Vincent Blok

Because existing frameworks in the ethics of AI often miss socio-ethical aspects of AI beyond the micro-level concerns, while structural impacts at meso and macro level raise societal concerns, there is a theoretical and empirical gap in research on AI’s multi-level impacts, and even fewer approaches that can translate insights across these levels into concrete design practices and policy interventions. This chapter introduces the ELSA Lab methodology, aparticipatory, multi-level approach from the Netherlands that engages Quadruple Helix stakeholders(researchers, companies, civilsociety, and policymakers) to broaden the perspectives on responsible AI. Unlike existing frameworks, ELSA Labs address not only micro-level issues but also meso- and macro- level considerations. The chapter outlines the problem and limitations of current frameworks (Sect.2), presents a state-of-the-art overview of ELSA research (Sect.3), introduces the ELSA Lab methodology with its principles and interventions (Sect.4), and concludes with a discussion of its advantages, limitations, and directions for future work.

In the 1990s, various philosophers of technology shifted their focus from reflections on technology in general (Technology) to reflections on concrete technologies (technologies) and consequently lost sight of overarching issues such as climate change. However, proponents of the shift to concrete technologies rightly argue that concrete technologies need to be taken into account, as, for example, not all concrete technologies have the same climate impact. This argument raises the question of whether both approaches can be integrated to enable research on overarching issues without losing empirical grounding. In order to propose a framework that integrates both approaches, we will first elaborate on the proponents of both approaches. Subsequently, we will use the case of time measurement to explore how the approaches can complement each other. Based on this exploration, we will propose a framework on how to relate philosophical theories on technology in general and concrete technologies in an integrated way.

Technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the instrumentalization and datafication of human life. In order to understand the level of analysis that is required to consider these societal concerns, we first explore the role of innovations in the disruption of the World. Subsequently, we zoom in on the economic dimension of technological innovations as the explanatory factor for societal concerns. Although we acknowledge the intricate relation between technology and economics in the capitalist economic system, we reject the intrinsic relation between technology and economy that is assumed by philosophers like Marcuse and Stiegler. Our hypothesis is that the relation between economics and technology is not intrinsic and should be disconnected in order to open a new political perspective on technological innovation. We develop such a political concept of technological innovation and provide a criterion to consider and address the societal concerns these technologies raise.

Technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the instrumentalization and datafication of human life. In order to understand the level of analysis that is required to consider these societal concerns, we first explore the role of innovations in the disruption of the World. Subsequently, we zoom in on the economic dimension of technological innovations as the explanatory factor for societal concerns. Although we acknowledge the intricate relation between technology and economics in the capitalist economic system, we reject the intrinsic relation between technology and economy that is assumed by philosophers like Marcuse and Stiegler. Our hypothesis is that the relation between economics and technology is not intrinsic and should be disconnected in order to open a new political perspective on technological innovation. We develop such a political concept of technological innovation and provide a criterion to consider and address the societal concerns these technologies raise.

In this chapter, we develop a critique of human-centered artificial intelligence (HcAI). We first reflect on the self-evident conception of the human-AI relation in the digital age and how this concept of the human is, at the same time, disrupted by AI. To this end, we reflect on ‘the human’ in HcAI, on the fusion of human intelligence (HI) and artificial intelligence (AI) in the digital age, and how this leads to the emergence of the homo virtualis. Subsequently, we question the increasing congruency between HI and AI in the conceptualization of the human-AI relation. To this end, we reflect on the difference between HI and AI and introduce critical issues in the human-AI relation that can be found at the level of the input, throughput, and output of the human-AI relation. We conclude the chapter with a proposal for a concept of HcAI that takes the fundamental difference between HI and AI as a point of departure and provides a research agenda for future research on the human-AI relation in the digital age.

