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The paper covers the discussion of three aspects of Thomas Reid’s political thought. Initially, it presents and discusses Reid’s understanding of Politics. Secondly, it is argued that, unlike the first principles of other branches of knowledge, such as Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind and Morals, the first principles of Politics are not the first principles of common sense. Politics is founded on a form of empirical knowledge that cannot be identified with common sense, with the judgments and beliefs due to the original constitution of mind that are shared by most humans. Finally, it is argued, from a parallel with the philosophy of nature, that common sense has only a methodological role in Politics

The paper advances the hypothesis that George Berkeley's philosophy does not overcome solipsism. In order to do this, it presents four difficulties on his arguments for other existences: (I) the argument about the existence of an external cause for sensitive ideas faces the difficulty of not eliminating the possibility that the mind itself is the cause of these ideas; (II) the argument present in the Dialogues to prove the existence of God is circular: it presupposes the existence of objects distinct from the mind, however, the argument for the existence of these objects presupposes the existence of God; (III) the argument in favor of the existence of those objects, besides being related to the mentioned circularity, is developed without Berkeley presenting a clear notion of what these objects are; (IV) the argument for the existence of other minds, in what appears to be their most plausible interpretation – which states that it is possible to infer the existence of other minds from the observation of irregular, inconstant, and vicious actions in subjects –, faces the difficulty that, in a scenario where such actions do not exist, Berkeley loses the evidence for the existence of other minds.

In this paper, we intend to offer an interpretation about the explanation of the (relative) idea of pure substance in general on John Locke’s philosophy, from Thomas Reid’s notion of ‘natural suggestion’. To achieve this aim, after contextualizing Locke’s notion of pure substance in general and distinguishing it from the idea of particular substance (section 1), we explicit that Locke’s words about the source of the idea of the former in the mind (either empirical or rational) are ambiguous and inconclusive (section 2). Then, we argue that the parallels between this idea and that of ‘relation’, as well as of ‘power’ do not assist in that answer, due to some problems we identify on them (section 3). Finally, we argue that the Reidian explanation for the source of the idea of ‘mind’, from the notion of ‘natural suggestion’ allows us to i) avoid those problems and ii) inasmuch as, according to this interpretation, the idea of pure substance in general would have an empirical source, Lockian empiricism would remain intact (section 4).

The paper discusses the notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘reflection’ in John Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding. It attempts to present two criteria by means of which it would be possible to distinguish between these mental activities. Firstly, consciousness is a passive, involuntary activity and does not depend on attention to be exerted, unlike reflection, which is, at least in one of its degrees – since Locke conceives the existence of two degrees of reflection –, an active, voluntary, and attentive activity of mind. Second, consciousness may be distinguished from reflection in that it is a mental activity that produces judgments / beliefs, unlike reflection, whose activities only produce ideas. While consciousness allows human beings to know – to judge about and to believe the existence of their mental phenomena –, reflection is only a mental capacity to have ideas and, as such, it is not true or false.

This thesis aims to discuss Thomas Reid’s (1710-1796) theory of the first principles of knowledge, more particularly, the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. In the first chapter, I discuss Reid’s foundationalist commitments in philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I argue that he is clearly a foundationalist about speculative and moral knowledge, but it is not clear if he keeps foundationalist commitments with regard to political knowledge – the first principles of politics are not self-evident beliefs: they are not justified from the start and, therefore, they do not have what is needed for being basic beliefs in a foundationalist view of the structure of knowledge. In the second chapter, I discuss Reid’s understanding of the sources of speculative, moral and political knowledge, namely, common sense and knowledge of mankind. I argue that while philosophy of mind and morals are based upon the first principles of common sense – immediate and irresistible beliefs due to the original constitution of mind, politics is based upon first principles of the knowledge of mankind – beliefs that are due to a mixture of the sagacity and the experience of the political scientist who lives among other human beings in a political society. In the third chapter, I try to explain Reid’s comprehension on the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I try to explain what a first principle of knowledge is, how to understand the distinction between the principles of contingent and necessary truths and what the means we have to identify the first principles of knowledge are. The fourth and last chapter is entirely dedicated to common sense. More particularly, I discuss how Reid defends the first principles of common sense from the skeptical attack.

