Viacheslav Zahorodniuk

In this article, I analyze Hume’s theory of custom to demonstrate that he provides no coherent account of how custom emerges in children’s minds. I begin with an examination of Hume’s theory of custom, which plays a central role in his epistemology by supporting thinking and providing a stable image of the world. However, Hume fails to explain when and how children begin to operate custom. Next, I examine Jean Piaget’s critique of Hume’s theory of custom and causality from the perspective of developmental psychology. Piaget argues that Hume overestimated the role of custom in forming causal connec­tions and that his idea that “custom develops gradually” cannot account for changes in children’s minds. His interpretation highlights what Hume’s theory lacks as a developmental theory: stages of development and an explanation of the transitions between them. Finally, I examine Elena Gordon’s attempt to read Hume developmentally. I demonstrate that the scattered nature of Hume’s references to childhood and the absence of an explanation of the developmental stages in his theory are serious arguments against such a reading.

Soviet philosophers, following Marx, divided philosophers of the past into two camps: materialistic and idealistic. The representatives of the first, including Locke, were treated as ideological allies; the members of the second were condemned as enemies. This vision determined the interpretations of Soviet Lockean scholars Igor Narskii and Georgii Zaichenko. I discuss their approach to three topics in Locke’s theory: his views on material substance, the distinction between sensations and reflections as the sources of ideas, and ideas of primary and secondary qualities. To bring Locke closer to dialectical materialism, Narskii and Zaichenko accentuate the passages in the Essay where Locke makes positive claims on the existence of material substance, omitting the places where he is more skeptical or agnostic. Speaking of the sources of ideas, both claim that reflection cannot be an independent source; all knowledge ultimately comes from the senses. Both view the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as problematic: Narskii claims the ideas of secondary qualities are subjective; Zaichenko offers a dispositional reading, arguing that they represent particular combinations of particles of matter. Their approach, which combines open bias and elements of forgery with some surprisingly relevant insights, is an unorthodox way to read Locke.

In this article, I discuss the ambiguous nature of the Soviet interpretations of Hume’s theory through the example of the leading Soviet researcher, Igor Narskii, and his book The Philosophy of David Hume. Generally, his approach conforms to the stereotypes about the Soviet history of philosophy. While analyzing topics of perception and reflection in the Treatise, Narskii accuses Hume of terminological ambiguity and suggests Marx’s notion of “disposition” as an optimal way to describe human perception. However, some of Narskii’s ideas are more intriguing. He claims that Hume does not distinguish between ideas and notions in his “representationalist” theory of abstraction and concludes that the role of language and social ties in forming general ideas was neglected in Hume’s theory. This resonates with contemporary trends in Hume studies. I will show how contemporary scholars answer those accusations by implementing the linguistic reading of Hume.