While current research in the ethics of AI concentrates on methods and approaches to ensure that AI serves human goals—enabling human self-realization, enhancing human agency, increasing social capabilities, and cultivating societal cohesion, the anthropological dimension of the human-AI relation remains largely neglected in the ethics of AI debate, let alone critically reflected upon. The objective of this chapter is to engage in such a critical reflection on the presupposed understanding of the ‘human’ in the human-AI relation. We first reflect on ‘the human’ as it is self-evidently understood in the HcAI literature (Section The self-evident concept of the human in human-centered AI), on the fusion of human intelligence and artificial intelligence in the digital age (Section The fusion of human intelligence (HI) and artificial intelligence (AI)), and how this leads to the emergence of the homo virtualis (Section The emergence of the homo virtualis). Subsequently, we question the increasing congruency between HI and AI in the conceptualization of the human-AI relation (Section Questioning the convergence). We first reflect on the difference between HI and AI (Section The difference between HI and AI) and introduce critical issues in the human-AI relation that can be found at the level of the input, throughput, and output of the human-AI relation (Section Critical issues in the human-AI relation). We conclude the article with a proposal for a concept of HcAI that takes the fundamental difference between HI and AI as a point of departure and provides a research agenda for future research on the human-AI relation in the digital age (Section Discussion and Conclusion).

In animal farming, there is the hope that artificial intelligence (AI) will improve efficiency and increase profits while providing solutions to reduce pollution and pesticide use and improve environmental sustainability, animal health and welfare. However, many are also concerned about AI’s ethical, legal, social, and economic impacts. These include the instrumentalisation of animals, bias caused by AI in how animals are portrayed, allowing the continuation of a harmful farming industry, and concerns around power asymmetries, data ownership, and copyright infringements. Therefore, there is a tension between the potential benefits and drawbacks of AI use in animal farming. This paper takes a forward-looking view of the benefits and challenges that AI may create in animal farming by the year 2032. Through several iterative rounds with stakeholders, this paper maps out a future scenario of AI in animal farming, identifying technological developments alongside potential drivers, barriers, and impacts. The scenario concludes with five recommendations for policymakers: 1. Initiate education programmes on AI in the sector; 2. Create ethical guidelines for AI in animal farming; 3. Science policy should be realistic and not only rely on technical solutions like AI; 4. Ensure public safety from harm caused by AI; 5. Implement better guidance on data-sharing in the sector.

In this chapter, we engage in an ecological phenomenology of the redesign of the World in the digital age in order to show why the consideration of the redesign of the World in the digital age is relevant for contemporary design philosophies and philosophies of technology (section “A New Critical Perspective for Design Philosophies”), and how design philosophers can research both the design of concrete artifacts and the World in which they are embedded in an integrated manner (section “An Ecological Phenomenology of the Redesign of the World in the Digital Age”). Based on our findings, we propose to study design at the physical level of artifacts, the processual level of invention and evolution, and the metaphysical level of the redesign of the World in an integrated manner. In order to set the stage, however, we first ask why contemporary design philosophies—and we take Value Sensitive Design as a case in point—are not able to move beyond the artifact level of design and are not able to study the World in which these designs are embedded (section “The Inability of Contemporary Design Thinking (Value Sensitive Design) to Reflect on the Redesign of the World”).

In this chapter, we explore how the ecological phenomenological methodology to research the human‑technology‑World relation (Blok, 2024) can be operationalised to enable ethicists of technology, responsible innovation, and ELSA‑researchers to broaden their perspective on the societal concerns that new emerging technologies like AI raise, and to work on responsible AI in practice. In this, we take a philosophy of innovation perspective on the nature of technological evolution to consider both technologies as outcomes of the innovation process, as well as this process itself. Building on recent research on ELSA labs, we propose that ecological phenomenology can be operationalised as a methodological approach of ELSA research and provide a multi‑layered assessment framework to assess the impact of disruptive technologies like AI and to implement responsible innovation in practice.

