Viktor Ilievski

This paper argues that reflections on evil and its origin formed part of philosophical inquiry already in the times of the Presocratics. It considers only those thinkers whose contribution to the issue may be characterised as noteworthy: Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and the Atomists. It is undeniable that none of the Presocratics presented an articulate theory of evil or a theodicy; therefore, the suggestions presented here are bound to remain conjectural. Still, it is my conviction that their fragments contain significant ideas related to evil’s origins. Insofar as they turned their attention to the problem of evil, the Presocratics displayed the following tendencies: (a) they declined to ascribe the existence of evil to the will of the gods. Instead, (b) the emergence of badness was seen as instigated by the disruption of the primeval harmony (Anaximander), or (c) coeval opposed principles in constant struggle for dominance were posited, one of which was the cause of good, the other of evil (Pythagoreans and Empedocles). (d) Attempts were made to make good’s existence dependent on the existence of evil or to declare the latter illusory (Heraclitus and Parmenides). (e) Emphasis was placed on the moral agents’ personal responsibility for badness (Democritus).

The aim of this paper is twofold: a) to identify the Stoic-attempted solutions to the problem of evil, allegedly appropriated by Plotinus and made use of in his main work on theodicy, which was divided by Porphyry into two treatises and published under the titles On Providence I. and II. (Ennead III. 2 and 3); and b) to demonstrate that the most significant theodicean strategies applied by the Stoics and later utilized by Plotinus are either of direct Platonic origin, or else might have been inspired by certain passages from Plato’s dialogues. As a side issue, it will be shown that the Stoic answers to the problem of evil that do not concur with the Platonic approach – with a single exception – are not taken into consideration by Plotinus. This is not to say that the Stoics’ contributions to the field of theodicy exerted no influence on Plotinus, but that in the counterfactual scenario where they never wrote on providence and theodicy, Plotinus would have nevertheless been able to compose a theodicy that is very similar to the present one, relying chiefly, if not exclusively, on Platonic sources and his own ideas.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the claims that Plato’s theodicy, if existent at all, is meager and undeveloped. In it I focus on the Timaeus alone, and after briefly examining the question why would an omnibenevolent God create a sensible world at all, try to extract three theodicean strategies from the dialogue. The first one is known as the Principle of Plenitude, and it professes to explain the abundance of life forms in the universe, some of which seem superfluous or unwanted. In the course of presenting this strategy, I also try to show that it can justifiably be ascribed to Plato, against Sarah Broadie’s criticism. The second strategy is the Solution from Personal Responsibility, and it mainly aims at addressing the moral aspect of the problem of evil. The third and the last one I call the Coeval Entity Solution, and it discloses the Timaean Necessity as a cause of natural evils. I try to argue, against David Sedley, that Necessity is indeed of stubborn or recalcitrant nature.

The main objectives that this chapter aims to accomplish are to demonstrate, as clearly and conclusively as possible, that Plato in the Timaeus posited Necessity, or ἀνάγκη, as the component which contributed the physical aspect of the creation, and that the Timaean Space, or χώρα, was not conceived of as some kind of Aristotelian ὑποκείμενον, but solely as a neutral spatial recipient of the world of Becoming. The chapter aspires to provide a consistent account that will unproblematically accommodate both above cosmogonic factors. While pursuing these principal objectives, it will also be argued that Plato envisioned what we would call “matter” through the notion of corporeality—constituted of the four elements and nondifferent from Necessity; that Necessity proper, in its causally potent state, arose only after the demiurgic ordering of the primordial traces; that the Platonic Space is not sheer expanse, but a full-fledged entity in the form of a plastic medium in which the creation takes place.

This book focuses on two central topics. The first one is the Platonic concept of time. What is it, how is it defined, what is it not, and how does it help us describe the changing realities surrounding us? The second one is Plato’s understanding of the perceptible world. How is it related to Forms, and how exactly does it work? These are central, wide-ranging, and highly contested questions that have been garnering attention in recent Platonic scholarship. We have ensembled an international team that aims to offer bold, innovative, and thought-provoking answers to these questions. The contributions represent a diverse range of starting points, methodologies, and interpretative traditions whose collective aim is to challenge your assumptions about Plato’s philosophy and help you rethink and revisit the Platonic corpus with fresh eyes.

This book focuses on two central topics that could help us answer how Plato conceives of the physical world and its relationship to Forms. The first one is the Platonic concept of time. What is it, how is it defined, what is it not, and how does it help us describe the changing realities surrounding us? The second one is Plato’s understanding of the perceptible world. How is it related to Forms, and how exactly does it work? These are central, wide-ranging, and highly contested questions garnering attention in recent Platonic scholarship. We have ensembled an international team that aims to offer bold, innovative, and thought-provoking answers to these questions. The nine contributions in this book represent a diverse range of starting points, methodologies, and interpretative traditions whose collective aim is to challenge your assumptions about Plato’s philosophy and help you rethink and revisit the Platonic corpus with fresh eyes.

The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the passage on evil in the Theaetetus 176a4-8. I submit that it stands in anticipatory relation to Plato’s mature theory of evil, as it can be deduced from the Timaeus. My assumption is that in the Theaetetus passage two contrary principles are postulated, one of which is the cause of good, while the other is the cause of evil. In order to support that assumption, I shall argue that a) Plato’s doctrine of the Forms is present in the Theaetetus Digression; b) the word ‘good’ at 176a6 refers to Plato’s highest entity – αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν; c) τὰ κακά of 176a5 are not to be identified with the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν mentioned in the same line; d) the ὑπεναντίον of 176a6, the subordinated opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν, and the second ἀνάγκη in the passage could denote the same entity, i.e. the Timaean Necessity.