‘useless’ knowledge, knowledge pursued without practical object; and why, according to him, there is value in being a knower. Though his answer to this question requires commitments we may resist, it has a structure of general philosophical interest.

This book revisits, and sheds fresh light on, some key texts and debates in ancient philosophy. Its twin targets are 'Old Chestnuts' – well-known passages in the works of ancient philosophers about which one might have thought everything there is to say has already been said – and 'Sacred Cows' – views about what ancient philosophers thought, on issues of philosophical importance, that have attained the status of near-unquestioned orthodoxy. Thirteen leading scholars respond to these challenges by offering new perspectives on familiar material and challenging some prevailing orthodoxies. On authors ranging from the Presocratics to Plotinus, the book represents a snapshot of contemporary scholarship in ancient philosophy, and a vigorous and illuminating affirmation of its continuing interest and power. The volume is dedicated to Professor M. M. McCabe, an inspiring scholar and teacher, colleague and friend to both the editors and the contributors.

In Plato's "Philebus" Socrates and Protarchus dispute whether pleasure, like belief, can be false. Their dispute illustrates a broader pattern of disagreement between them about how to evaluate pleasure. Of two contrasting conceptions of false pleasure-derived from work by Bernard Williams and by Sabina Lovibond respectively-false pleasure of the Lovibond type best answers the challenge to which Protarchus' resistance gives rise. Socrates' own example of false pleasure may be read in this way, in contrast to its prevailing interpretation, and this alternative reading seems better suited to the argument's context, both immediate and distant.

Tradition has it that ‘deuteros plous’, an idiomatic expression used by Plato most famously at Phaedo 99c–d, refers to the use of oars to get to one’s destination in the absence of suitable wind for sailing. The nautical motif is a gesture towards the seafaring credentials of Holger Thesleff, the scholar to whom the volume pays tribute, the author, most notably for this occasion, of three books and several articles on the style, chronology and metaphysical outlook of Plato’s dialogues, now conveniently gathered together in a single volume, Platonic Patterns: A Collection of Studies by Holger Thesleff. But the expression also points towards the...

This is the first exploration of how ideas of politeia structure both political and extra-political relations throughout the entirety of Greek and Roman philosophy, ranging from Presocratic to classical, Hellenistic, and Neoplatonic thought. A highly distinguished international team of scholars investigate topics such as the Athenian, Spartan and Platonic visions of politeia, the reshaping of Greek and Latin vocabularies of politics, the practice of politics in Plato and Proclus, the politics of value in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and the extension of constitutional order to discussions of animals, gods and the cosmos. The volume is dedicated to Professor Malcolm Schofield, one of the world's leading scholars of ancient philosophy.