In recent years, ‘human-centered artificial intelligence’ (HCAI) has emerged as a prominent framing device in the societal debate on the implications of AI. By adopting this phrase, AI ethics discourses make an appeal to the notion of the ‘human,’ while failing to critically reflect on its meaning. Against this background, we pose the question as to what ‘human’ is taken to mean in the context of HCAI. We apply a critical hermeneutic approach to analyze prominent HCAI literature and identify five key characteristics that shape the meaning given to the concept of the ‘human’ in HCAI: universalism, individualism, instrumentalism, psychologism, and exceptionalism. Following this, we introduce Hannah Arendt’s philosophical anthropology to provide an understanding of human existence as essentially political life, and argue that the HCAI discourse would benefit from considering the political dimension of human existence. We conclude the paper by proposing a research program for developing a reconceptualization of HCAI informed by philosophical anthropology.

In this article, we philosophically reflect on the nature of business management. We move beyond the political paradigm of the conceptualization of management in order to lay the ground for a philosophy of business management. First, we open-up the self-evident conceptualization of business management in contemporary management practices by comparing ancient and contemporary definitions of management. Second, we develop a framework with six dimensions of the nature of business management that can guide future philosophical and empirical work on the nature of business management: management control, people management, asset management and entrepreneurial action, management as participation, management as responsive action and management as constituting meaning.

In this article, I reflect on the nature of innovation to lay the groundwork for a philosophy of innovation. First, I contrast the contemporary techno-economic paradigm of innovation with the work of Joseph Schumpeter. It becomes clear that Schumpeter’s work provides good reasons to question the techno-economic paradigm of innovation. Second, I contrast ‘innovation’ with ‘technology’ and identify five differences between the two concepts. Third, I reflect on the process-outcome dimension and the ontic-ontological dimension of innovation to develop four characteristics of the phenomenon of innovation. These four characteristics move beyond the techno-economic paradigm of innovation and highlight, first, the importance of its process dimension understood as ontogenesis, second, the outcome of innovation, and third, the importance of the ontological dimension of innovation, which is considered adjacent to its fourth characteristic, i.e., the ontic level of the outcome of innovation. After drawing conclusions, a research agenda for future research is provided.

Digital Twins are conceptualised in the academic technical discourse as real-time realistic digital representations of physical entities. Originating from product engineering, the Digital Twin quickly advanced into other fields, including the life sciences and earth sciences. Digital Twins are seen by the tech sector as the new promising tool for efficiency and optimisation, while governmental agencies see it as a fruitful means for improving decision-making to meet sustainability goals. A striking example of the latter is the European Commission who wishes to delegate a significant role to Digital Twins in addressing climate change and supporting Green Deal policy. As Digital Twins give rise to high expectations, ambitions, and are being entrusted important societal roles, it is crucial to critically reflect on the nature of Digital Twins. In this article, we therefore philosophically reflect on Digital Twins by critically analysing dominant conceptualisations, the assumptions underlying them, and their normative implications. We dissect the concept and argue that a Digital Twin does not merely fulfil the role of being a representation, but is in fact a steering technique used to direct a physical entity towards certain goals by means of multiple representations. Currently, this steering seems mainly fuelled by a reductionist approach focused on efficiency and optimisation. However, this is not the only direction from which a Digital Twin can be thought and, consequently, designed and deployed. We therefore set an agenda based on a critical understanding of Digital Twins that helps to draw out their beneficial potential, while addressing their potential issues.

One of the pressing issues in philosophy of technology is the role of human creativity in human-technology relations. We first observe that a techno-centric orientation of philosophy of technology leaves open the role and contribution of human creativity in technological evolution, while an anthropocentric orientation leaves open the role of the technical milieu in technological evolution. Subsequently, we develop a concept of creation as deviation and responsiveness in response to affordances in the environment, inspired by the affordance theory by James Gibson. With this concept of creation as deviative responsiveness, we articulate the human contribution to human-technology creation, namely, our intentional deviation of the inhibiting forces of the currently dominant niche or meaningful world of human-technology relations, in order to become responsive to new affordances in human-technology creation that constitute a new niche or world of human-technology relations.

