Violeta Conde

La formulación precisa de problema de la infradeterminación de las teorías por la evidencia en filosofía de la ciencia es, ciertamente, novedosa. Sin embargo, podemos rastrear sus orígenes en otros grandes temas filosóficos, como el escepticismo o el problema de la inducción. Este artículo trata de explorar los factores que han influido en el surgimiento y caracterización de la noción de infradeterminación, así como algunos problemas acerca de la naturaleza y pretensiones de la ciencia vinculados a ella. Para ello, se ha estudiado el debate teórico que involucra a clásicos como Duhem y Quine, además de otras voces contemporáneas como Laudan y Stanford, entre otros.

Este artículo explora la relación entre el expresionismo y el existencialismo nórdicos a través de la figura y la obra de Edvard Munch (1863-1944), situándolo en el contexto histórico, filosófico y artístico de finales del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX. A partir de una lectura transversal que enlaza pintura, filosofía, literatura y música, se analizan las conexiones entre Munch, Søren Kierkegaard, Henrik Ibsen y Edvard Grieg, quienes, desde distintos ámbitos, expresaron la angustia (Angst) como núcleo de la experiencia moderna. El estudio aborda cómo el expresionismo surge como respuesta estética al vacío espiritual y social de la modernidad, proponiendo el “grito” como metáfora de la conciencia desgarrada del ser humano ante la incertidumbre existencial. Asimismo, se examina El grito como paradigma visual de la angustia y de la libertad humana según la concepción kierkegaardiana. Finalmente, se plantea que la obra de Munch constituye una anamnesis del siglo XX: una memoria colectiva del dolor y la alienación, cuya vigencia interroga aún hoy nuestra propia condición existencial.

In our daily lives, we often make claims about what is possible or necessary, prompting the question of how we come to acquire these modal claims. In this paper we examine what Vaidya and Wallner have called the "problem of modal epistemic friction." According to this problem, some accounts of modal knowledge presuppose essentialist theses, thereby making the epistemology of modality a special case of the epistemology of essences. Vaidya advances an essence-based account centered on the method of “variation in imagination” (VIM), wherein the essential properties of an object are those that remain constant across imaginative variations over time. However, since this method is closed under logical consequence, it identifies what—in Finean terms—constitutes consequential rather than constitutive essences. In this paper, we aim to refine Vaidya's proposal by offering a way to capture constitutive essences, starting from a consequential perspective. To do so, we will draw on the notion of web consequence (WC), as developed by Schnieder, which helps distinguish constitutive essences from those which are merely consequential.

On the one hand, according to Meinongianism, there are two types of objects: those that exist and those that do not (which subsist). Moreover, among the objects that subsist, there is a special class of entities that are ‘beyond being’ (Nichtsein), such as impossible objects and fictional objects. On the other hand, according to necessitism, there are two types of objects: those that S-exist and those that L-exist. Furthermore, there is a third category of objects that do not L-exist, as their intended terms fail to refer—such as impossible objects and fictional objects.In this discussion, I will argue that the dispute between the Meinongianist and the Necessitist regarding the significance of existence is merely verbal and that both frameworks ultimately endorse a three-category ontology.

El presente artículo tiene como finalidad explorar la posible relación entre el concepto de verdad de Alfred Tarski y el primer teorema de incompletitud de Kurt Gödel. Para ello, se analizarán los diferentes procedimientos llevados a cabo para la definición de la noción de verdad, por un lado, y la construcción de la prueba de incompletitud, por otro, de manera que puedan salir a la luz las motivaciones que las alientan y las implicaciones que se derivan de ellas. Nuestra hipótesis de partida defiende que la cuestión de la autorreferencialidad en los lenguajes -ejemplificada en la clásica paradoja del mentiroso- será el alfa y omega de ambas cuestiones, así como su punto de convergencia.

Timothy Williamson is known for defending the view that second-order S5 system axiomatized with Barcan Formulae gives us the most sensible doctrine for metaphysical modality. Barcan Formulae require a constant domain of quantification in which absolutely everything is necessary. Among the objects that constitute this ‘everything’ we find contingently non-concrete objects. These objects do not occupy spatiotemporal coordinates and exist just in the logical sense of ‘exist’ defended by Williamson. In this paper, I try to characterize these sui generis objects arguing that the only properties we can use to individuate them are non-qualitative, including some modal properties. This is so because, as I show in the paper, if we try to individuate contingently non-concrete objects using qualitative properties we incur into the predicative reading of expressions like ‘possible X’ rejected by Williamson.

En el presente artículo se tratará de reflexionar acerca del estatus ontológico del concepto de identidad personal a partir de las así denominadas propuestas «narrativistas» de los filósofos Daniel Dennett y Clément Rosset. No se pretende tanto abordar la pregunta sobre la existencia última de dicha identidad cuanto hacerse cargo de cómo se nos aparece, las similitudes que presenta el proceso de construcción identitaria con el proceso narrativo y el papel activo tanto de uno mismo como de los demás en su edificación.

In his book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson defends first-order necessitism using simplicity as a powerful argument. However, simplicity is decomposed into two different, even antagonistic, sides: elegance and parsimony. On the one hand, elegance is the property of theories possessing few and simple principles that allow them to deploy all their theoretical power; on the other hand, parsimony is the property of theories having the fair and necessary number of ontological entities that allow such theories give an account of themselves. Since necessitism endorses Barcan Formulae for the sake of elegance, it is committed to a vast number of contingently non-concrete objects, so one may think that it is not qualitatively parsimonious. I argue that necessitism could be viewed as an additive case in the sense that Alan Baker characterizes the adjective so quantitative parsimony should be considered when it comes to necessitism instead of qualitative parsimony.

As Williamson puts it, ‘necessitism’ is the metaphysical view that claims that “necessarily everything is necessarily something”. As that claim involves modal unrestricted quantification, the necessitist must accept it as a part of an intelligible discourse. Here, I present one of the main objections that have been presented against the intelligibility of unrestricted quantification: the objection based on the so-called All-in-One Principle. I then propose possible strategies that the necessitist could adopt to shield themselves from the objection.