The paper advances the hypothesis that René Descartes presents a skeptical system of philosophy in Thomas Reid’s reading. There is a sort of ‘involun-tary’ or ‘accidental’ skepticism that results from the adoption by Descartes of both a skeptical method and a skeptical principle. The first section shows to what extent the Cartesian method of doubt – which focuses on the reliability of the faculties of the mind - is a skeptical demand that cannot be satisfied. The second section shows how the principle of the Cartesian system – which establishes that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of the mind – is not only skeptic but leads exactly and naturally to the most radical form of skepticism, namely, solipsism. The third section discusses the Cartesian sources of the doubt on the existence of external world according to Reid.

The paper discusses Thomas Reid's objection to David Hume's theory of personal identity. The hypothesis states that this criticism is not effective because it is based on a misunderstanding of Hume’s theory, namely, that Hume would have admitted a negative ontological thesis - the inexistence of a mind beyond perceptions - and a positive ontological thesis - a mind reduced to a bundle of perceptions. After explaining in what measures Reid’s objection is based upon this misunderstanding, the paper shows why Hume does not accept those theses,

The paper covers the discussion of three aspects of Thomas Reid’s political thought. Initially, it presents and discusses Reid’s understanding of Politics. Secondly, it is argued that, unlike the first principles of other branches of knowledge, such as Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind and Morals, the first principles of Politics are not the first principles of common sense. Politics is founded on a form of empirical knowledge that cannot be identified with common sense, with the judgments and beliefs due to the original constitution of mind that are shared by most humans. Finally, it is argued, from a parallel with the philosophy of nature, that common sense has only a methodological role in Politics.

The paper presents and discusses how Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense replies to the skepticism about the epistemic reliability of the faculties of mind. The hypothesis presented establishes that Reid’s reply has three arguments. First, Reid shows why it is impossible to prove the reliability of the faculties of mind and why philosophers may begin their investigations by accepting the truth of the beliefs due to these faculties. Secondly, Reid shows that it is inconsistent to choose one of these faculties as the only source of true beliefs. This is arbitrary. Those authors, who choose, for example, consciousness as the only source of reliable knowledge, only reinforce the claim that all faculties of mind are equally reliable. Thirdly, if the faculties of the mind operate properly, that is, when our mind is not affected by any disorder or disease, there is no good reason to call them into question and to doubt the truth of their beliefs.

The paper states a hypothesis concerning Thomas Reid's moderation in his reply to skepticism. It is initially argued that commonsense beliefs, though due to reliable faculties, are doubtful, fallible, and correctable. They are not completely immune to skeptical attack. It is further argued that Reid intends to reply only to one form of skepticism, the partial one – the skepticism of authors who accept at least one mental faculty as a reliable source of knowledge. Reid does not intend to argue with the skeptic who equally denies his assent to the reliability of all faculties – that is, the radical skeptic. This radical form of skepticism is harmless to practical life and philosophy and, for that reason, is not a threat. Finally, the hypothesis advanced is discussed considering other interpretations of Reid’s reply to skepticism.

The paper advances the hypothesis that, in Thomas Reid's reading, David Hume's skepticism of the Treatise on Human Nature is not solely due to his acceptance of the ‘ideal hypothesis’ – the principle according to which ideas are the immediate objects of the mental operations –, but it has another source, namely, that doubt on the reliability of the faculties of the senses, memory, and reason. Moreover, the paper argues that the suggested distinction between two roots for Hume’s skepticism allows a more exact view on Reid’s reading of Hume and solve some misinterpretations.