During the second half of the twentieth century, several philosophers of technology argued that their predecessors had reflected too abstractly and pessimistically on technology. In the view of these critics, one should study technologies empirically in order to fully understand them. They developed several strategies to empirically inform the philosophy of technology and called their new approach the empirical turn. However, they provide insufficient indications of what exactly is meant by empirical study in their work. This leads to the critical question of what counts as an empirically informed philosophy of technology in the empirical turn. In order to answer this question, we first elaborate on the problems that the empirical turn philosophers tried to address; secondly, we sketch their solutions, and, thirdly, we critically discuss their conceptions of empirical study. Our critical analysis of the empirical turn contributes to new efforts to engage in an empirically informed philosophy of technology.Keywords: Empirical turn · Philosophy of technology · Postphenomenology · Critical theory of technology · Analytical philosophy of technology.

Grasping the identity of hybrids, that is beings which cross the binarism of nature and technology (e.g. genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), synbio inventions, biomimetic projects), is problematic since it is still guided by self-evident dualistic categories, either as artefacts or as natural entities. To move beyond the limitations of such a one-sided understanding of hybrids, we suggest turning towards the categories of affordances and the juxtaposition of needs and patterns of proper use, as inspired by the Heideggerian version of phenomenology. Drawing upon selected concepts by Heidegger, we argue that hybrids can be conceptualised as a regenerative design and use to serve the planet. We argue that the ideal type of non-exploitative account of hybrids consists of the adaptive approach to the environment, which does not, however, exclude the possibility of designing and constructing new beings. We also point out that hybrids undermine the divide of being destructive/regenerative which marks the boundaries of nature and technology.

While research in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) has grown recently, the relationship between AI’s ethical and economic dimensions is under-researched. This is surprising, given the considerable investments in AI by Big Tech companies (e.g., Microsoft, META and IBM) and their ambiguous role in today’s public debate on AI. After the second Trump election, this ambiguity has resulted in industry opposition to rules and regulations (e.g., disinvestments in moderation facilities at social media platforms and calls for deregulation). AI ethics must respond to the economic underpinnings of this situation. While economics in AI ethics has also been seen in recent funding schemes (e.g., investment in 30 ethical, legal, and social (ELSA) labs), there is a ambiguity in how these AI ELSA labs should respond to economic aspects. This paper examines the role of economics in responsible AI research, using the case of the ELSA lab approach. The four features of ELSA (proximity, anticipation, interdisciplinarity, and interactivity) serve as a point of departure to demonstrate how economics can be integrated within the ELSA framework of AI. This paper proposes that economics should be integrated within these four ELSA features to implement responsible AI successfully.

In this article, we reflect on the conditions under which new technologies emerge in the Anthropocene and raise the question of how to conceptualize sustainable technologies therein. To this end, we explore an eco-centric approach to technology development, called biomimicry. We discuss opposing views on biomimetic technologies, ranging from a still anthropocentric orientation focusing on human management and control of Earth’s life-support systems, to a real eco-centric concept of nature, found in the responsive conativity of nature. This concept provides the ontological and the epistemological condition for an eco-centric concept of biomimetic technologies in the Anthropocene. We distinguish five principles for this concept that can guide future technological developments.

The point of departure of this article is the trend towards hybridisation in new technology development, which makes classical dichotomies between machines, human life and the environment obsolete and leads to the post-human world we live in today. We critically reflect on the post-human concept of the hybrid world. Although we agree with post-humanists that human life can no longer be opposed to machines but appears as a decentralized human-technology relation, alliance or network that constitutes a hybrid world, we ask for a limit to hybridisation. After rejecting the concept of metabolism as such a limit, we explore the concept of the responsive conativity of material entities. The principle of conativity of material entities provides a materialist perspective on metabolism, which enables us to conceive material entities as self-assertive material entities that are differentiated from the environment. The principle of responsivity of material entities provides a materialist perspective on the post-human world in which material entities are responsive to each other and form alliances and networks. We propose to differentiate between the conativity and responsivity of material entities and propose the conativity of matter as a limit to hybridisation in the post-human world.

