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Victor Reppert

Glendale Community College
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    10
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 More details
  • Glendale Community College
    Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies
    Other faculty (Postdoc, Visiting, etc)
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1989
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Religion
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Physical Science
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Religion
17th/18th Century Philosophy
1 more
  • All publications (10)
  • Defending the Dangerous Idea: An Update on C.S. Lewis’ Argument from Reason
    Sehnsucht: The C.S. Lewis Journal 1 (1): 43-56. 2007.
  •  19
    C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: A Philosophical Defense of Lewis’s Argument from Reason
    InterVarsity Press. 2003.
    Who ought to hold claim to the more dangerous idea—Charles Darwin or C. S. Lewis? Daniel Dennett argued for Darwin in Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Offering careful, able development of Lewis's thought, Victor Reppert now champions C. S. Lewis, demonstrating that Lewis's "argument from reason" can bear up under the weight of the most serious philosophical attacks.
  • ‘The Lewis-Anscombe Controversy’: A Discussion of the Issues
    Christian Scholar's Review 19 32-48. 1989.
    G. E. M. Anscombe
  •  88
    Reply to Parsons and Lippard on the Argument from Reason
    Philo 3 (1): 76-89. 2000.
    Philosophy of ReligionReligious Topics
  •  256
    Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question
    Metaphilosophy 23 (4): 378-92. 1992.
    Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes
  •  169
    Several Formulations of the Argument from Reason
    Philosophia Christi 5 (1): 9-33. 2003.
    Religious TopicsCosmological Arguments for Theism
  •  176
    Miracles and the case for theism
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 25 (1). 1989.
    THIS PAPER IS A DISCUSSION OF MACKIE’S HUMEAN ARGUMENT THAT MIRACLES CANNOT PLAY A ROLE IN A CASE FOR THEISM. I ARGUE THAT MACKIE IS MISTAKEN IN CONTENDING THAT MIRACLES CANNOT FORM PART OF A CASE FOR THEISM. IF THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT CERTAIN EVENTS DEVIATE FROM THE ORDINARY COURSE OF NATURE, AND IF AFFIRMING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD WOULD RENDER THAT EVIDENCE MORE COMPREHENSIBLE THAN OTHERWISE, THEN IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT EVIDENCE THAT THESE EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED IS EVIDENCE THAT GOD EXISTS
    Arguments from MiraclesHume's Argument against Miracles
  •  199
    The Argument from Reason
    Philo 2 (1): 33-45. 1999.
    In this paper I argue that the existence of human reason gives us good reason to suppose that God exists. If the world were as the materialist supposes it is, then we would not be able to reason to the conclusion that this is so. This contention is often challenged by the claim that mental and physical explanations can be given for the same event. But a close examination of the question of explanatory compatibility reveals that the sort of explanation that would have to be given for the event of…Read more
    In this paper I argue that the existence of human reason gives us good reason to suppose that God exists. If the world were as the materialist supposes it is, then we would not be able to reason to the conclusion that this is so. This contention is often challenged by the claim that mental and physical explanations can be given for the same event. But a close examination of the question of explanatory compatibility reveals that the sort of explanation that would have to be given for the event of, say, inferring that atheism is true, is incompatible with the event being explicable as a purely physical product of a purely physical universe.
    Arguments Against TheismReligious Topics
  •  172
    Ramsey on eliminativism and self‐refutation
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 499-508. 1991.
    (1991). Ramsey on eliminativism and self‐refutation. Inquiry: Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 499-508.
    Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes
  •  77
    Causal Closure, Mechanism, and Rational Inference
    Philosophia Christi 3 (2): 473-483. 2001.
    Causal Closure of the Physical
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