Vincent Samar

The Supreme Court’s antiabortion opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., which overruled Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, on the one-hand suggests that the Court may be moving toward eliminating all non-enumerated fundamental rights not deeply rooted in the Nation’s longstanding history and tradition. On the other hand, it may suggest only that the Court might be just opening the door to overruling specific non-enumerated rights with which it no longer agrees. Either way, many long-recognized, non-enumerated, human rights, beyond abortion that are essential to individual autonomy and human dignity are now up for grabs. Such rights in the area of privacy law will most likely include not just abortion, but also contraception, interracial marriage, and the Court’s more recent recognition of same-sex marriage, and possibly still other precedents, including whether states can criminalize adult consensual same-sex behavior in private. More importantly, the proposed foundation for this Court’s potential departure from its past case precedents cannot be justified even by claiming such rights are not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. As I hope to show in this article, neither from the point of view of looking to this Nation’s longstanding history and traditions, if properly understood, nor from the point of view of allowing Equal Protection to aide in identifying forms of discrimination not previously recognized or afforded much attention, can departures from past human rights precedents based in autonomy be justified.

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses were meant to guarantee freedom of religion for all persons living in the United States. This was to be done by ensuring that government could not establish a state religion nor interfere with individual practices and beliefs so long as they did not violate public morals. The idea was to have the two clauses operate together to ensure state separation in matters of religion. However, recent caselaw involving government accommodations to religious organizations has emphasized the Free Exercise Clause with little or no attention afforded the Establishment Clause. As a result, intermediate factors like entanglement, endorsement, general applicability, and neutrality, that previously were used to assist the separation of church and state, are now called into question. This Article attempts to rekindle these factors by attaching a public/private distinction to the way the two clauses are understood, to ensure a more certain and clearer basis for the separation of church and state.

Where did the right to privacy come from and what does it mean? Grappling with the critical issues involving women and gays that relate to the current Supreme Court appointment, Vincent J. Samar develops a definition of legal privacy, discusses the reasons why and the degree to which privacy should be protected, and shows the relationship between privacy and personal autonomy. He answers former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork's questions about scope, content, and legal justification for a general right to privacy and pays particular attention to issues involving gays and lesbians.

This anthology examines Love's Labours Lost from a variety of perspectives and through a wide range of materials. Selections discuss the play in terms of historical context, dating, and sources; character analysis; comic elements and verbal conceits; evidence of authorship; performance analysis; and feminist interpretations. Alongside theater reviews, production photographs, and critical commentary, the volume also includes essays written by practicing theater artists who have worked on the play. An index by name, literary work, and concept rounds out this valuable resource.

Many people submit to the law simply because they believe that the institutions administering it are just. But what if a law itself is unjust? The duty to obey law presupposes that laws are both consistent and just; because they aren't always, appeals to a higher political morality are sometimes necessary if justice is to be served. Justifying Judgment reconsiders the relationship between legal and political philosophy to show that the former is incomplete without the latter. Taking the problem of how to solve difficult cases as his point of departure, Vincent Samar demonstrates the inherent incompleteness of conventional theories of law in order to examine the meaning of justice in a democratic society. He reviews the current state of legal and political theory and then sets forth a metatheory for law which would enable judges to decide such cases by drawing upon competing theories of jurisprudence as the case's level of a

This article reviews the field of international human rights with particular attention to the way that the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the Human Rights Committee, and local domestic courts operate to resolve human rights cases. It first notes what internationally recognized human rights there are and the sources that give rise to them. It then explains how relativism enters human rights decision-making, especially at the domestic court level, in part because a common grounding for the human rights pro-pounded was never adopted. Even at the level of the International Court of Justice, its failure to include an ethical modality in the way it interprets treaties generally, and human rights treaties in particular, can leave it floundering to present any consistent framework for its own human rights decision-making. The article then presents a philosophical theory to justify the human rights that are recognized, based on an objective criterion that can be developed to assist courts in deciding conflicts of rights cases. Especially with respect to state domes-tic courts, the International Court of Justice can serve as a model to be emulated were it to adopt this theoretical framework for future hu-man rights decision-making.

