In Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill contends that the roots of justice lie in two key elements: the belief that harm has been done to an individual and the desire to punish the wrongdoer. This second impulse arises from two emotional capacities shared with many nonhuman animals: the desire to defend oneself against aggression and sympathy, what we now commonly refer to as “empathy.” In this paper, I take up the challenge of providing a more detailed account of Mill’s remarks by appe…
Read moreIn Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill contends that the roots of justice lie in two key elements: the belief that harm has been done to an individual and the desire to punish the wrongdoer. This second impulse arises from two emotional capacities shared with many nonhuman animals: the desire to defend oneself against aggression and sympathy, what we now commonly refer to as “empathy.” In this paper, I take up the challenge of providing a more detailed account of Mill’s remarks by appealing to the philosophical literature on moral emotions and animal morality. I concentrate on two capacities possessed by several mammalian and avian species: recognition of intentional action in others and empathy. More precisely, I argue that (1) many animals can recognize when individuals intentionally cause suffering to another and that (2) their empathy could track the badness of others’ suffering. These two capacities enable them to (3) recognize the wrong-making features of intentionally causing suffering. To defend this thesis, I first summarize Mill’s views on the origins of justice (Sect. 1) I expand on these three elements (Sects. 2–4), respond to two possible objections or reservations (Sect. 5) and conclude with some remarks on how sympathy could give rise to the desire to punish wrongdoers (Sect. 6).
