Victor Portugal

This paper examines the shift from (late) modern to contemporary philosophy by examining Husserl’s early account of concepts. Given Husserl’s ambiguous allegiance in this transition, his treatment of concepts provides a privileged vantage point for understanding both his philosophy and his role in the shift toward contemporary philosophy. This paper argues that Husserl’s early view of concept (1896–1903) was strongly shaped by a Bolzanian, logical-objectivist framework, which he later reassessed in light of further developments. Against Ursula Neemann’s influential claim that Husserl ultimately broke with Bolzano in favor of a Kantian position, this study contends however that he neither abandoned core Bolzanian tenets nor returned to Kant. Rather, his reassessment arose from internal phenomenological concerns. The paper outlines Husserl’s early treatment of concepts. It recognizes Husserl’s indebtedness to and partial divergence from Bolzano. I reject Neemann’s thesis, while I highlight ontological and epistemological advances that made Husserl diverge from Bolzano.

In this article I attempt to deal with Husserl’s transcendental turn in connection with the reception by the Göttingen circle through three different aspects. My contribution aims to be chiefly historical, in order to provide a general picture of one of the most important events in the history of phenomenology, but also to enact possible systematic consequences related to the interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology after this event. First, I briefly recover the background within which Husserl erected with his Logische Untersuchungen, going over his development until the publication of his Ideen I, reconstructing the main points and features expounded in the latter that characterized transcendental phenomenology. Secondly, I put forward a general characterization of some of the main critiques raised by his students at the time, namely the concept of pure consciousness and world, as well as the performance of the phenomenological method. Thirdly, I attempt to expose, by means of Husserl’s later texts, some of his main responses to misunderstandings regarding his phenomenology.