Vincent Cuypers

This paper shows how cases drawn from the marine sciences can be particularly fruitful for philosophical reflection about the nature of science. We offer a meta-philosophical adaptation of a heuristic (the Krogh Principle) taken from comparative biology, drawing connections between a problem common to both biology and philosophy of science: how to apportion scarce attention between the bewildering array of potential study systems? And how to do so in a way which recognises the diversity of those study systems, but preserves the possibility of generalisation? The Krogh Principle offers a heuristic: choose cases where the phenomenon of interest is demonstrated in an extreme or unusual way, so as to make the phenomenon particularly accessible. We follow one particular sub-strategy, namely, the exploration of cases which are subject to strong environmental constraints, which we expect to be as fruitful in the choice of organisms as it is for scientific case studies. Marine sciences offer examples of substantial environmental constraints on scientific practice, and so present extreme and unusual examples from which philosophers can improve existing conceptual machinery to the benefit of both philosophers and scientists. In particular, we use examples from coral reef and deep-sea science to show how marine sciences can both reinforce and refine philosophical understanding of the role played by values in science. We conclude by suggesting that many other topics – in both philosophy and science - may also stand to benefit from philosophical engagement with environmentally-constrained or otherwise unusual case studies, in particular cases taken from the marine sciences.

Species lists play an important role in biology and practical domains like conservation, legislation, biosecurity and trade regulation. However, their effective use by non-specialist scientific and societal users is sometimes hindered by disagreements between competing lists. While it is well-known that such disagreements exist, it remains unclear how prevalent they are, what their nature is, and what causes them. In this study, we argue that these questions should be investigated using methods based on taxon concept rather than methods based on Linnaean names, and use such a concept-based method to quantify disagreement about bird classification and investigate its relation to research effort. We found that there was disagreement about 38% of all groups of birds recognized as a species, more than three times as much as indicated by previous measures. Disagreement about the delimitation of bird groups was the most common kind of conflict, outnumbering disagreement about nomenclature and disagreement about rank. While high levels of conflict about rank were associated with lower levels of research effort, this was not the case for conflict about the delimitation of bird groups. This suggests that taxonomic disagreement cannot be resolved simply by increasing research effort.

Human interaction with the living world, in science and beyond, always involves classification. While it has been a long-standing scientific goal to produce a single all-purpose taxonomy of life to cater for this need, classificatory practice is often subject to confusion and disagreement, and many philosophers have advocated forms of classificatory pluralism. This entails that multiple classifications should be allowed to coexist, and that whichever classification is best, is context-dependent. In this paper, we discuss some practical consequences of classificatory pluralism, in particular with regard to how one is supposed to find the best classification for a given context. We do so by means of a case study concerning oaks, in particular the pedunculate oak (_Quercus robur_ L.) and the sessile oak (_Quercus petraea_ (Matt.) Liebl.), two important putative species that present several classificatory challenges; and by applying one recent philosophical framework conceptualizing classification, the so-called Grounded Functionality Account (GFA) of (natural) kinds. We show how the GFA elucidates several issues related to oak classification and gives directions to optimize classificatory practices, and discuss some implications for scientific taxonomy.

Scientific activities strongly depend on concepts and classifications to represent the world in an orderly and workable manner. This creates a trade-off. On the one hand, it is important to leave space for conceptual and classificatory criticism. On the other hand, agreement on which concepts and classifications to use, is often crucial for communication and the integration of research and ideas. In this paper, we show that this trade-off can sometimes best be resolved through conceptual governance, in which scientific institutions set a collective conceptual standard, and that voting can be a reasonable way to implement that governance. Voting is a means to aggregate among conflicting values, preferences and priorities that often underpin conceptual or classificatory debates, all while signaling ongoing disagreement. We also discuss how the legitimacy of the voting process and its outcome can be ensured.