Veronika Weidner

The introduction offers a brief presentation of John L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument which is the central focus of the book. Weidner notes how the hiddenness argument resembles the argument from evil, both of which conclude that there is no God. The book’s research question states: Why, if there is a God, is God’s existence not evident to everyone? Weidner approaches the book from a theistic viewpoint using an analytic style of philosophy. The book includes an account of the notion of God’s hiddenness, an exposition of the hiddenness argument, and a reply to the argument which rejects one of the argument’s premises arguing that beliefless faith in the form of the assumption that God exists allows for personal relationship with God.

In this chapter, three general characteristics of Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument arediscussed, namely that it is anti-theistic, deductive, and evidentialistic. Moreover, Weidner introduces and discusses the relevance of the terms propositional hiddenness, experiential hiddenness, experiential evidence, and propositional evidence. The bulk of the chapter consists of a much-needed exposition of the details of the hiddenness argument and its premises. That is, Weidner explicates Schellenberg’s concepts of divine relational-personal love and God’s openness for relationship (premises 1 and 2), belief and non-belief that God exists as well as the role of experiential evidence, i.e., religious experience (premise 4), and four different types of nonresistant nonbelievers (premise 6).

In Weidner’s view, Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument is not a proof, i.e., a sound deductive argument, for the non-existence of God. For at least one premise has plausibly been shown to be left unsupported, namely that belief that God exists is necessary for personal relationship with God. However, the book’s research question of why, if there is a God, God’s existence is not evident to everyone, does not here find an answer. The purpose of Weidner’s detailed exposition of the hiddenness argument and particular discussion of one of its premises is to invite as broad a range of scholars as possible to seriously reflect on Schellenberg’s anti-theistic hiddenness reasoning and join the hiddenness debate.

Weidner discusses how the notion of the hiddenness of God, or alternatively of divine hiddenness, has its origins in theology rather than philosophy. In that context, the term has been taken in a literal sense, presupposing that there is a God who is in some sense hidden. Weidner elucidates two of the senses in which God has been claimed to be hidden, which include the hiddenness of his presence and essence, and two of the senses in which God has been claimed to be not that hidden, which include the evidence of his existence and energies. By contrast, Weidner clarifies how Schellenberg’s non-literal understanding of the term used in his hiddenness argument refers to the occurrence of what he calls nonresistant nonbelief, i.e., the state of affairs in which someone lacks belief that God exists, even though she is not resistant toward a personal relationship with God.

Weidner offers a short overview of the various responses to Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument proposed so far. This includes several discussions, including discussions of the following: the ways the argument and the notion of divine hiddenness have been misunderstood, the ways the hiddenness argument has been compared to the argument from evil, the ways the truth of the argument’s premises have been challenged, and the further propositions which have been introduced in service of a defense or theodicy. Moreover, further developments of anti-theistic hiddenness reasoning, beyond Schellenberg’s original argument, are presented. Weidner’s own reply objects to one specific premise of the hiddenness argument and utilises an account of beliefless theistic faith. By way of illustrating, inter alia, the historic example of Mother Teresa, Weidner makes a plausible case that beliefless assumption that God exists suffices for personal relationship with God.

Die Rede von der Verborgenheit Gottes gehört untrennbar zu der Tradition des Theismus, d. h. zu der Tradition des Judentums, Christentums und Islam. Ein kanadischer Philosoph löste jüngst jedoch eine äußerst lebhaft geführte und mittlerweile weit ausdifferenzierte Debatte mit der These aus, dass die traditionelle Redeweise von der Verborgenheit Gottes bei näherem Hinsehen nicht nur Schwierigkeiten aufwerfe, sondern vielmehr den Schluss nahelege, dass Gott gar nicht existiert. John L. Schellenbergs sog. Hiddenness-Argument, das die Nicht-Existenz Gottes zu beweisen ersucht, wird in der englischsprachigen analytischen Religionsphilosophie zuweilen sogar als ähnlich schwerwiegender Einwand gegen den Theismus beurteilt wie das sog. Argument aus dem Übel.

This book examines the so-called hiddenness argument of the Canadian philosopher John L. Schellenberg. ​The hiddenness of God is a topic evincing a rich tradition in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rather recently, an argument emerged claiming that the hiddenness of God reveals on closer inspection the non-existence of God. Some say that Schellenberg ́s hiddenness argument is likely as forceful as the argument from evil rendering theism rather implausible or even false. In this book, an account of the traditional theistic notion of divine hiddenness is presented, which contrasts sharply from Schellenberg ́s use of the term. Moreover, a well-needed detailed exposition of the premises of the hiddenness argument is offered, thereby preparing the ground for an even more in-depth future hiddenness debate. Furthermore, a reply to the argument is given which challenges the truth of one specific subpremise, according to which belief that God exists is necessary in order to personally relate to God. Even though a plausible case is made that the hiddenness argument is unsound, it is beyond dispute that the argument deserves more serious reflection by theists and atheists alike.