The paper advances the hypothesis that David Hume’s philosophy explains the corporeal dimension of the self, particularly, one’s belief in a body as being ‘her own body’, as a part of one’s self, in light of three different perspectives: through the operations of the imagination, the associative principles and the perception of mental and physical parallel states; through the occurrence of certain passions in the mind, particularly, pride, humility, and self-interest which direct one’s attention to a body that is felt to be her own body; through the consciousness of the ability of the will to guide the power of moving certain parts of the body. Finally, it is argued that the mental phenomenon of belief in one's own body is a mutual construction of the human mind, that is, it is produced simultaneously by intellectual, affective, and volitional operations.

This paper aims to discuss the philosophical roles of common sense in Thomas Reid’s thought. I argue that there is not only one way of appealing to common sense in attempt of discovering truth and allowing knowledge. According to my understanding, Reid makes at least three distinct uses of common sense: (1) the foundational use, in which common sense is taken as the foundation upon which knowledge must be built; (2) the methodological use, in which common sense arises as a source of methodo-logical presuppositions of philosophical investigations; (3) the instrumental use, in which common sense, in the light of the emotion of ridicule, is used as an instrument to refute philosophical principles and conclusions.

Little attention has been paid to the fact that Thomas Reid's epistemology applies to ‘political reasoning’ as well as to various operations of the mind. Reid was interested in identifying the ‘first principles’ of political science as he did with other domains of human knowledge. This raises the question of the extent to which the study of human action falls within the competence of ‘common sense’. Our aim is to reconstruct and assess Reid's epistemology of the sciences of social action and to determine how it connects with the fundamental tenets of his general epistemology. In the first part, we portray Reid as a methodological individualist and focus on the status of the first principles of political reasoning. The second part examines Reid's views on the explanatory power of the principles of human action. Finally, we draw a parallel between Reid's epistemology and the methodology of Weberian sociology.

The paper advances two hypotheses concerning Thomas Reid’s reading of George Berkeley’s immaterialist system. First, it is argued that, on Reid’s view, Berkeley is skeptic about the existence of the objects of the material world, not in virtue of a doubt about the senses but for his adoption of the principle that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of mind. On Reid’s view, that principle is a skeptical principle by its own nature. Secondly, it is argued that Berkeley really accepts in his system the notion of ‘idea’ such as Reid understands it, namely, as an entity distinct from mind and its operations.

The paper aims to discuss the notion of ‘common sense’ in Thomas Reid’s philosophy. It presents two hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that the common sense that Reid uses in philosophical matters is nothing but the set of original principles of the mind that determine human beings in regard to their notions, beliefs and inclinations, as well as the judgments and beliefs that are due to these principles. The second hypothesis states that Reid understands a kind of ‘developed common sense’, a common sense that develops throughout human life by the proper cultivation of the powers of the mind.

The paper aims to present two distinct ways of defending John Locke’s theory of personal identity from Thomas Reid’s objection. First, it will be argued that this objection is not effective since it starts from a misunderstanding of Locke’s theory. The identity of a person is not preserved by the psychological continuity of consciousness, as Reid understood it, but by its ontological continuity: the existence of the same consciousness preserves the personal identity. Secondly, it will be argued that it is possible to reply to that objection in the light of the observation that the personal identity is preserved by the identity of the man: person and man are connected by means of the notion of body.

I intend to discuss Hume’s theory of personal identity in Books I and II of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, I intend to argue that Hume’s distinction between a ‘personal identity with regard to thought and imagination’ and a ‘personal identity with regard to passions and self-interest’ is only methodological, not radical. That is, the philosopher does not sug-gest the existence of two distinct ideas of personal identity in mind. Secondly, I try to show the contribution of the passions of pride and humility to the production of a belief in personal identity. Pride and humility contribute to the liveliness of this belief by producing the person’s interest in his sensations and actions of the past and the future. Thirdly, I want to show how passions and self-interest make it possible to explain the corporeal aspect of the belief in personal identity. I propose to discuss how the body and its qualities can be understood as constituent elements of the notion of personal identity.