How to understand new encounters between the living and the technological? Exemplary of such new encounters are the biotechnological creations of synthetic biology, where life and technology are increasingly intertwined in complex and intimate ways. This developing biotechnological field frames its novel entities as ‘artificial life’, ‘living technology’, and ‘biohybrid systems’. While synthetic biology too easily uses machine metaphors and technological frames for living entities, traditional philosophical frameworks also risk ontological reductionism in their efforts to understand life and technology in relation to each other. In contrast, Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation helps to understand the similarities between life and technology without reducing life forms to machines and without conflating technological objects with living systems. The aim of this article is twofold: first, to shed light on the relationship between life and technology, and second, to examine the emergence of new borderline cases resulting from synthetic biology, all with the help of the theory of individuation. Our hypothesis is that individuation facilitates our understanding of these new encounters between living beings and technologies, and provides conceptual clarity to prevailing dualisms such as life and technology, artificial and natural. We will develop Simondon’s theory into a framework and apply it to the case of synthetic biology, thus opening up the possibility that individuation can also help us to think about future encounters between life and technology.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming our society, offering remarkable opportunities but also raising significant Ethical, Legal, and Social Aspects (ELSA) that should be addressed for responsible development. Some existing approaches to responsible AI successfully translate ELSA into concrete AI design practices but risk overlooking power dynamics and structural issues, while others excel at fostering dialogue yet struggle to turn insights into real design changes. This paper develops the ELSA Lab approach as a promising way to bridge this gap. Building on research in Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), Social Labs, and Quadruple Helix (QH) collaboration, we show how this approach combines the strengths of practical, solutionist strategies with sufficient negotiation and reflexivity. We not only outline the key features of this ELSA Lab approach theoretically but also present a hands-on work process for putting it into practice. This approach aims to drive a systemic shift toward more responsible AI.

In the 1990s, various philosophers of technology shifted their focus from reflections on technology in general (Technology) to reflections on concrete technologies (technologies) and consequently lost sight of overarching issues such as climate change. However, proponents of the shift to concrete technologies rightly argue that concrete technologies need to be taken into account, as, for example, not all concrete technologies have the same climate impact. This argument raises the question of whether both approaches can be integrated to enable research on overarching issues without losing empirical grounding. In order to propose a framework that integrates both approaches, we will first elaborate on the proponents of both approaches. Subsequently, we will use the case of time measurement to explore how the approaches can complement each other. Based on this exploration, we will propose a framework on how to relate philosophical theories on technology in general and concrete technologies in an integrated way.

Abstract: In the 1990s, various philosophers of technology shifted their focus from reflections on technology in general (Technology) to reflections on concrete technolo- gies (technologies) and consequently lost sight of overarching issues such as climate change. However, proponents of the shift to concrete technologies rightly argue that concrete technologies need to be taken into account, as, for example, not all concrete technologies have the same climate impact. This argument raises the question of whether both approaches can be integrated to enable research on overarching issues without losing empirical grounding. In order to propose a framework that integrates both approaches, we will first elaborate on the proponents of both approaches. Subse- quently, we will use the case of time measurement to explore how the approaches can complement each other. Based on this exploration, we will propose a framework on how to relate philosophical theories on technology in general and concrete technolo- gies in an integrated way.

The current societal debate surrounding AI appears committed to the idea that AI should be ‘human-centered.’ This commitment reflects an anthropocentric framing that overlooks the moral needs of nonhuman entities and expresses the position of moral exceptionalism. In response, we call for bio-centered AI and ask how the biosphere can be placed at the center of our thinking about AI development and implementation. We deploy the concepts of poiesis and mimesis to investigate the AI-biosphere relation. Viewing AI as poietic reveals how it both depends on the extraction of materials from the biosphere in development, and adapts the biosphere to human needs and wants in implementation. Building on this we argue that AI currently rests upon and reinforces a reductive anthropocentric and exploitative understanding of the biosphere. Viewing AI as mimesis reveals how AI technologies are bio-mimetic in taking inspiration from natural forms, and offers a progressive understanding of the AI-biosphere relation by providing impetus for articulating an explorative bio-mimetic concept of AI that can ground the articulation of bio-centered AI.