In this Article, I take up the thesis that international and comparative law sources are relevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution because the Constitution itself warrants respect only insofar as it is a means for achieving minimal protections for human dignity. I argue a narrow version of this thesis: Our domestic constitutional interpretations should be checked by looking to the minimal set of rights recognized in other systems that share certain contents. And I take up the problem that what may appear as shared values at one level may reflect different understandings at a deeper, more reflective level. For example, the framers of our Constitution clearly sought to advance liberty. But the liberty they sought to advance may not have been the same liberty that became of concern during the Fourteenth Amendment's period of ratification, and in the subsequent history of Supreme Court constitutional cases following its adoption. In this article I propose to consider the set of rationally based aspirations that our system of constitutional rights and many other related systems seem to presuppose as a ground for developing a growing conception of liberty and dignity that the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt.

In this article I want to consider whether the authority of the United States to enter into treaties in a global environment is limited by constitutional constraints. The issue arises because a reasonable interpretation of the language of Article VI would place the treaty power on the same status-footing as the Constitution of the United States. But if that is the case, then presumably a treaty might be designed that could delegate constitutional powers to bodies like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), or other international organizations. Or, a treaty might be designed to reserve particular constitutional rights – like the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases – from operating within certain contexts as might concern areas over which the United States exercises territorial jurisdiction, for example, Guam, Puerto Rico, and in other contexts where only international agreements apply.

This Article discusses what a “super-precedent” is in American Constitutional Law. Additionally, it describes the current criteria used to identify super-precedents and the limitations of these criteria. It then mentions the various precedents that have been afforded this august title and suggests the need for an additional criterion to ensure the continued protection of those precedents most closely associated with the protection of human rights. Finally, the article identifies three additional precedents, beyond those usually recognized, that ought to be ranked super-precedents and provides a basis for ranking all precedents, grounded in autonomy, when they either conflict with one another or encounter a compelling state interest.

The purpose of this essay is to suggest a new direction in our thinking about substantive due process that recognizes human rights in the lived experience of our fellow human beings. The applicability of the approach, at least for equal protection purposes, was hinted at by the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, but it has never been given full consideration.1 There, Justice Kennedy noted the very real impact of a state group of people. What he did not say is how such an amendment might also impact the self-impression gays and lesbians have of themselves, although this would certainly be part of such an amendment’s impact. Moreover, legal and philosophical research in this area suggests that there may be more here than previously thought. While I do not hope to resolve every philosophical question at the heart of my legal analysis, I do intend to bring forth enough substance to answer the indeterminacy charge levied by certain Supreme Court justices and others concerning which rights should count as “fundamental” under substantive due process in part by looking at the impact such rights have on individual self-esteem. I

In this article, I argue that public education should provide a constructive forum for discussing aspects of lesbian and gay lifestyles in both primary and secondary schools. My argument is that such action is necessary to offset the way the dominant culture limits the capacities of gays and lesbians to achieve human self-fulfillment. In making this argument, I recognize that I am going beyond merely promoting social tolerance to legitimizing an actual place for discussion of the needs and interests of gays and lesbians in the society at large. The principles I will apply to make this argument are not specifically situated in legal philosophy (concerning the nature of law and its evaluation), but rather, principles of normative political philosophy (concerning ethical justifications of governmental institutions) as we might find in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948.

Is there an obligation by nations, who do not themselves recognize same-sex marriage to recognize such marriages when they have been consummated abroad? Is the right to such recognition a human right? If so, what obligations do the domestic courts of various countries have to incorporate the right to same-sex marriage for their own people? Must international law recognize a right to same-sex marriage as a human right, especially if some nations have already begun to move on that track? These questions are moving to center stage as more and more countries in the EU and elsewhere are being forced to address various rights claims especially by lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered communities. At their core, these questions are troublesome not so much because of the communities they affect, but because they draw attention to a deeper set of problems concerning the relationship of domestic to international human rights law. What are the similarities and differences between these two areas of law, is there a hierarchy where one area dominates the other, do international human rights norms arise out of various domestic constitutional provisions, and what are the duties of courts (especially domestic courts) in declaring the law? Can local traditions, religious beliefs, or constitutional requirements justifiably stand in the way of extraterritorial recognition of international human rights law?

Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the Establishment Clause have failed to provide a clear framework for determining what government actions are prohibited. Part of the problem concerns what kinds of actions constitute an establishment of religion. What criteria should determine the boundaries of an establishment challenge? Are governmental actions that may only indirectly affect religion (either positively or negatively) prohibited? This article aims to provide a coherent and normatively justified understanding of the Establishment Clause to help answer these questions by considering not just the history of the Clause or the cases the Court has decided under it, but also considering overlaps from various philosophical justifications for the Clause—including justifications from rights theory, political liberalism, utilitarianism, and communitarianism. In the process, the article eliminates from consideration the Supreme Court’s so-called “accommodationist” approach and presents a new understanding of the neutrality test that anchors itself between strict separation and the current neutrality approaches. This it does by also taking into account what in moral theory is known as the doctrine of double effect and by showing how the doctrine further limits the various judicial views to just neutrality in the new sense I suggest, while also providing both clearer and firmer conditions.

The unexpected passing of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia left a vacancy on the Court in the midst of a presidential election year. As a result, the appointment process did not proceed in the same fashion as previous appointments. Instead, the Senate declared shortly after Justice Scalia’s death that it would not consider any candidate to fill the vacancy until the next president is elected. The Senate remained steadfast in this decision throughout the remainder of President Obama’s term. This Article analyzes the constitutional questions surrounding the Senate’s refusal to consider any nominee and argues the Senate has a duty to advise and consent in a timely manner. Additionally, it demonstrates how a politically-motivated delay threatens the integrity of the constitutional process for selecting judges, violates separation of powers concerns by politicizing the Court, and contradicts the express intent of the Framers of the Constitution.

Is there an independent legal method separate from the political process for handling a constitutional amendment that may be inconsistent with, or contrary to, the basic structure and rights the Federal Constitution currently inaugurates, or are courts stuck with having to accept the amendment on its face? This problem is not unique to the United States. Nor is it the same problem as whether a state constitutional amendment may violate the Federal Constitution. While I initially focus on the U.S. Constitution, I plan, before the end of this piece, to broaden out to other national constitutions as well, and certainly some of the arguments might also apply to state constitutional amendments, as we see with the controversy over the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8. In this vein, it will make sense to consider cases from other nations, like Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, in which the Supreme Court of India held that the judiciary could strike down amendments to the constitution passed by Parliament that conflict with the constitution’s “basic structure.” The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed what constitutes the basic structure of the U.S. Constitution. This is the question addressed in this article.

Large-scale data brokers collect massive amounts of highly personal consumer information to be sold to whoever will pay their price, even at the expense of sacrificing individual privacy and autonomy in the process. In this Article, I will show how a proper understanding and justification for a right to privacy, in context to both protecting private acts and safeguarding information and states of affairs for the performance of such acts, provides a necessary background framework for imposing legal restrictions on such collections. This problem, which has already gained some attention in literature, now becomes even more worrisome, as government itself becomes a consumer of this information to fight off a domestic instantiation of the global Covid-19 pandemic. This Article proposes some definite ways in which the courts and Congress might limit both the private sector and the government’s use of such data to ensure individual autonomy will not be sacrificed.

The article argues that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) rights are a particular instantiation of human rights. But in order to make this argument several things must be done first. Preliminarily, it should be noted that some transgendered issues fall under the rubric "gay rights," even though strictly speaking, they center most prominently on gender and not sexual orientation. Still, there gender aspects are often ignored because of concerns related to sexual orientation, such as whether a transgendered female can use a woman's washroom. Arguably, the reverse may also be true of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, as many of society's concerns regarding this group involve their following gender roles, even though the discrimination against them is not usually seen as sex discrimination. Bearing that in mind, among the various responsibilities of this article is to define--in the broad sense--what gay and lesbian rights are. This is followed by a similar set of expressions defining what human rights are and an argument for how such rights get justified. Once that is done, the connection between gay and lesbian rights and human rights is pursued within the context of a theory of political morality that establishes the centrality of human rights to all moral concerns.

Is the current state of international governance by the United Nations and related organizations a preface to what eventually might become a world government? Is it at all similar to what was the structure of government in the United States after the adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1781 and before adoption of the Constitution of 1787? Are changes in the way international institutions like the United Nations operate related to changes in our conceptions of the role of these institutions in providing international governance? When governmental institutions prove to be too weak to adequately perform the tasks expected of them is there a natural evolution toward greater centralization of power? If so, might an early sign of this evolution be decisions by public officials that afford greater deference to the decrees of international institutions that previously might have been sidestepped?