Victoria Lavorerio

This paper analyses how deep disagreements should be conceptualised. It critically examines the most prominent definitions and theories available and assesses their capacity to capture the phenomenon. We argue that, although existing accounts provide valuable insights that further our understanding of deep disagreements, they are imprecise for various reasons. Subsequently, we argue that these imprecisions motivate a more exhaustive meta-epistemological reflection regarding how we should go about defining and theorizing about deep disagreements. Finally, we provide said reflection by developing a family-resemblance conception of deep disagreements and arguing for methodological pluralism when theorizing about this phenomenon. Such proposal is defended on the basis that ignoring the heterodoxy of deep disagreements comes at the expense of philosophical unclarity or imprecision.

With the phrase “disagreement challenge”, we refer to the thesis that philosophers’ persistent disagreements regarding substantial theses offer fodder for scepticism over the possibility of philosophical knowledge. In this chapter, I aim to reconsider the disagreement challenge, particularly, the way that philosophical disagreements are construed as peer disagreements. I argue that peer disagreement may not be the most adequate lens through which to view the kind of disagreements that motivates philosophical scepticism. This is because the notion of peerhood presupposes that the parties think of the issue from a similar enough perspective. Instead, I think we should think of pervasive philosophical disagreements as deep disagreements. Using the framework of deep disagreement to analyse clashes between philosophical views, it becomes apparent that there’s more in play in our differing positions than evidence and capabilities. Through the examination of two prominent views of deep disagreements - the hinge view and the fundamental epistemic principles view - we come to see how numerous interrelated epistemic factors shape our philosophical positions. On this basis, a new disagreement challenge is proposed, and its connections with conciliationism, scepticism, and equilibrism are explored.

This paper critically examines how deep disagreements should be conceptualised. Initially, it analyses the most prominent definitions and theories of deep disagreements and assesses their capacity to capture the phenomenon. It argues that although existing accounts provide valuable insights that further our understanding of deep disagreements, they are imprecise for various reasons. Subsequently, the paper contends that these imprecisions motivate the need for a more exhaustive meta‐epistemological reflection regarding how epistemologists should go about defining and/or theorising about deep disagreements. It ends by briefly outlining the options available. We can either continue to defend a given account of deep disagreement and adapt it to address the criticism or argue that “deep disagreement” does not represent an epistemologically interesting class. A third option, the one favoured in the paper, is to defend a pluralistic conception of deep disagreements. A thorough development of pluralism, however, is left to future research.

Este capítulo constituye una revisión crítica de “La lógica de los desacuerdos profundos” de Robert Fogelin, artículo fundante en la discusión contemporánea sobre desacuerdos profundos. Se discutirán las tesis de este artículo que han generado mayor discusión, controversia y, a mi entender, también mayor confusión en los casi cuarenta años desde su publicación. Me refiero a la concepción de Fogelin acerca de la argumentación, la naturaleza de los desacuerdos profundos y la posibilidad de su resolución racional.

En este capítulo, analizo a qué se refiere Kuhn cuando habla de metáfora en las Conferencias Notre Dame, pero sobre todo a explorar a qué no se refiere. En la primera sección, analizo por qué Kuhn usa el término “metáfora” para referirse al proceso de aprendizaje de lenguaje científico, en particular, los paralelismos que encuentra entre ambos fenómenos. En la segunda sección, se presentan algunos aspectos centrales de dos teorías influyentes sobre la metáfora: la teoría del mapeo estructural y la teoría de las metáforas conceptuales. Luego, en la sección III, vuelvo a Kuhn para ver las diferencias cruciales que encontramos entre los procesos metafóricos y el proceso de ostensión del que habla el autor. Finalmente, presento una noción del segundo Wittgenstein, la idea de figura, para ofrecer una nueva forma de interpretar la idea de que el cambio revolucionario involucra un cambio en la metáfora central.

Is it possible to disagree with someone without considering them cognitively flawed? The answer seems to be a resounding yes: disagreeing with someone doesn't entail thinking less of them. You can disagree with someone and not think that they are unreasonable. Deep disagreements, however, may challenge this assumption. A disagreement is deep when it involves many interrelated issues, including the proper way to resolve the disagreement, resulting in its persistence. The parties to a deep disagreement can hold neutral or even positive judgements of each other's epistemic character, as parties’ judging each other's epistemic character negatively (i.e., epistemic disdain) is not a defining feature of deep disagreements. When analysing real-life cases, however, we find that epistemic disdain is typical of deep disagreements. In this article, I analyse why this is the case. Given that epistemic disdain undermines cognitive peerhood, the prospects of deep disagreements between epistemic peers seem bleak. Finally, it is discussed how the phenomenon of epistemic disdain, as it relates to deep disagreements, may increase affective polarisation.

We call systematic disputes that are particularly hard to resolve deep disagreements. We can divide most theories of deep disagreements in analytic epistemology into two camps: the Wittgensteinian view and the fundamental epistemic principles view. This essay analyzes how both views deal with two of the most pressing issues a theory of deep disagreement must address: their source and their resolution. After concluding that the paradigmatic theory of each camp struggles on both fronts, the essay proceeds to show that, despite their differences, these theories share some core assumptions and think of deep disagreements similarly: as grounded in fundamental epistemic differences between the parties. This underlying conception of deep disagreements the author calls “the fundamental model.” The essay provides reasons to be wary of this conception, and hence, mainstream epistemologists’ treatment of the issue.

The influence of Wittgenstein’s work in the study of deep disagreements has been dominated by On Certainty. Since the metaphor of ‘hinges’ plays a central role in the scholarship of On Certainty, a Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreements is assumed to be based on hinge epistemology. This means that a disagreement would be deep because it concerns parties with conflicting hinges. When we shift our attention to a different part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, however, another picture of deep disagreements emerges. This article proposes a new Wittgensteinian approach to disagreements through the analysis of the Lectures on Religious Belief. Some of the disagreements that Wittgenstein and his pupils discuss in these lectures are deep, but not because they are grounded in different hinges, but because they are disagreements about pictures.

In “The Logic of Deep Disagreements,” Robert Fogelin claims that parties to a deep disagreement lack the common ground needed for arguments to work, making the disagreement impervious to rational resolution. Although Fogelin’s article received numerous responses, there has been no attempt to elucidate the epistemological theory behind Fogelin’s theses. In this article, I examine Fogelin’s theory of deep disagreements in light of his broader philosophy. The picture that emerges is that of relativism of distance, à la Bernard Williams. By interpreting Fogelin’s theory as relativism of distance, it avoids some of the critiques that have been raised against it.

In his 2014 article “Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements”, Steven Hales argues that relativism is a plausible disagreement resolution strategy for epistemically irresolvable disagreements. I argue that his relativistic strategy is not adequate for disagreements of this kind, because it demands an impossible doxastic state for disputants to resolve the disagreement. Contrarily, Fogelin’s :1–8, 1985) theory of deep disagreement does not run into the same problems. Deep disagreements, according to Fogelin, cannot be resolved through argumentation because the conditions for argumentation are lacking in such contexts. I advance the view that deep disagreements arise due to differences in disputants’ mutually supporting interrelated beliefs. This view avoids the hurdles caused by the tiered structure of support found at the heart of Hales’s view on disagreement: the assumption that belief and perspective can be separated, and that disagreement is located.