Digitalisation in agri-food systems will have major concrete consequences for environmental, ethical, legal and social developments in decades to come. Because of the far reaching consequences of the event of digitalisation, recent developments in the data economy have been described as involving a paradigm shift. This paper offers a conceptual framework that aims to contribute to existing transition theory by enhancing the philosophical perspective on the multidimensional transformation of digitalisation in agri-food. The research works from a broad understanding of paradigm shifts, extrapolating it onto empirical instances of current events in agri-food. It investigates, beyond components such as innovations, policies and institutions, the onto-epistemological basis of system configurations, exploring fundamental and ethical questions at stake in planetary crises and systemic entanglements. It ultimately answers that a complete shift has not yet occurred because the axiological dimension entailing values and ethics has not evolved along with other paradigm dimensions. It concludes in the normative claim that the concept of a paradigm shift should be used consciously, to remain critical of the suggestion that a novel ethical framework exists today and to warn of the risk of falling back into traditional, unsustainable tendencies.

Digitalisation in agri-food systems will have major concrete consequences for environmental, ethical, legal and social developments in decades to come. Because of the far reaching consequences of the event of digitalisation, recent developments in the data economy have been described as involving a paradigm shift. This paper offers a conceptual framework that aims to contribute to existing transition theory by enhancing the philosophical perspective on the multidimensional transformation of digitalisation in agri-food. The research works from a broad understanding of paradigm shifts, extrapolating it onto empirical instances of current events in agrifood. It investigates, beyond components such as innovations, policies and institutions, the onto-epistemological basis of system configurations, exploring fundamental and ethical questions at stake in planetary crises and systemic entanglements. It ultimately answers that a complete shift has not yet occurred because the axiological dimension entailing values and ethics has not evolved along with other paradigm dimensions. It concludes in the normative claim that the concept of a paradigm shift should be used consciously, to remain critical of the suggestion that a novel ethical framework exists today and to warn of the risk of falling back into traditional, unsustainable tendencies.

One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. The communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and, in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, in which Heidegger takes over a notion of the will in a non-critical manner. In this article, this interpretation is challenged and a stronger interpretation of Heidegger’s concern with the will is developed. Our hypothesis is that Heidegger’s concern with the will at the onset of the thirties is brought about by his confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with the concept of the will. Based on his lecture courses from 1930 and 1936/37 and his Rectoral Address from 1933, enables us to discern three main characteristics of Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will in the early thirties.

Technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the instrumentalization and datafication of human life. In order to understand the level of analysis that is required to consider these societal concerns, we first explore the role of innovations in the disruption of the World. Subsequently, we zoom in on the economic dimension of technological innovations as the explanatory factor for societal concerns. Although we acknowledge the intricate relation between technology and economics in the capitalist economic system, we reject the intrinsic relation between technology and economy that is assumed by philosophers like Marcuse and Stiegler. Our hypothesis is that the relation between economics and technology is not intrinsic and should be disconnected in order to open a new political perspective on technological innovation. We develop such a political concept of technological innovation and provide a criterion to consider and address the societal concerns these technologies raise.

Synthetic biology is a highly disruptive technology that particularly affects the agriculture and food production domains. Rather than using farmed animals or crops, synthetic biology allows for ‘cellular agriculture’—the production of agricultural commodities using cell cultures and host micro-organisms. In light of the possibility that cellular agriculture can enable sustainable food production, and considering that most people strongly prefer food that they perceive as natural, this paper is guided by the following research question: how are the values of sustainability and naturalness affected by the disruption of cellular agriculture? We analyze how different stakeholders discuss these values. After demonstrating that the intra-value conflicts evident in sustainability and naturalness are based on different interpretations of these values, we create conceptual clarity in these different interpretations and show how these intra-value conflicts relate to the ongoing divide between ecomodernism and ecology with respect to the future of agriculture and food.